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Abstract
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine the deadliest shooting that has happened
on a community college campus. The following research questions guided this dissertation study:
(1) What was the law enforcement response to the deadliest community college campus shooting
in history? (2) Did previous mass shootings inform the law enforcement response to the deadliest
community college campus shooting? (3) What implications for practice can be derived by
studying the deadliest of these shootings? This case study utilized multiple sources of
information, from official police reports, official institutional reports, archives of publications,
and participant interviews from some of the law enforcement officers directly involved in the
case.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
As long as civilization has existed, violence against humans at the hands of humans has
existed. Today, on every continent, in every country, humans clash with each other and the result
is often death. Some may say violence has become a normal part of the lives of American
citizens. Certainly American society as a whole is subject to violence on a daily basis. Violence
seems to cross racial and gender boundaries, as these horrific acts affect every racial group,
social class, ethnicity, gender, and any other category one can imagine. Yet, when news breaks
of another workplace shooting, another elementary school shooting, or another shooting on the
campus of a higher education institution, Americans seem surprised it has happened again. Yet,
according to Drysdale, Modzeleski, and Simons (2010), there have been more than 270 acts of
directed assaults on college and university campuses nationwide since the early 1900s. Inclusion
in the category of directed assaults required the attack to be specific to institutions of higher
education, must have had specific targets selected prior to the assault or during the assault, and
required the perpetrator to have the present ability to employ lethal force.
Context of the Research Problem
In the first four weeks of 2014 alone, the United States saw several acts of violence at
colleges and universities. On January 20, a student was shot while sitting in his vehicle in the
parking lot of the Schwartz Athletic Center on the campus of Widener University, a private
university near Philadelphia. On January 21, a 23-year-old teaching assistant fatally shot another
21-year-old teaching assistant in the Electrical Engineering Building on the campus of Purdue
University. On January 24, a 20-year-old engineering technology student and football player was
fatally shot outside a dormitory on the campus of South Carolina State University. On January
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30, two individuals approached a student on the East Florida State College Palm Bay campus and
began beating the student with a pool cue. The victim student pulled a handgun from his car and
shot one assailant in the chest. In all, three individuals were dead and one victim survived. Such
violent incidents continued throughout the spring semester. On March 24, a student at University
of North Carolina at Greensboro was shot during an altercation with another student. On April 2,
a 41-year-old male who had no apparent ties to the university fatally shot a 26-year-old female
program coordinator in the University of Washington’s College of Architecture. Police officials
declared the incident a murder-suicide.
I developed Table 1 to help identify the deadliest campus shootings that have occurred in
higher education in an attempt to identify which incident to study. In the table, I listed: the
number killed at each institution, excluding the shooter; the type of institution, public or private;
and the class status of the shooter, if applicable. I included those campus shootings where four or
more individuals were killed and noted three cases that stood out with respect to the number
killed in the incident. I identified the following three cases as the deadliest campus shootings in
higher education history: The University of Texas, Austin had a campus shooting with 14 killed,
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University had a campus shooting with 32 killed and
Umpqua Community College had a campus shooting with nine killed.
Table 1
Campus Shooter Characteristics
______________________________________________________________________________
Year
Location
Type of Institution
Number Killed
Class Status
______________________________________________________________________________
1961
University Of Texas
Public
13
Undergraduate
1976

California State University

Public

7

Custodian

1991

University of Iowa

Public

5

Graduate
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Table 1 (Cont.)
Campus Shooter Characteristics
______________________________________________________________________________
Year
Location
Type of Institution
Number Killed
Class Status
______________________________________________________________________________
2007
Virginia Polytechnic Institute
Public
32
Undergraduate
2008

Northern Illinois University

Public

5

Graduate

2010

Oikos University

Private

7

Undergraduate

2015

Umpqua Community College

Public

9

Undergraduate

Although each incident listed in the table is tragic in its own way, these stories pale in
comparison to one horrific day in 2007. A lone gunman descended on the seemingly unaware
campus of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) in Blacksburg,
Virginia. As students and faculty were thinking about the end of spring semester and the freedom
of summer, this violent and unstable individual had been preparing to commit what would be the
deadliest shooting rampage in the history of American higher education on their unfortunate
campus.
Virginia Tech Shooting
Seung-Hui Cho was born on January 18, 1984 near Seoul, South Korea. Early in
childhood, Cho was described by his parents as a well behaved, though very bashful and quiet.
One of Cho’s aunts remembered how he was not a child who liked to be hugged and would very
seldom respond to being spoken to (Cho & Gardner, 2007). Cho’s uncle was happy when he
found out the family was moving to America because he thought the move would help Cho gain
confidence since the United States was such an open society (Kleinfield, 2007). After eight years
of attempting to obtain visas for the family, the Cho’s made the move to the United States in

3

1992 and settled in a predominantly Korean neighborhood near Washington, DC where Cho’s
father took a job as a dry cleaner (Cho & Gardner, 2007).
Although Cho’s uncle had hoped the move to the United States would be beneficial to
Seung-Hui that was not the case. As early as the sixth grade, Cho’s teachers began to be
concerned with his behavior; he was very withdrawn and communicated very little in class,
which prompted them to recommend therapy for him. Although the family took the advice, doing
so created a significant hardship on the family in order to arrange for Cho to attend those
sessions (Neuman & Macias, 2007). Cho’s teachers were not the only ones who noticed how he
failed to respond to teachers’ questions, often just staring ahead until they called on someone
else. Classmates began to tease him, some going so far as to offer him money if he would say
something in class (Cho & Gardner, 2007). Several years later, Cho’s therapist began to become
concerned with the content of is artwork as he had taken to painting increasingly darker themes
(Virginia Tech Review Panel [VTRP], 2007). Around this time, the Columbine High School
murders took place, and officials at Cho’s school learned of a paper he had written in which he
expressed a desire to complete such a massacre (Neuman & Macias, 2007). Cho’s family took
him to a psychiatrist, who prescribed him medication for depression and anxiety. The medicine
appeared help to him, but after just over a year, the doctor discontinued the medication after Cho
told them he was fine (Neuman & Macias, 2008).
Once in high school, Cho’s teachers began to take note of his lack of communication with
the teachers and other students, though his schoolwork was fine. One teacher referred Cho to a
counselor who asked him if he had ever been treated for any mental health issues. Cho said that
he had not. Ultimately, Cho was given accommodations for class that allowed for modifications
to the oral communication requirements for his assignments (VTRP, 2007). With these
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accommodations in place, Cho was able to successfully complete high school. Although his
counselors would recommend he select a smaller college close to home, Cho enrolled in Virginia
Tech in 2003 (VTRP, 2007). For about the next three years, Cho continued to have difficulty
adapting to and communicating with others. One female student expressed concern about her
interactions with Cho, prompting her to file a complaint about his behavior. She indicated to
campus police that Cho had been making unsolicited and unwanted contact with her over the
Internet, as well as by phone and in person. This report caused the police to interview Cho and
tell him to stop contacting the student and subsequently refer the case to the University’s Judicial
Affairs department (VTRP, 2007). Another student contacted the campus police and complained
that she had received disturbing text messages from Cho. Police again interviewed him and
ordered him to have no further contact with her. Shortly after the interview, Cho sent a suicidal
text message to his roommate, which was reported to authorities as well. It was that text message
that caused Cho to be involuntarily hospitalized overnight, yet he was released the next day, the
last day of classes before winter break (VTRP, 2007).
April 16, 2007 began unremarkably for those who were around Cho, as he, unbeknownst
to them, set the events of the day in motion without any outward signs the day would be any
different. Cho awoke early and was working on the computer when his roommates got up. They
remembered seeing him get ready for the day in much the same manner as days before. As usual,
Cho left the dorm room without saying a word. Around 6:45 a.m., a student reported seeing him
near the West Ambler Johnson residence hall, about a two-minute walk from his room. Although
Cho had access to West Ambler Johnson hall by the use of an electronic pass card to check his
student mailbox, he was too early to enter the building, as his access began at 7:30 a.m. After
gaining access to the building, Cho walked up to the room of Emily Hilscher, a seemingly
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random female student on the fourth floor (VTRP, 2007). According to police, no known
connection between Hilscher and Cho existed and no one knows for sure how he was able to
gain access to the building. When Emily entered her room shortly before 7:15 a.m., Cho was
waiting for her. Resident Advisor Ryan Clark lived next door to Hilscher and that morning he
heard a commotion in Hilscher’s room. Clark responded to Hilscher’s room where Cho shot
Clark and Hilscher at point blank range. Although they both survived the initial assault, each
succumbed to their injuries a short time later. This commotion prompted another student in the
residence hall to alert the campus police. However, the student reported the disturbance as being
possibly from someone falling out of one of the loft beds in the dorm room, a common call
received by emergency personnel on campus (VTRP, 2007). Although he was covered in blood
and left bloody footprints at the scene, Cho was able to make it out of West Ambler without
anyone having remembered seeing him. The police responded to the scene of the murders. After
interviewing several students, they focused their efforts on locating Emily Hilscher’s boyfriend,
who the police had been told owned a handgun and was known to practice shooting at a target
range. Little did the police know the culprit was Cho, who by all accounts had no ties to either
victim (VTRP, 2007).
Shortly after killing Emily Hilscher and Ryan Clark, Cho returned to his dorm room
where he changed clothes, took the time to log into his email accounts to delete messages and
delete the account. Next, he removed the hard drive from his computer and took both the hard
drive and his cell phone as he left the dorms (VTRP, 2007). It was shortly after this time that
Cho mailed a package to the NBC studios, which contained a CD bearing videos of himself
talking about his complaints about society and the wrongs that had been perpetrated against the
“mistreated and downtrodden of the world” (VTRP, 2007, p. 99). The package also contained
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handwritten letters and pictures of Cho on which he had written captions. These items would
soon become America’s first glimpse into the mind of a killer.
Just after 9:00 a.m. that day, while police were busy processing the crime scene and
interviewing witnesses in the West Ambler Johnson residence hall, Cho traveled back to campus
and made his way into Norris Hall. Once inside, Cho chained the double doors shut from the
inside at three of the building’s entrances and placed a note on one of them warning not to
remove the chains or a bomb would go off (VTRP, 2007). Cho went to the second floor and
began looking into numerous classrooms, even visiting some of the classrooms more than once,
before he began his shooting rampage. Over the next ten minutes or so, Cho would make his way
up and down the halls of the Norris building, shooting students and faculty members alike.
According to the witnesses interviewed by the panel, Cho would move from classroom to
classroom, often firing from the doorway and sometimes from inside the classroom, and then
move on to the next room. Cho returned to one classroom several times, ultimately killing all
students and the professor in that class (VTRP, 2007). In all, 25 students and 5 faculty members
were murdered during the shooting spree, 17 more were shot and survived, and 6 students were
injured escaping the building after the shooting began. Cho fired almost 200 rounds from his
Walther P22 and Glock 17, with the final shot fired being from the Glock 17 when Cho turned
the gun on himself and committed suicide. When police searched his body, they found an
additional 203 rounds for the weapons, with some rounds already loaded in magazines and some
just loose in his backpack (VTRP, 2007).
Over the next several weeks and months, University officials and Americans nationwide
would struggle to comprehend the magnitude of the loss of life at Virginia Tech. Questions
would be asked about how such a tragedy could befall victims at a place many would consider a
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safe haven. Yet, it should have come as no surprise that there were individuals in the world who
were capable of inflicting mass murder on a campus of a higher education institution. On April
16, 2007, Cho became the deadliest gunman on a campus of higher education since his
predecessor, a man named Charles Whitman, who some 40 years earlier earned that distinction at
the top of the bell tower on the campus of the University of Texas at Austin on April 5, 1966
(Lavergne,1997).
University of Texas, Austin
Charles J. Whitman was born on June 24, 1941 in West Palm Beach, Florida to Charles
A. and Margaret Whitman, their first child (Lavergne, 1997). The elder Whitman was a
plumbing contractor by trade and had established a prosperous business prior to his son’s birth.
Both parents were considered strict. While the younger Charles was provided for very well in
material things, he received little emotional support from his parents, either by the nearly
impossible standards of his father or the failure of his mother to intervene or temper those
unreasonable expectations (Lavergne, 1997).
Charles Whitman left his home at the age of 18 and enlisted in the United States Marine
Corps. He was trained in all aspects of military life. Whitman was found early on to be proficient
in firing the 30-caliber M-1 Carbine. The M-1 was a “ten-pound, eighty-five-dollar, gasoperated, air-cooled, clip-fed, semi-automatic” weapon with which Whitman used to earn high
marksmanship scores in Marine training (Kyle, 2013, p. 192). Having completed basic training
as a member of the Marines, Whitman began taking classes at the University of Texas. There, he
met his soon-to-be wife, Kathy. Whitman began to resent the Marine Corps and his obligation to
it since it kept him away from his wife. Over the next couple of years of his enlistment, Whitman
continued to become disillusioned with the Marine Corps, often writing in his journal about how
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many days he had left before he would be free (Lavergne, 1997). At one point after returning
home, Whitman sought out the help of a mental health professional to whom he disclosed his
feelings about climbing the University of Texas Tower with a deer rifle and shooting people
(Lavergne, 1997). In the pre-dawn hours of April 6, 1966, Whitman murdered his wife by
stabbing her while she slept in bed and went on to murder his mother before traveling to the
tower. He assaulted a receptionist, wounded two people and killed two others, climbed the stairs
to the top of the University of Texas Tower, a little over 300 feet above the campus, and began
shooting at students in the courtyard below. From his position atop the tower, Whitman was able
to shoot 45 people, killing 14, before two Austin Police officers were able to ascend the tower,
and engage Whitman. Those officers ended the deadliest act of violence ever committed on a
campus of higher education until Cho’s rampage at Virginia Tech four decades later (Lavergne,
1997).
Prevalence of College Campus Violence
In response to the shooting at Virginia Tech, President George W. Bush tasked members
of several public safety organizations such as the Secret Service, FBI, Attorney General, and
Department of Health to study the prevalence of violence on college campuses nationwide
(Drysdale et al., 2010). Those agencies in cooperation with the Department of Education began a
research project in which the authors sought to provide:
An overview of these incidents and the involved subjects, discusses initial observations
regarding behaviors of the subjects, and offers preliminary considerations regarding the
data that may have relevance to threat assessment. While the participating agencies are
aware of the limitations of an open-source descriptive review, this preliminary effort will
be complemented by a more in-depth study to be conducted by the Department of
Education and the FBI. (Drysdale et al., 2010, p. 2)
The researchers examined all reported incidents of campus violence between 1900 and 2008 in
the United States by studying over 4,400 higher education institutions, with more than 60% of
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the institutions being four-year colleges and universities and 40% being two-year colleges
(Drysdale et al., 2010). According to Drysdale et al. (2010), of the 272 incidents of directed
attacks on higher education campuses since the 1900s, perpetrators using a firearm carried out
54% of those attacks.
In the first decade of the 2000s, higher education experienced a rise in directed assaults
on campuses nationwide (Drysdale et al., 2010). While it is unknown exactly why those assaults
rose, one might look at the increase in student enrollment in higher education and the correlation
to the increased number of those attacks as a potential explanation. Other possible reasons for
this rise could be the increase in the media coverage of such events, the development of a more
zealous gun culture, as well as the many technological innovations in firearms seen during the
previous century. In this study, a distinction will be made between all directed assaults as defined
by Drysdale et al., (2010) and those involving a firearm as the primary weapon used in the
assault. Additionally, this study will develop criteria for inclusion of incidents to be considered
the deadliest of the shootings on higher education campuses.
Purpose of Study
Nearly 10 years have passed since the tragedy at Virginia Tech, and yet Americans are
still shocked and surprised to hear about shootings occurring on college campuses. In the first
four weeks of 2014, the United States saw several acts of violence occur on the campuses of
higher education institutions and to this date, none have surpassed Virginia Tech in terms of how
many innocent lives taken. On October 1, 2015, a male student entered a writing class on the
campus of the Umpqua Community College near Roseburg, Oregon and fatally shot eight
students and a professor. In addition, the individual shot eight other students who survived their
injuries. When law enforcement officers arrived and engaged the shooter in a gun battle, the
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suspect shot himself in the head and ended the deadliest community college campus shooting in
United States history. The purpose of this study was to answer questions such as, “How did law
enforcement respond to the deadliest campus shooting on a community college campus?”
Further, “What impact, if any, did the lessons learned in the aftermath of previous mass
shootings have on law enforcement’s response to the shooting?” In addition, ultimately, “What
implications for practice can be derived by studying the deadliest community college campus
shooting?” One might question what themes exist across higher education that may contribute to
the number and severity of these acts of violence. The purpose of this study was to examine the
deadliest community college campus shooting in United States history in an effort to develop
implications for practice for both law enforcement and higher education constituents.
Significance of Study
Looking at the current body of research into shootings on higher education campuses,
there appeared to be a gap in the literature. Many scholars had written about the frequency of
mass shootings on higher education campuses, however, most of the studies were quantitative in
nature. This qualitative case study examined the deadliest campus shooting on the campus of a
community college in the history of the United States from the perspective of the law
enforcement officers who responded to the incident in an effort to identify implications for law
enforcement and higher education practice.
Research Questions
To fulfill the current study’s purpose, the following research questions guided the study.
1. What was the law enforcement response to the deadliest community college campus
shooting in history?
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2. Did previous mass shootings inform the law enforcement response to the deadliest
community college campus shooting?
3. What implications for practice can be derived by studying the deadliest community
college campus shooting?
Definition of Terms
I began by examining the literature about the prevalence of mass murders, mass
shootings, and campus shootings. The main obstacle I encountered was the fact much that
disagreement existed among scholars about the exact definitions of terms such as mass murder,
mass shootings, and campus shootings. For the purposes of this study, I settled on the following
definitions when looking at the aforementioned topics:
•

Mass murder- while no particular consensus existed about the exact definition of
mass murder among scholars; it appeared the minimum threshold for an incident to
meet that definition should be at least three individuals murdered at the same time, or
at least in relative proximity to each other, by a single individual.

•

Mass shootings- after examining the definitions scholars gave, no particular
consensus existed about the exact definition of mass shootings. A good working
definition for an incident to be classified as a mass shooting would be that the event:
(1) happened in a public place, such as a business or even a college campus; (2) the
event happened during the same day, where at least one gunman uses firearms to
cause the death of more than three individuals; and (3) the total number of deaths did
not include the perpetrator(s) (Bjelopera, Bagalman, Caldwell, Finklea & McCallion,
2013; Follman, Aronsen, & Pan, 2012; Schildkraut & Elsass, 2016).
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•

Campus shootings- contain all of the criteria for a mass shooting, with the location of
the shooting required to be on, or in close proximity to, an institution of higher
education. For the purposes of this study, primary and secondary education
institutions were excluded.
Delimitations and Limitations

Although shootings on higher education campuses were not found to be a common
occurrence, I deliberately imposed some limitations on the scope of this study in order to focus
on law enforcement’s response to the deadliest shooting on a community college campus. The
case studied for this project was unique in that it was the most recent, deadliest shooting in
higher education; it was the deadliest campus shooting to ever occur on a community college
campus; and it was the deadliest campus shooting to occur on any higher education campus since
the Virginia Tech shooting.
Additionally, I decided to study this single case where nine individuals were killed, even
though I identified two other campus shootings that had close to the same number of victims as
the case chosen. Those two cases were the 1976 California State University shooting and the
2010 Oikos University shooting, both of which had seven individuals killed. I intentionally
excluded the California State University shooting from consideration due to it occurring more
than 40 years ago, as I wanted to focus on the most recent of the deadliest campus shooting. I
excluded the Oikos University shooting, although it was a more recent case, as it occurred on the
campus of a private institution and I intentionally decided to limit the potential cases chosen to
public higher education institutions.
I chose to employ a single-case study design, which created the following limitations:
First, I was unable to ensure the anonymity of the participants who were interviewed and the
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identity of the institution I chose to study. Since this case was the deadliest campus shooting
since the Virginia Tech incident, it garnered significant media coverage. Many of the participants
chosen to be interviewed were identified by name and rank in many of the news stories about the
incident. There was no way to keep the identity of the participants anonymous since their stories
had, to some degree, already been told in the media.
Next, I had to rely upon participants to help identify other potential interview candidates,
as the official report of the investigation from the law enforcement agency who handled the
event had not yet been released. Several of the participants interviewed were involved in the
immediate shooting incident, yet, had not been interviewed by the media. I did not know their
identities until beginning to interview officers whose names I was able to discover while
researching the incident through public records. Another limitation of having to rely upon
participants to identify other potential participants was the possibility that some willing
participants were never actually contacted and were unaware the study was being conducted at
all. It is possible that some unique insights or recommendations from those individuals were
never discovered. Furthermore, I attempted to obtain interviews from members of the institution
where the shooting occurred, but the institution administration declined to participate citing the
fact that there were outstanding lawsuits and the campus had not officially debriefed the incident.
Outline of Study
This dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 introduced the study by
chronicling several campus shootings and discussed the three deadliest campus shootings in
history. Chapter 2 provided a review of the pertinent literature surrounding violence in the
United States and on campuses of higher education. Chapter 3 discussed the methodology for
selecting the deadliest campus shooting to study and the methodology for analyzing that case.
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Chapter 4 was the single-case study which included not only a discussion of the publicly
available information about the incident, but identified themes from individuals who were
directly involved in the shooting response and aftermath. Chapter 5 presented a summary and
conclusions from the case and identified implications for practitioners of higher education.
Chapter Summary
Violence on college campuses in the United States is a relatively common occurrence,
with more than 270 acts of directed assaults on college and university campuses nationwide since
the early 1900s (Drysdale et al., 2010). In the 1960s, higher education experienced the deadliest
campus shooting in history when a shooter climbed the tower at the University of Texas, Austin
and shot 45 people, killing 14. Nearly 40 years later, a student at Virginia Tech shot 47 people,
killing more than 30 of them. Most recently, a gunman entered a classroom on the Umpqua
Community College campus and shot 17, killing eight students and a professor. If history is any
indicator, higher education is likely to experience more campus shootings in the future. The
purpose of this study was to examine the deadliest community college campus shooting in
United States history in an effort to develop implications for practice for both law enforcement
and higher education constituents.
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CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The purpose of this study was to examine the deadliest community college campus
shooting in United States history in an effort to develop implications for practice for both law
enforcement and higher education constituents. Presented in this chapter are the following topics:
history and prevalence of mass murder in the United States from the 1900s to the present, what
researchers have said about mass shootings in general, and the occasions of mass shootings on
campuses of higher education. The development and evolution of firearms in the United States
along with the attitudes of higher education constituents toward weapons on campus were also
addressed.
History of Mass Murder
Defining Mass Murder
Scholars disagreed about the frequency and trends of mass murder in the United States,
and not all researchers defined mass murder in the same way, so it became important for this
study to decide what criteria must be met in order to classify an event as a mass murder. For the
purposes of this study, serial murders and spree murders were excluded. Serial, or spree murders
differ from mass murders in that serial, or spree murders “involve multiple victims killed by the
same offender or offenders in separate events over a period of days, months, or years,” while
mass murders “involve four or more people killed---not including the shooter(s)—in less than
one day by the same offender or offenders” (Bjelopera et al., 2013, p. 7). The first known use of
the term “mass murder” came after a shooting on the campus of an institution of higher
education. According to Auxemery (2015), Hilde Bruch, Professor of Psychiatry, Baylor
University College of Medicine, used the term “mass murder” in 1967. Bruch (1967) referred to
the incident of Charles Whitman, who had murdered his wife and mother and subsequently
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climbed the bell tower on the campus of the University of Texas, Austin shooting and killing 14
more people, as an act of mass murder.
Most researchers agreed that in order to be classified as a mass murder, specific criteria
must be met, including the total time over which the killings took place as well as the total
number of victims. Holmes and Holmes (1992) stated, “Mass murder is the killing of a number
of persons at one time and in one place” (p. 53). Duwe (2004) used four victims killed as the
criteria for inclusion into the category of mass murder. Duwe’s (2004) rational as to choosing the
threshold of four killed as opposed to three appeared to be two-fold. First, Duwe (2004)
primarily used newspaper coverage of killings in The New York Times, as the source of data for
the period from 1900 to 1976, while he relied upon the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Report,
which did not become a valid source of data until around 1976, for his study of the period of
1976-1999. According to Duwe (2004),
A study based on the three-victim criterion would have over three times as many cases as
would one that used the four-victim threshold. Thus, even though a triple homicide tends
to be a newsworthy event, there is still a greater likelihood that a study using a threevictim criterion would miss media reports on a larger proportion of cases than would one
that employed a four-victim threshold.” (p. 734-735)
Secondly, Duwe (2004) chose the FBI’s Supplemental Homicide Reports (SHR) and according
to Auxemery (2015) the “FBI distinguishes single, double, and triple homicides from mass
murders, which are four or more simultaneous homicides” (p. 150).
Additional factors should be considered when defining mass murder, such as the location
and distance traveled during the incident (Holmes & Holmes, 1992), or even the number of
offenders and the number of victims who were wounded but not killed (Dietz, 1986). Holmes
and Holmes (1992) stated, “Surely a murderer who kills half the requisite number of victims at
one site and then travels directly to another site where the other half are killed ought to qualify as
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a mass murderer” (p. 479). Holmes and Holmes (1992) believed that not only should the location
of the event be taken into consideration, but also “the possibility of distance between murder
sites” as “a mass murder may go into a business establishment and kill several customers and
then go across town and kill another person. This must be considered a single act of mass murder
despite the slightly varying times and locations” (p. 54). According to Dietz (1986), “mass
murder should be defined as offenses in which multiple victims are intentionally killed by a
single offender in a single incident” regardless of the location of the event or the distance
traveled (p. 479). While no particular consensus existed about the exact definition of mass
murder among scholars, it appeared the minimum threshold for an incident to meet that
definition should be at least four individuals murdered at the same time, or at least in relative
proximity to each other, by a single individual.
Timeframes of Mass Murder
Once the definition of mass murder was decided upon, the next task was to examine the
timeframe of when mass murder began to take place in the United States. Most research about
mass murder in the United States focused on either the timeframe beginning in the 1900s and
continuing to the 1960s (Duwe, 2004; Schildkraut & Elsass, 2016) or beginning in the 1960s and
continuing to present day. While research seemed to center on these two timeframes, mass
murders did occur in the United Stated prior to the 1900s. Schildkraut and Elsass (2016) listed
the following acts of mass murder that occurred prior to 1900:
•

July 26, 1764—Four Native Americans from the Lenape tribe entered the local
schoolhouse as part of Pontiac’s Rebellion and murdered a schoolteacher and 11
students by clubbing and scalping them.
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•

July 25, 1880—Charles Berhues entered a Louisiana Sunday School where his
cousin, with whom he was upset with for marrying a girl he liked, was teaching,
killed him, and wounded four others.

•

February 14, 1883—Lem Harbaugh killed three schoolchildren attending the Ponca
Creek School in Nebraska with a needle gun.

•

March 26, 1893—At a school dance in Louisiana, a gunman opened fire, killed two
people, and wounded three.

•

December 12, 1898—Five people were shot and killed along with two others
wounded at a school exhibition in West Virginia.

These examples seemed to indicate that incidents of mass murder did not begin in the 1960s but
had been occurring in the United States for over two hundred years.
Some scholars asserted mass murder became more prevalent beginning in the 1960s and
continued to increase in the subsequent decades. However, according to Schildkraut and Elsass
(2016) “the first [mass murders] occurred in the 1920’s and 1930’s, and mainly included acts of
familicide. The second wave began in the 1960’s, and was on a considerably larger scale than the
first” (p. 34). Duwe (2004) agreed, “Although the mid-1960’s marked the beginning of a mass
murder wave, it was not unprecedented, because mass killings were nearly as common in the
1920’s and 1930’s” (p.729). Schildkraut and Elsass (2016) went on to state:
Due to the increasing media coverage of the second wave of mass killings, people often
associate this period with the beginning of the mass shooting ‘epidemic.’ Yet in reality,
public mass shootings as we know them had been occurring for nearly 150 years prior.
(p. 34)
Duwe (2004) argued that not only did the mass murder rate not increase after 1960, little
research into the rate of mass murder between 1900 and 1965 had ever been done. Duwe (2004)
sought to find out if scholars who believed that the 1960s marked the onset of a mass murder
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wave in the United States were correct in their assertion. In order to accomplish this task, Duwe
(2004) studied news accounts from the New York Times for the timeframe of 1900-1975 and the
FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Report (SHR) and newspaper articles for the years 1976-1999.
For the years from 1900-1975, Duwe (2004) identified 403 cases that were potential mass
murders by running a search in the Times newspaper article database using the categories of
murders and attempted murders, shootings, arson, fires, bomb explosions and mass murder. After
reading the accounts listed for these 403 identified cases, Duwe (2004) was able to eliminate 144
of the cases, which were either spree or serial murders, lacked the requisite number of victims
killed, or the incidents did not happen in the United States even though the New York Times still
reported on them.
Additionally, Duwe (2004) added one case to the total number of cases after reading an
article about another mass murder and identified a New Jersey case from 1996 that met his
criteria. This brought the total number of mass murders from 1900-1975 to 260 (Duwe, 2004.)
One limitation to the method employed by Duwe (2004) is that he did not actually read every
single page of the New York Times between 1900-1975, so he was unable to say with certainty
the 260 cases were exhaustive of the possible instances of mass murder during that timeframe.
For the timeframe of 1976-1999, Duwe (2004) relied upon two separate searches of the
FBI’s SHR, the first was 1976-1996 and the second was 1997-1999. The first search of 19761996, resulted in 692 incidents reported to have involved at least four victims and after reading
the newspaper accounts of those incidents, Duwe (2004) eliminated 55 cases found not to be
mass murders, but located 37 others not reported to the SHR. These additional cases brought the
final number of cases to 568 mass murders between 1976 and 1997. The second search for mass
murders occurring between 1997 and 1999 indicated there were 83 incidents, which involved
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four or more victims. Similar to the first search, this search revealed an additional 18 cases of
which Duwe (2004) found 16 of those cases were not accurately reported as mass murders.
Overall, 81 cases of mass murder occurred between 1997 and 1999, bringing the total number of
cases to 649 between 1976-1999 as compared to 1900-1975 which had 260. Duwe (2004)
concluded that although some argued there were very few mass murders before 1966, in reality
the New York Times had reported on 173 mass murders between 1900 and 1965. Duwe (2004)
asserted that “although claimsmakers [sic] correctly noted that a mass murder wave began in the
mid-1960’s, it was neither unprecedented nor did it continue to escalate with each passing year.
Rather, the first mass murder wave in the 20th century was in the 1920’s and 1930’s, followed by
the one that began in the mid-1960’s” (p. 745). Duwe (2004) cautioned, however, “These waves
were qualitatively different. This finding, together with the tranquility of the 1940’s and 1950’s,
may help explain why claimsmakers [sic] thought the latter mass murder wave was
unprecedented” (p. 745).
While some researchers believed that the 1960s began a new wave of mass murders in
the United States, others pointed to the number of cases of mass murder that occurred prior to
1960 as evidence that mass murder has a much longer history. Thus far, this literature review has
only defined what constituted mass murder and has examined the prevalence of it without taking
into consideration the preferred method of killing utilized by mass murderers. Therefore, it was
also important to look at what method of killing was most commonly used by those committing
mass murders in the United States.
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Mass Shootings
Defining Mass Shootings
The previous section explored the history of mass murder in the United States. Just as it
is important to discuss how scholars defined mass murders, it is also important to explore how
scholars identified what constituted a mass shooting. Similar to the disagreement about the exact
definition of mass murders that existed in the literature, scholars also disagreed to some extent on
what exactly constituted a mass shooting. This section will examine the definitions of those mass
murders classified as mass shootings, public mass shootings, and active shooters. It concludes by
discussing the prevalence of those types of mass murders in the United States.
A bit of overlap in terminology existed when examining the different definitions of what
incidents actually qualified as a mass shooting. Some terms such “mass shooting,” “public mass
shooting,” and “active shooter” were sometimes used interchangeably. Schildkraut and Elsass
(2016) examined what criteria different governmental agencies, such as the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC), the U. S. Department of Education, as well as scholars such as Newman, Fox,
Harding, Mehta and Roth (2004) used to classify incidents as mass shootings. For example, the
CDC relied upon their School-Associated Violent Death study, which required the incident to
take place on school property, but only considered those events that were associated with a
school function and not those shootings that occurred elsewhere. The U.S. Department of
Education as well as the Secret Service also classified a mass shooting as an incident where a
current or former student attacked someone on school grounds and the shooter specifically chose
a school as the location for the attack. Similarly, Newman et al. (2004) required the incident to
take place at a school where multiple victims were shot and the shooter was a current or former
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student (Schildkraut & Elsass, 2016). After considering the previously mentioned definitions as
well as other publications, Schildkraut and Elsass (2016) identified a mass shooting as:
[a]n incident of targeted violence carried out by one or more shooters at one or more
public or populated locations. Multiple victims (both injuries and fatalities) are associated
with the attack, and both the victims and location(s) are chosen either at random or for
their symbolic value. The event occurs within a single 24-hour period, though most
attacks typically last only a few minutes. The motivation of the shooting must not
correlate with gang violence or targeted militant or terroristic activity. (p. 32)
This definition seemed to take into consideration a variety of factors, many of which had some
commonality within the sources studied but where no exact agreement in definition existed.
Bjelpoera et al. (2013) also sought out a clear definition of a mass shooting in a report
prepared for Congress. Bjelopera et al. (2013) looked for some commonality of definitions
among scholarly journal articles, monographs, and government reports. After studying these
sources, the researchers noted the definitions and requirements for mass shootings, public mass
shootings and active shooters varied concerning “the number of victims or fatalities involved, the
weapons used, the motives of the perpetrator, and the timeframes within which the casualties or
injuries occurred” (Bjelopera et al., 2013, p. 4). Bjelopera et al. (2013) noted a distinction
between a general definition of mass shootings and what they termed “public mass shootings”.
Bjelopera et al. (2013) defined public mass shootings as “incidents occurring in relatively public
places, involving four or more deaths—not including the shooter(s)—and gunmen who select
victims somewhat indiscriminately” (p. 4). Bjelopera et al. (2013) indicated that a public space
included parking lots, restaurants, workplaces, as well as school campuses, both at the primary
and secondary level as well as the post-secondary level.
The FBI categorized public mass shootings as those incidents that involved an active
shooter where at least four people were killed by one or more individuals (Blair & Schweit,
2014). The Department of Education and the Department of Homeland Security defined an
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active shooter as “an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a
confined and populated area.” They further noted, “Implicit in this definition is that the subject’s
criminal actions involve the use of firearms” (Blair & Schweit, 2014, p. 5). Additionally, the
Department of Homeland Security indicated that “in most cases, active shooters use firearm(s)
and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims” (DHS, 2008, p. 3).
After examining the definitions scholars gave, no particular consensus existed about the
exact definition of mass shootings. One could argue that a good working definition for an
incident to be classified as a mass shooting would be that the event: (1) happened in a public
place, such as a business or even a college campus; (2) the event happened during the same day,
where at least one gunman uses firearms to cause the death of more than three individuals; and
(3) the total number of deaths does not include the perpetrator(s) (Bjelopera et al., 2013; Follman
et al. 2012; Schildkraut & Elsass, 2016). This is not to say there are no other possible criteria that
could be included, just that for the purposes of identifying mass shootings in the present study,
the aforementioned definition will be utilized when selecting cases to examine and stay within
the scope of the study.
Prevalence of Mass Shootings
While much of the current research into mass shootings studied the 1960s to present day,
a number of mass shootings occurred in the United States between the 1900s and 1960s.
Schildkraut and Elsass (2016) identified mass shootings that took place in the United States as
early 1898 when five people were shot and killed along with two others wounded at a
disturbance in Charleston, West Virginia. Schildkraut and Elsass (2016) claimed in the early
1900s Americans saw a number of incidents of mass public shootings. In 1912, for example,
family members of Floyd Allen, who was on trial for and recently convicted of interfering with
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another investigation, opened fire at a courthouse in Hillsville, Virginia, killing 5, including the
judge, prosecutor, and sheriff, and wounding 7 others. In 1915, a small business owner named
Monroe Phillips, who had recently suffered real estate losses in Bibb County, Georgia, opened
fire on nearby citizens, killing five and wounding 20 others (Schildkraut & Elsass, 2016).
According to Duwe (2004), Phillips started his public mass shooting by killing a prominent local
attorney whom he blamed for financial losses and then opened fire on the crowd of people who
responded to the initial shooting. Schildkraut and Elsass (2016) indicated that while “the 1920’s
and 1930’s were a quieter and more peaceful era in the United States, there were still several
incidents of public mass shootings, albeit fewer than in later decades” (p.36).
Duwe (2004) studied the prevalence of mass murder in the United States in an effort to
determine whether the 1960s began a new wave of mass murder, as some scholars claimed. In
his study, Duwe (2004) studied news articles from the New York Times as well as the FBI’s
Supplementary Homicide Reports to identify which mass murders were considered mass
shootings. In examining incidents of mass murder between 1900 and 1999, Duwe (2004) argued
that “even though we see relatively high percentages of mass public shootings during the 1930’s
(17%) and 1940’s (23%), there were only 21 incidents that took place between 1900 and 1965”
(p. 755). Fox and DeLateur (2013) studied myths and misconceptions about mass shootings and
claimed, “The moral panic and sense of urgency surrounding mass murder have been fueled by
various claims that mass murders, and mass shootings in particular, are reaching epidemic
proportions” (p. 4). Lemieux (2014) conducted a study of the effect of firearm laws on the
number of mass shootings in the United States and concluded, “The frequency of public mass
shootings has continually increased since 1910” (p. 87). However, Schildkraut and Elsass (2016)
disagreed, and argued that “despite the clear findings that mass shootings are not on the rise, but
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in fact have remained relatively stable over time, the general public still has a tendency to
believe that these types of events are becoming more commonplace” (p. 32). Duwe (2004)
claimed, “Although the mid-1960’s did mark the onset of a genuine increase in mass murder, it
was not unprecedented. What was unprecedented in the years following 1966 was the frequency
with which mass public shootings occurred” (p. 755).
Interestingly, and pertinent to the current study, was the fact that the apparent increase in
the frequency of mass shootings began with a shooting that occurred on a campus of higher
education. Duwe (2004) asserted that the mid-1960s began with a number of mass shootings
such as the 1966 mass public shooting at the University of Texas, where Charles Whitman, who
had just killed his wife and mother, opened fire on students walking across the campus. Whitman
climbed a tower on the institution’s grounds and from his elevated vantage point, shot and killed
14 people and wounded an additional 32 people before being killed by a police officer. It was
this campus shooting that was considered the worst campus shooting in the history of higher
education, and held that distinction for over 40 years. Only a few weeks after the University of
Texas shooting, Arthur Davis opened fire at an apartment complex in Connecticut, killing five
and wounding two others. Later that year, Robert Smith entered an Arizona beauty school,
opened fire, and killed five people and injured two others (Schildkraut & Elsass, 2016). Other
mass shootings occurred in the 1970s that met the criteria for mass murder, and it could be
argued foreshadowed future mass shootings at institutions of education. In 1974, a 17-year old
killed three, wounded nine more at a New York high school; in 1976, a janitor at California State
University-Fullerton shot, killed five, and wounded two others; and in January of 1979, a 16-year
old opened fire at an elementary school and killed two while wounding nine others (Schildkraut
& Elsass, 2016).
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Mass shootings continued in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s. In August of
1982, a gunman entered a business that had just serviced his lawnmower, opened fire, killed
eight, and wounded three others. In June of 1984, Abdelkrim Belachheb entered a Texas
nightclub, shot, killed six, and wounded one other person. That same year, James Huberty
opened fire at a McDonald’s in California, killed 21, and wounded 19 others before being shot
by a police sniper (Schildkraut & Elsass, 2016). In 1991, a gunman entered a cafeteria in Texas,
opened fire and killed 23 people; and later that year higher education experienced more student
deaths by a campus shooter when a graduate student shot and killed five at the University of
Iowa (Schildkraut & Elsass, 2016).
In their study of the prevalence of mass shootings, Follman, et al. (2012) created an open
source database of mass shootings in the United States. Much like Duwe (2004) who studied
mass murders using the criteria of at least four victims killed in a single event, Follman et al.
(2012) studied those public shootings between 1982 and 2012 in which at least four victims were
killed in the incident. This database was generated using the FBI’s SHR four victim criteria,
which was the accepted criteria to define a mass shooting prior to 2013. To complete the
database, Follman et al., (2012) used the following criteria to identify cases of mass shootings:
•

The perpetrator took the lives of at least four people.

•

A lone shooter carried out the killings.

•

The shootings occurred in a public place. (Crimes primarily related to gang activity,
armed robbery, or domestic violence in homes were not included.)

•

Perpetrators who died or were wounded during the attack are not included in the
victim counts.
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•

Also included a handful of cases also known as “spree killings”—cases in which the
killings occurred in more than one location over a short period, the otherwise fit the
criteria above.

The results of Follman et al. (2012) indicated there were 62 mass shootings between 1982 and
2012, and while Follman et al. (2012) did look at many mass shootings to compile the database,
it is important to note that they excluded those shootings carried out by multiple shooters, those
shootings that only met the three-victim criterion used by Dietz (1986), and those incidents that
took place in more than one location during the same 24-hour period. In 2013, President Barrack
Obama lowered the FBI’s SHR threshold from four or more victims to three or more victims, so
Follman et al. (2016) created an additional database to cover the years of 2013 to 2016. The
researchers found 21 additional cases that qualified as mass shootings using the reduced victim
criteria. According to Follman et al. (2016), those 21 cases reaffirmed their original findings
noted in the original database. Fox and DeLateur (2013) argued that studies such as Follman et
al. (2012) actually underestimated the prevalence of mass shooting to some degree because they
“did not include all mass shootings in their analysis” (p. 4).
Previous scholars such as Follman et al. (2012) created databases that enabled the
isolation of mass shootings. Blair and Schweit (2014) studied a database with 160 cases of active
shooters that occurred in the United States between 2000 and 2013 and found that active shooters
killed 486 individuals and injured an additional 557 individuals in that timeframe. Of the 160
cases of active shooters, 70% of the incidents occurred either at a business/place of commerce or
in an educational environment and 40 percent of the incidents were classified as a mass killing
under the federal Investigative Assistance for Violent Crimes Act of 2012, 28 USC 530C
(b)(1)(M)(i) with three or more individuals killed in a single incident (Blair & Schweit, 2014).
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Of the 160 incidents occurring within the studied timeframe, Blair and Schweit (2014) identified
the four deadliest of these public mass shootings as:
•

The Cinemark Century 16 Theatre attack in Aurora, Colorado on July 20, 2012, in
which 12 individuals were killed and 58 wounded;

•

The Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in Blacksburg, Virginia on
April 16, 2007, in which 32 individuals were killed and 17 were wounded;

•

The Ft. Hood Soldier Readiness Processing Center in Ft. Hood, Texas on November
5, 2009, in which 13 individuals were killed and 32 wounded;

•

The Sandy Hook Elementary School and a residence in Newtown, Connecticut on
December 14, 2012, in which 27 individuals were killed (20 of them children) and
two wounded (p. 7).

While only the Virginia Tech incident actually occurred on the campus of an institution
of higher education, it is important to note that one of the other shooters was a current student of
higher education. James Holmes, the accused shooter at the theatre in Aurora, Colorado attended
nearby University of Colorado’s Anschutz Medical Campus. He was under the care of a
psychiatrist on campus at the time of his mass shooting and actually sent detailed plans to that
faculty member prior to the shooting. Those plans were not delivered to the professor until after
the massacre. Adam Lanza, the accused shooter in the Sandy Hook Elementary School incident
was a former student at Western Connecticut State University (Blair & Schweit, 2014).
With three of those four deadliest mass shootings either occurring on campuses of higher
education, near those campuses, or carried out by individuals who were associated with higher
education, it became apparent that mass shootings did in fact affect higher education. Therefore,
it seemed important for practitioners to examine what impact mass shootings had on all
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stakeholders in higher education. The present study attempted to identify implications for higher
education practice by studying the deadliest campus shooting on a community college campus.
The next section will identify the prevalence of mass shootings that have occurred on campuses
of higher education since the 1900s.
Campus Shootings
This section examined mass shootings that have occurred on campuses of higher
education since the 1900s. Examining the history of mass shootings that have occurred on
college campuses lead the present study in order to help identify the deadliest community college
campus shooting to be studied. There appeared to be a gap in the literature on school shootings
because few studies centered exclusively on institutions of higher education. Most studies of
school shootings fell into one of three categories: studies centered on primary and secondary
schools only, studies centered on both primary/secondary schools as well as post-secondary
schools, and studies that made no distinction between primary/secondary or post-secondary
schools. A thorough review of the literature revealed one study that exclusively covered
institutions of higher education and that particular study will be useful for the present study.
Primary and Secondary Schools Only
Some studies of school shootings only examined primary and secondary schools and not
post-secondary schools. Anderson et al. (2001) studied school-associated violent deaths in the
United States between 1994 and 1999 in an effort to “describe recent trends and features of
school-associate violent deaths in the United States” (p. 2695). Anderson et al. (2001) reviewed
media reports of school violence, including school shootings, and interviewed at least one school
official or law enforcement official involved in each incident to verify data in the media reports.
For inclusion in their study, the incident had to meet the following criteria: must have been a
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fatal injury because of homicide, suicide, legal intervention (police action) or an unintentional
firearm-related death; must have been on the campus of a public or private elementary or
secondary school or on the way to or from such school. (Anderson et al., 2001). Anderson et al.
(2001) noted 220 events resulting in 253 deaths in the period studied with 172 homicides, 30
suicides, 11 homicide-suicides, 5 deaths from legal intervention and 2 unintentional firearmrelated deaths.
In 2008, the Centers for Disease Control in collaboration the U.S. Department of
Education and the U.S. Department of Justice created the School-Associated Violent Death
(SAVD) study that was a study of the characteristics of school-related student homicides
between July 1992 and June 2006. For the study, cases identified met the following criteria: must
have involved a homicide of a student; must have been on the campus of a public or private
elementary or secondary school in the United States; and the victim must have been on the way
to or from school or a school-related function (SAVD, 2008). The researchers conducted a
computer search of two newspaper and broadcast media databases, Lexis-Nexis and Dialog and
conducted an interview of an involved official to verify data in the computer search. The results
of the study found 116 homicides in 109 school-associated events with 65% of those deaths as a
result of gunshot wounds (SAVD, 2008). It is important to note that with both Anderson et al.
(2001) and the 2008 CDC report, data were collected from media reports, which did not take into
account those events, not reported to the media that could cause both studies to have underreported the actual number of school-associated deaths during their respective periods studied.
Flannery, Modzeleski and Kretschmar (2013) examined incidents of multiple-homicide
shootings at schools. The researchers also studied the CDC’s SAVD for the period from 2000 to
2010 and focused their study on the mental-health issues of multiple-homicide perpetrators of
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school shootings but excluded shootings in higher education. Flannery et al. (2013) stated,
“While some characteristics of the incidents and shooters invariably overlap, the focus of this
review is primarily on shootings that have occurred in K-12 schools” (p. 2). The results of their
study found:
•

Mental health problems of perpetrators are a risk factor for school shootings, but
mostly in combination with other significant psychopathology such as antisocial
personality or extreme social rejection.

•

A significant limitation to risk assessment [of potential school shooters] is the
restriction on access to information about an individual’s mental health status,
diagnoses, medication utilization or treatment history.

•

In most multiple-victim incidents, more than one person was provided information
about the attack before it occurred, but the information that was known to peers was
almost never communicated to an adult.

•

We know more about the very limited sample of school shooters who kill multiple
victims than we do about incidents of school shootings or potential school shootings
where lethal outcomes were successfully averted.

Primary/Secondary and Post-Secondary Schools
Some studies of school shootings examined primary and secondary schools as well as
post-secondary schools. Wike and Fraser (2009) utilized both case comparisons and anecdotal
reports to identify characteristics of school shooters as well as characteristics of where those
shootings occurred but placed “the emphasis on public secondary education but, where possible,
we draw inferences to shootings in higher education” (p. 163). Based upon their examination, the
researchers noted that student shooters appeared to share two characteristics. The first was the
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shooters often were known to have had a fascination with weapons and the second was they
often told someone of their plans in what Wike and Fraser (2009) termed as “leakage” (p. 164).
As a result of their study, Wike and Fraser (2009) developed six prevention strategies, which
included the need for increased security, and communication within the school, the need to
establish resources for troubled students, and the need to break down codes of silence that often
prevent students from voicing their concerns about other students’ behavior. Although a stated
outcome from the study was to draw inferences about higher education shootings from the
characteristics of primary/secondary school shooters, the researchers failed to address any
inferences they may have noted.
Another study conducted by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation identified 160 case of active shooters in the United States between 2000 and 2013.
Blair and Schweit (2014) looked at all incidents of active shooters during that time-frame and
noted that 39 of the 160 cases identified happened in an educational setting where 27 incidents
occurred in primary/secondary schools and 12 incidents occurred at institutions of higher
education.
Newman and Fox (2009) examined shootings in American high schools for the period of
2002-2008 and attempted to compare and contrast shootings on college campuses with shootings
at high schools. For cases to be included in their study, Newman and Fox (2009) developed the
following criteria:
•

The location of the incident is a “public stage” either on school property or at a
school-related function.

•

The shooters must be current or former students of the school.
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•

There must be multiple victims (although the injuries do not have to be fatal) or, at
the very least, multiple targets.

•

Although some victims may be targets specifically because they have wronged the
shooter, there are typically others who are chosen only for their symbolic significance
(the principal, the preps, the prayer circle, the jocks) or are shot at random (p. 1288).

Newman and Fox (2009) relied upon the Virginia Tech Review Panel’s list of fatal shootings
between 1966 and 2007, along with media-generated lists of school shootings found on the
Internet to identify their cases. Based on their search, the researchers found four shootings that
met the criteria, one middle school and three high schools. Unlike Wike and Fraser (2009), who
found shooters in their study had a fascination with weapons, Newman and Fox (2009) noted that
only two of the four (50%) of middle school or high school shooters had such an interest in
weapons. Newman and Fox (2009) further identified five college shootings that met their criteria
and similar to middle school or high school shooters, just two of the five (40%) identified college
shooters displayed a known interest in weapons. It should be noted that both studies had a small
sample size and the results of those studies may not be generalized for all school shootings.
No Distinction Between Primary/Secondary and Post-Secondary
At least one study of school shootings conducted by the U.S. Secret Service and the U.S.
Department of Education made no distinction between primary/secondary or post-secondary
locations but referred to their cases as targeted school attacks. The primary stated purpose of the
study was to “develop information that could be useful to schools in better understanding and
preventing targeted violence in school settings. The emphasis of the study was on examining the
attackers’ pre-incident thinking and behavior, to explore information that could aid in preventing
future attacks” (Vossekuil, Fein, Reddy, Borum, & Modzeleski, 2004, p. 7).
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The researchers identified targeted school attacks by working backward beginning in
2000 and going back to 1974. They interviewed school violence experts to help identify some
cases that met their requirements; they consulted with law enforcement officials for information
about potential cases; and they searched both publicly available databases, subscription
databases, and professional publications. For the purposes of the study, Vossekuil et al. (2004)
utilized the following criteria for inclusion:
•

A current or recent former student attacked someone at his or her school with lethal
means (e.g., a gun or a knife).

•

The student attacker purposefully chose his or her school as the location of the attack.
Consistent with this definition, incidents where the school was chosen simply as a site
of opportunity… were not included (p.7).

Researchers identified “37 incidents of targeted school violence involving 41 attackers that
occurred in the United States from 1974, the year in which the earlies incident identified took
place, through June 2000, when data collection for the study was completed” (Vossekuil et al.,
2004, p. 8). Among the implications noted by the study are important issues that are pertinent to
the present study. Those findings included:
•

Incidents of targeted violence at school rarely are sudden, impulsive acts.

•

There is no accurate or useful profile of students who engaged in targeted school
violence.

•

Most attackers engaged in some behavior prior to the incident that caused others
concern or indicated a need for help.

•

Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.
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•

Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most shooting incidents were stopped by
means other than law enforcement intervention (Vossekuil et al., 2004, p 31).

Higher Education Institutions Only
Significant for the present study of the deadliest community college campus shooting was
Drysdale et al., (2010) who identified more than 270 acts of violence that have occurred on
college and university campuses nationwide since the early 1900s. After the 2007 campus
shooting at Virginia Tech, President George W. Bush directed his Attorney General and
Department of Education Secretary to help identify ways the federal government could help
prevent such an attack from occurring.
After a series of meetings with stakeholders in higher education, Drysdale et al., (2012)
set out to answer three questions: (1) How prevalent are incidents of campus violence?; (2) Who
is responsible for the attacks?; and (3) Are the perpetrators affiliated with higher education? The
researchers utilized a three-tier approach to data collection, first searching the Internet for lists of
school-related acts of violence, then they conducted a search string of Nexis utilizing phrases
from the first search, followed by a phrase-based search of online newspaper articles (Drysdale,
et al., 2010). In the study, Drysdale et al., (2010) included several attributes, including but not
limited to shootings, stabbings strangulation, or any combination of those methods, having
happened on a college campus. Cases that qualified for their study required the attack to be
specific to institutions of higher education, must have had specific targets selected prior to the
assault or during the assault, required the perpetrator to have the present ability to employ lethal
force, and the assault must have taken place either on campus or in close proximity to the
campus. Of the more than 270 incidents of campus violence, 54% of the cases involved a
shooting (Drysdale et al., 2010). Since a majority of the incidents of campus violence studied
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were identified as a shooting, it was apparent there was a need to further study campus shootings
and the present study attempted to fill a part of that need.
One of the deficiencies noted in the literature about campus shootings was that studies of
school shootings often included not just institutions of higher education, but primary and
secondary schools as well. With most of the literature surrounding school shootings being
focused primarily, if not exclusively, on primary and secondary school shootings, a gap in the
literature existed. This study attempted to fill part of that gap by examining the deadliest campus
shooting on a community college campus. Since more than 50% of the incidents of campus
violence involved the use of at least one firearm, it was important to examine the history and
development of the weapons used by campus shooters. The next section will explore the history,
lethality, and availability of weapons used by perpetrators of violence on college campuses.
History of Firearms in the United States
With the current study focusing on the deadliest campus shooting at a community
college, it is important to understand the history of firearms and how they have developed over
time to their current lethality, ease of use, and availability to someone inclined to attack students
and faculty at an institution of higher education. Barrett (2012) asserted, “In the United States,
guns are much more than a tool of law enforcement or an article of commerce. They are
embedded in the country’s history” (p. 20). “By the time the Constitution was framed, a tradition
of private firearm ownership was an aspect of daily life and American identity. To many
Americans, over many generations, guns have represented freedom, individualism, and selfreliance” (Barrett, 2012, p. 20). Over the course of American history, different guns have been
utilized for all sorts of purposes, from weapons of war, to personal protection, to securing food,
and even for the purposes of inflicting death. This section looked at the history of the different
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types of firearms used since the beginning of the country and may help shed light upon how
guns, from their prevalence to their lethality, have contributed to the prevalence of mass
shootings in general and on higher education campuses in particular.
Understanding the evolution of the types of firearms used in campus shootings requires a
brief discussion of the types of guns used in American throughout history. The evolution of those
guns provided a backdrop for the types of weapons used in mass shootings as early as the 1900s.
They represent how American firearms evolved from slow-reloading and primitive firing
mechanisms to more precise weapons, able to fire multiple rounds more accurately, all of which
are characteristics of many of the guns used in mass murders and campus shootings.
First Generation
Three main guns were prevalent in the United States prior to the 1900s, the American
Long Rifle (Kentucky Rifle), the Spencer Repeater, and the Colt Single Action Army (Colt .45).
These weapons utilized firing systems such as percussion-fired and flint-fired rounds, which
were notably slow to reload and represented a sort of “first generation” of firearms. Around the
turn of the century, a “second generation” of firearms allowed military personnel and criminals
to achieve a higher numbers of rounds fired due to an increased capacity of bullets, however,
they lacked the accuracy and reliability of weapons later favored by mass shooters on campuses
of higher education.
The American Long Rifle (Kentucky Rifle)
The American Long Rifle (Kentucky Rifle) dates back to the late 1700s. According to
Kyle (2013), European-born gunsmiths from the 1620s patterned the New World American long
rifles off designs. These rifles used black-powder flintlock and weighed less than 10 pounds.
Thus, they were “surprisingly lightweight… more like a precision combat surgical instrument
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than a battlefield weapon” (Kyle, 2013, p. 5). Kyle (2013) explained that while the weapon was
accurate, the time required to fire each shot from the weapon was quite long. Once the trigger
was pulled, the flint traveled to contact the frizzen pan, which ignited gunpowder, and the small
flash of flame then ignited the powder behind the projectile. The result was a large cloud of gray
smoke exiting the barrel just after the projectile leave. The Kentucky Rifle was used in battle
from the late 1700s until the mid-1800s when the Spencer Repeater began to gain popularity
(Kyle, 2013).
The Spencer Repeater
In the spring of 1861, President Abraham Lincoln arrived at a firing range to test out two
new rifles, the Spencer Repeater and the Henry Repeater (Kyle, 2013). The Henry Repeater,
unlike the Kentucky Rifle, was a lever action rifle that utilized a long tube magazine running the
length of the barrel of the gun (Kyle, 2103). The Henry could fire 16 shots without having to
reload and “took about half a minute to reload; a soldier could then squeeze off another sixteen
shots as fast as he could jerk the lever back and forth” (Kyle, 2013, p. 35). Next up was the
Spencer Repeater. Unlike the Henry, the Spencer had:
Seven cartridges fit into the weapon’s stock. Using an innovative dropping-block design
and lever action, all seven rounds could be quickly and accurately fired. When you pulled
down on the trigger guard, the breech opened and the spent cartridge was ejected. Push
the guard back on up and the new cartridge slipped into place, ready to fire. Spare
magazines could be kept ready for speedy loading in combat. (Kyle, 2013, p. 40)
Of the two guns, the Spencer Repeater found greater favor in Lincoln’s eyes. Later in 1861, the
Union contracted with the gun manufacturer to provide 10,000 Spencer Repeaters for the army.
The Spencer repeater helped the North secure victory at the Battle of Gettysburg. Kyle (2013)
noted that “those Spencer Repeaters proved that volume of fire was one important key to
winning a battle that’s been called a turning point of the Civil War” (p. 50). As the Civil War
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ended and America began its next chapter, the Spencer Repeater would fade and the Colt SingleAction Army Revolver (Colt .45) would rise to the challenges in the wild American West (Kyle,
2013).
The Colt Single-Action Army Revolver (Colt .45)
Gun maker Samuel Colt developed the Colt Single-Action Army Revolver (Colt .45), and
it was his first pistol that fired center-fire cartridges (Kyle, 2103). Prior to the Colt .45, most of
Colt’s revolvers used a method of loading which required the powder and ball [bullet] to be
loaded down the front of the cylinder and fired by striking a percussion cap. Colt copied the
Smith & Wesson Model 3 Revolver’s use of a metal center-fire cartridge containing the powder,
primer, and bullet all in one (Kyle, 2013). The Colt .45 proved to be the preferred weapon of
both outlaws, like Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid, Billy the Kid, and the Dalton Boys as
well as lawmen, such as Virgil, Wyatt, and Morgan Earp (Kyle, 2013). The Colt .45 would be
used in the famous 1881 Gunfight at the O. K. Corral in Tombstone, Arizona after two cowboys;
Billy Clanton and Frank McLaury, appeared in Tombstone wearing Colt .44 pistols on their hips
in violation of a law requiring weapons to be checked (Kyle, 2013). The Earp brothers, all armed
with Colt .45’s, along with Doc Holliday, confronted Clanton and McLaury at the O.K. Corral
where they had gathered with their brothers and other cowboys. Some confusion about the exact
chain of events still exists, but when the shootout was over, three cowboys had been killed and
three lawmen were wounded (Kyle, 2103). While the “Colt revolvers had been instrumental in
opening up the American West,” in order “to finally ‘win’ the West, the United States needed an
even bigger gun” which happened to be the Winchester 1873 Rifle (Kyle, 2013, p. 83).
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Second Generation
From around the turn of the century until the 1960s, a “second generation” of weapons
developed in the United States. The Winchester 1873 Rifle, the M1903 Springfield, and the
M1911 Army Pistol, incorporated technology that changed from slow reloaded flint-fired and
percussion cap-fired weapons to lever action rifles and magazine-fed handguns that allowed
quicker reload times and fired multiple rounds before the operator reloaded. It is important to
examine the “second generation” of advancement in weapon technology, as the ability to fire
multiple rounds without the need to reload was an important characteristic in weapon selection
for campus shooters and other active mass shooters.
The Winchester 1873 Rifle
In October of 1892, the infamous Dalton Gang arrived in Coffeyville, Kansas and began
robbing the two banks in town. When the citizens heard about the robberies, many responded to
the Isham Brothers hardware stores where they armed themselves with Winchester 1873 rifles
and began shooting at the bank robbers (Kyle, 2013). After the gunfire subsided, four members
of the Dalton Gang were dead, along with four civilians but the town’s money had been saved
from the robbers. Kyle (2013) noted the Winchester 1873 rifles the citizens armed themselves
with:
Fed as many as fifteen bullets through a round tube magazine into the breech. Pull down
on the trigger guard, come back up with it, fire---even if most of these folks hadn’t grown
up around guns all their lives, they still would have had no trouble learning how to fire
the rifle in the heat of the battle. The front sight was fixed, and while the rear could be
adjusted, my suspicion is that at close range the good citizens of Coffeyville didn’t have
to do much messing around with the sight. (p. 91)
While the Winchester 1873 was utilized by Dalton Gang as well as others in the West, Kyle
(2013) asserted, “Winchesters were never commonly used as combat weapons by American
military forces” due to the “difficulty of cycling rounds while lying flat behind thin cover” so it
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“became the all-purpose working rifle for countless thousands of cowboys, ranchers, lawmen,
and homesteaders in the last quarter of the nineteenth century” (pp. 93-94). Even President
Theodore Roosevelt, who became a cowboy and rancher after his wife and daughter died in
1884, used a Winchester rifle as he tracked three fugitives from justice and marched them back
forty miles to face charges (Kyle, 2013). As Roosevelt found out nearly 15 years later at the
battles of Kettle Hill and San Juan Heights, there was another weapon superior to the
Winchester, the Spanish Model 1893 Mauser.
The M1903 Springfield
When Roosevelt lead American troops to the eastern side of Santiago, Cuba he found the
Americans outgunned in both artillery and small arms fire. The Spanish had the Spanish Model
1893 Mauser, “a fast-firing, speed-loading, repeating firearm of excellent reliability and smooth,
safe, and effective performance” (Kyle, 2013, p. 115). The Americans had a bolt-action rifle, the
U.S. magazine Rifle, a .30 caliber, Model 1896, which was modeled off a Norwegian gun as well
as the 1873 Trapdoor Springfield that fired black powder cartridges (Kyle, 2013). Roosevelt
carried a Winchester rifle to battle and even opted to purchase Winchesters for some of his
troops to use, however, the Mauser was the superior weapon in the battle (Kyle, 2103). Despite
the troops being outnumbered and utilizing inferior weapons, Roosevelt led the Americans to
victory at the battles of Kettle Hill and San Juan Heights. Although these battles did not win the
Spanish-American war, they set the stage for the signing of the Treaty of Paris and marked a
“turning point in American guns; the shift from antiquated military rifles to cutting-edge, modern
weapons that could dominate the battlefield” (Kyle, 2013, p. 121).
Four years after San Juan Hill, Springfield Armory introduced its M1903 Springfield
rifle, a bolt-action, .30 caliber, five-round magazine, stripper-clip-fed rifle called the U.S. Rifle,
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Caliber .30, Model of 1903 (Kyle, 2013). Other than the firing pin, the M1903 was a Spanish
Mauser and it so closely resembled the Mauser that the owners of Mauser sued the American
government for copying its rifle. The disposition of the lawsuit required the United States to pay
hundreds of thousands of dollars in royalties (Kyle, 2013). Theodore Roosevelt loved the new
M1903 so much that he ordered his own custom hunting model of the rifle and used it on
numerous hunting trips across three continents over the next 12 years (Kyle, 2013).
The M1911 Army Pistol
While the Springfield 1903 was an effective weapon for the battlefield and was a great
hunting rifle, there was another firearm that was also standard issue for the American military
from 1911 to 1985, the Automatic Pistol, Caliber .45, Model M1911, popularly known as the
1911. After the Spanish-American war, the U.S. Army found itself fighting in the Philippine
Islands against radical Islamist Moro tribesmen, and realized their issued .38 Long Colt revolvers
were ineffective at stopping the Moro (Kyle, 2013). This led the Army to seek out a better option
for a handgun and tested handguns from five companies, the Army decided on the 1911:
A semi-automatic, locked-breech, single-action Cold Pistol. The handgun chambered .45
caliber, 230-grain, full metal jacket, smokeless rounds fed from a single stack, sevenshot magazine. The winning prototype had fired no less than six thousand rounds. It had
been dunked in acid and salt water, and forced to handle deformed and misloaded [sic]
rounds. It became the official sidearm of the U.S. Army on March 29, 1911. (Kyle, 2013,
pp. 150-51)
The Marine Corps and the Navy followed suit in adopting the weapon a couple of years later.
The 1911 was considered semi-automatic handgun, which differed from the Colt .45 in that
instead of a cylinder to hold the rounds, the 1911 had “a spring-loaded magazine easily filled
with bullets. The mag [sic] slips vertically inside the pistol grip. Rack the pistol—pull back the
slide (the top of the gun, sitting over the barrel). This chambers a round. Aim. Fire” (Kyle, 2013,
pp.155-56).
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The 1911 proved to be an effective handgun used in World War I against the Germans, in
Latin America and the Caribbean during the Banana Wars, as well as in Haiti in 1919 when a
Marine sergeant snuck into Charlemagne Peralte’s camp and executed him in front of many of
Peralte’s followers (Kyle, 2013). After being successfully used in both World War I and World
War II as well as the Vietnam War, the M1911 was adopted back at home in the United States by
numerous law-enforcement agencies including the FBI, Secret Service, and even the Texas
Rangers. Yet, as great of a weapon the M1911 was, it was no match for the next-generation of
firearms that developed, most notably the Thompson Submachine Gun which in 1939 Time
magazine called the deadliest weapon ever devised by man (Time, 1939). This “third generation”
of firearms became much more accurate and much more reliable than previous generations of
firearms and those new firearms were often employed by mass shooters both in the public and on
campuses of higher education.
Third Generation
The Thompson Submachine Gun
During the late 1920s and the early 1930s, the Thompson enjoyed an infamous, although
relatively short-lived popularity. It was commonly adopted by the gangsters of the era. Al
Capone was eating in his favorite restaurant in late 1926, when nine limousines pulled in front of
the restaurant and fired more than a thousand rounds of ammunition from Thompson
Submachine guns into the business. This shooting would come to be known as the Siege of
Cicero (Kyle, 2013).
The Thompson differed from previously examined rifles in that a semi-automatic rifle
required the operator to pull the trigger of the firearm each time he or she wished to fire a round.
The Thompson was an automatic rifle that required the operator to simply press and hold the
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trigger and rounds were fired, automatically one after another, until either the operator released
the trigger or the magazine ran out of bullets. Other notorious gangsters, such as John Dillinger
and Baby Face Nelson also favored the Thompson, nicknamed the “Tommy Gun.” Baby Face
Nelson used the weapon to kill more FBI agents than any other criminal in history (Kyle, 2013).
Although the Thompson was originally invented to be used in World War I as a way of
clearing enemy trenches, it was not finished in time to be utilized by soldiers in the war.
Unfortunately, gangsters of the time adopted and used the weapon so often that the Thompson
Submachine Gun became synonymous with organized crime (Kyle, 2013). By the time World
War II started, nearly a million and a half Thompsons were in service and used by GI’s. Those
Thompson Submachine Guns were not only utilized in WW II, but in Korea and Vietnam as
well. The weapon remained in the United States military inventory long after WW II came to an
end, with some of them still being used as late as the 1960s (Kyle, 2013). By the mid-1960’s,
another battle rifle, The M16, emerged and was tested in the jungles of Vietnam.
The M16 Rifle
In November of 1965, the United States found itself engaged in a fight with the People’s
Army of Vietnam, and for the first time, American soldiers were deployed into battle with a fully
automatic assault rifle (Kyle, 2013). The weapon soldiers carried was officially called the
XM16E1, a name later shortened to M16 (Kyle, 2013). As the battle continued, reports of
problems with the M16 surfaced and as Kyle (2103) stated, “the gun had a fatal weakness as a
combat rifle: It was not very forgiving if you fouled it or got it full of dirt” and as such “the
damn thing had the tendency to jam at the worst possible time (p.245). This problem, however,
did not render the entire weapon system useless; it just required some major revisions to the
weapon. By the 1980s revisions such as an added forward assist (allowed operator to make sure
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the bolt was closed), a change in the powder charges in the cartridge, and revised instructions
about the importance of keeping the weapon clean had been made (Kyle, 2013).
Unfortunately, much like the Thompson Submachine Gun, the M16 and its subsequent
improved versions not only caught the eye of those in combat but appealed to the criminal
element as well. In 1997 in North Hollywood, California, two heavily armed men entered a Bank
of America and were confronted by the police before they could escape the bank. Although they
were not carrying M16’s exactly as previously described, they were armed with fully automatic
rifles with drum-style magazines [large, round magazines capable of holding hundreds of
rounds] and were wearing body armor (Kyle, 2013). The police at the time were armed with
semiautomatic pistols and shotguns and for the next forty-five minutes, the pair outgunned the
police, wounding 18 of the nearly 300 officers who responded (Kyle, 2013).
Officers were finally able to kill the pair with automatic assault rifles located at a nearby
gun shop but the need for the police to be better armed became apparent. The Bank of America
incident in 1997 was not the first time in history law enforcement found itself facing criminals
who were better armed than they were. Almost 11 years earlier, Special Agents with the FBI in
Miami, Florida spotted two bank robbery suspects who were wanted in connection with two
murders and a missing woman (Barrett, 2012). As the FBI agents converged upon the men,
armed with a rifle and a shotgun, the men shot at the agents. Agents returned fire with their FBI
issued five and six shot revolvers and by the time the shooting stopped, two agents had been
killed and five others injured (Barrett, 2012). After the Miami shootout, Lieutenant John
Rutherford of the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office set out to find a better handgun to replace the
revolvers issued to Sheriff’s Deputies (Barrett, 2012) Little did he know, a new handgun was
about to be discovered that changed the face of law enforcement. Those handguns, created by an
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Austrian railroad worker named Gaston Glock, quickly became the most widely used handgun in
law enforcement history.
The Glock
Gaston Glock developed the first model of Glock pistol in the early 1980s, which
contained just thirty-four components and was nearly ten ounces lighter than other comparable
pistols at the time (Barrett, 2012). Glock, a railroad worker turned government contractor, was
known to produce good quality knives and ammunition belts for the Army in Austria. Because of
his reputation, Glock was selected to have his Glock pistol prototype tested against four other
pistols for consideration of adoption by the Austrian Army. Gaston Glock’s new pistol tested the
best and in 1983, the Ministry of Defense ordered twenty thousand Glock 17’s (Barrett, 2012).
Glock, with the help of Karl Walter, a gun salesman, introduced the Glock to the United States in
the early 1980s. Their timing was unfortunate as the Glock brand of pistols gained both notoriety
and criticism with its introduction. Barrett (2012) spoke about the turmoil in the United States
over hijackings of commercial airlines that coincided with the introduction of Glock pistols. The
Glock handgun had a trigger and lower receiver assembly made almost entirely of a kind of
polymer plastic instead of metal like the current models of handguns available. Many opponents
of this new weapon technology (partially plastic handguns) feared these handguns could escape
detection with currently employed methods of x-ray detection in airports (Barrett, 2012). In fact,
during a 1986 hearing of the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Crime,
Representative Biaggi, a former New York City police officer who had been a member of
Congress for 20 years, called the firearm the “latest tool of terrorist technology…because it is
mostly plastic. I say that the Glock 17 is far more difficult to detect than any conventional
weapon” (Barrett, 2012, p.45-6).
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Despite this early controversy, the Glock pistol quickly became one of the most popular
handguns in the United States. Many gun-control advocates continued to claim the weapon was
the preferred choice of those who chose to commit gun violence but Barrett (2012) disagreed.
Those claims appeared to be unsubstantiated, at least according to a 2002 Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms study of 88,570 guns recovered from crime scenes in 46 cities during
2000 (Barrett, 2012). The study ranked the top 10 weapons recovered from those scenes studied,
and interestingly, the Glock was not even listed in the top 10. Yet, according to Barrett (2012)
“Some of our most prolific psychopaths have favored the Glock, presumably because of its large
ammunition capacity and lightning speed” (p. 22). Mass public shooters such as Seung-Hui Cho
at Virginia Tech, Steven Kazmierczak from Northern Illinois University, and Jared Loughner in
Tuscon, Arizona, all used the Glock as at least one of their weapons of choice (Barrett, 2012).
From flints, to percussion caps, to lever action to automatic shooting, firearms in the
United States evolved over several hundred years to what they are today. With the most recent
iterations of these weapons capable of inflicting great numbers of deaths, the argument could be
made that this evolution in lethality has some correlation to the prevalence of mass shootings in
the United States. Early firearms in the United States were somewhat primitive and not
conducive to firing multiple rounds in short periods. The latest types of firearms allow the
operator to fire dozens, if not hundreds of rounds, in the time it would take earlier weapons such
as the Kentucky rifle to fire a single round, reload, and fire a second round. Even weapons such
as the Spencer Repeater or the Winchester 1873, which were capable of firing 7 to 15 rounds
before needing to be reloaded, were far less reliable and accurate than weapons developed in the
past couple of decades. The increased accuracy and reliability of firearms gave modern mass
shooters greater potential to inflict large numbers of injuries and casualties. The present study
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examined the deadliest community college campus shooting in American history and included a
discussion of the type of weapon system the shooter used. The next section examined student,
faculty, staff, administration, and campus police officials’ perceptions and attitudes about the
idea of weapons being carried on their campuses, whether concealed or otherwise.
Attitudes Toward Weapons on Campus
In 2004, Utah became the first state to pass a law that allowed concealed carry of
firearms on the state’s public college campuses. Surprisingly, in the wake of the massacre at
Virginia Tech in 2007, states increasingly allowed students to carry concealed firearms on
campus. By 2008, 17 states had attempted to pass laws similar to Utah allowing handguns on
campus (Bartula & Bowen, 2015). As of 2009, 24 states had weapon-bans in place for colleges
and another 23 states left the decision up to individual institutions (Bartula & Bowen, 2015).
Proponents of this type of legislation often made the argument that in order to make a college or
university a less desirable target of mass shooters, institutions should allow students, faculty, and
staff to carry concealed firearms. Having this knowledge, individuals who were prone to
violence against the members of the campus would be less likely to choose that particular
institution. The National Rifle Association along with other pro-concealed carry advocates, such
as the group Students for Concealed Carry on Campus, argued that the campus community
would be safer and more secure with the knowledge that some legally authorized individuals on
campus were armed and willing to react to threats such as an active shooter on campus. Not
everyone felt the same about concealed carrying of weapons on campus. Smith (2012) wrote,
“Opponents of such legislation argue that allowing guns on campuses would be a mistake. The
American Association of University Professors is one such opponent” (p. 240). Quizon (2011)
quoted AAUP spokeswoman Nse Ufot as saying “campuses would be better served by a more-
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balanced approach—for example, looking for ways to improve counseling services that would
help identify unstable and potentially dangerous people, or adjusting emergency-response plans
to deal with violent situations” (p. 2).
While there was a great deal of research into guns and gun control generally, very little
research into college students’ view of gun control existed. A few studies measured college
students’ attitudes toward campuses allowing concealed carry. One study conducted by
Cavanaugh, Bouffard, Wells, and Nobles (2012) found students did not seem particularly
comfortable with the concept of weapons on campus. Cavanaugh et al. (2012) conducted a study
of two universities in states that had recently considered introducing legislation that would allow
for concealed carry on campus. The researchers administered an in-person survey in classes at
both universities and after controlling for blank surveys and those filled out by non-students
present in the course, had a response rate of 78.4% at one university and 72.1% at the other
(Cavanaugh et al., 2012). The results of this study revealed one institution reported a nearly 3:1
ratio of being not comfortable at all with concealed handguns on campus to being very
comfortable while the other institution had a very similar result with greater than a 2:1 ratio
(Cavanaugh et al., 2012).
Another study conducted by Miller, Hemenway, and Wechsler (1999) did not specifically
explore students’ comfort with concealed weapons on campus but more generally sought to
determine the rate of firearm possession on campus and to explore potential differences between
those students who carried firearms versus those who did not. Miller et al. (1999) surveyed 130
4-year colleges and utilized a random sample size of 26,920 students returning 15,685 surveys
that equated to a 58% response rate. This study indicated that of those who completed the survey,
6% of men and 1.5% of women reported they had a working firearm at college (Miller et al.,
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1999). Miller et al. (2002) conducted a follow-up survey to Miller et al. (1999) in which the
researchers claimed in “the only previous survey of firearm possession at college, 6.4% of male
students and 1.5% of female students had a working firearm at school” (Miller et al., p. 57,
2002). This follow-up study (Miller et al., 2002) examined the relationship between the general
public’s firearm ownership and overall firearm ownership of college students. Miller et al.
(2002) surveyed 119 4-year colleges and utilized a random sample size of 21,055 students
returning 10,904 surveys that equated to a 52% response rate. Those responses came from
students who were enrolled in public colleges (69%) and private colleges (31%) which,
according to the researchers is approximately the national distribution of four-year students
(Miller et al., 2002). During the course of the research, they revealed that of those who
responded to the survey, 4.3% indicated they had a working firearm at college, and interestingly
of those 4.3%, 1.6% of them had actually been threatened with a gun a school (Miller et al.,
2002). Miller et al. (2002) found:
That gun owning college students are more likely than their unarmed counterparts to
drink frequently and excessively and, when inebriated, to engage in activities that put
themselves and others at risk for life-threatening injury, such as driving when under the
influence of alcohol, vandalizing property, and having unprotected intercourse. In this
respect, college students who carry weapons generally…are more likely than nonweapon-carrying students to consume excessive amounts of alcohol, to fight, and to have
multiple sexual partners. (p. 63)
While these two studies did not seek to examine students comfort with concealed
weapons on campus, both studies indicated that only a small percentage of respondents, 7.9%
and 4.3% respectively, admitted having a working firearm at college. Given the fact that a very
small percent of those college students admitted to having had possession of a working firearm
while on campus, it would seem to indicate the majority of the students would not be
comfortable with additional weapons on campus. Otherwise, one would expect to see a higher
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incidence of weapon possession among those students surveyed. The obvious limitation to that
claim is these two studies only examined a portion of all colleges in the United States.
Both Cavanaugh et al. (2012) and to some degree Miller et al. (2002) found in their
research that only a small percentage of college students are comfortable with the idea of
allowing weapons to be carried on campus. Similarly, faculty members and school administrators
tended to be against the idea of allowing concealed weapons on campus according to studies
conducted by several researchers. Bennett, Kraft and Grubb (2012) surveyed one university in
southeastern Georgia in an effort to gauge faculty attitudes toward concealed carry on their
campus. In their study, the researchers contacted 287 faculty/administration members via campus
mail to request their participation of which 158 completed and returned the survey that
represented a 55% response rate (Bennett et al., 2012). Of the 158 responses, researchers found
that 13 of those respondents identified as administrators, and subsequently omitted those 13
responses due to the fact that “While administrators at the university hold faculty status, they
typically teach no more than one course per year and are in much less contact with large numbers
of students” (Bennett et al., p. 339, 2012). According to Bennett et al. (2012), 70% of those
surveyed either opposed or strongly opposed Georgia’s new gun legislation, HB 89, which
expanded the places concealed carry permit-holders were allowed to carry a concealed weapon.
Although HB 89 did not allow concealed carry as it was passed, 72% of those surveyed were
strongly opposed to allowing concealed carry on college campuses and 70% were strongly
opposed to allowing weapons in churches or synagogues (Bennett et al., 2012). Bennett et al.
(2012) found while “the present study showed that political party affiliation and gun ownership
were the most significant predictors of opposition to the HB 89, …the current study lacked
variables measuring political ideology, only capturing self-identified political party” (p. 349).
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Bennett et al. (2012) went on to say that, “While the current study represents attitudes from over
half of the faculty at only one state university in Georgia, it appears clear that, by and large,
college faculty are generally opposed to allowing concealed handguns on campuses or in places
of worship” (p. 350). Although not a part of their particular study, Bennett et al. (2012) noted
that administrators also indicated a strong opposition not only to HB 89 but to other proposed
amendments that allowed weapons on campus and in religious buildings. Bennett et al. (2012)
found that 11 of the 13 respondents were strongly opposed to all three measures.
Thompson, Price, Drake and Teeple (2013) also researched faculty perceptions of
carrying concealed weapons on campus. In their study, the researchers sent a questionnaire to
1,125 faculty members at 15 randomly selected state universities in five Great Lake states to
assess their attitudes about concealed weapons on campus. Faculty members were asked about
being a victim of crime on campus, their feelings about their safety on campus, confidence in
campus police to prevent crime, and whether or not they carried weapons on campus (Thompson
et al., 2013). Nearly 800 questionnaires were returned (70% response rate) with a majority of the
respondents being male, white, Democrat, and who did not hold a concealed carry weapons
permit. Thompson et al. (2013) found that 97% of the responding faculty said they felt safe while
on campus, 82% indicated they were not worried about being a victim of violence, and only 9%
of those faculty members had actually been a victim of a crime on campus. In addition, the
researchers found the vast majority of the faculty who responded (94%) did not support
concealed carry on campus, with 92% of those respondents indicating they would not seek to
become concealed-carry licensed if it became legal, and in fact, 93% of them believed if
concealed-carry were allowed on campus, other faculty would not feel safe (Thompson et al.,
2013). While a majority of the respondents in this study were male, white, Democrat, and did not
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hold a concealed carry weapons permit, those respondents who were male, Republican, and
owned two or more firearms were more likely to support concealed-carry on campus than the
majority of the respondents (Thompson et al., 2013) Faculty members who were against
concealed-carry on campus cited a number of reasons for why they were uncomfortable with the
idea. Those reasons included “they might miss and another person might mistakenly be shot,” the
fact that “researchers and practitioners alike report hit ratios by trained police officers that vary
from 17 to 34%,” and “concern that they might be mistaken for a ‘campus shooter’ if they had
their own guns drawn” (Thompson et al., 2013, p. 371). Thompson et al. (2013) concluded:
Based on the majority of the findings of the current study it is clear that the vast majority
of university faculty were not supportive of having concealed handguns on campus. Most
faculty already feel extremely safe on their campuses and clearly do not support the
introduction of concealed handguns. If faculty feel so strongly about not having
concealed handguns on college campuses it is imperative that they become informed
regarding legislation that is being introduced in their states that may impact their
workplaces. (p.371)
Not surprisingly, those surveyed who identified as leaning more toward Democratic ideology
tended not to support concealed carry on campus while those who identified as leaning more
toward Republican ideology tended to not only support concealed carry on campus but were
more likely to be firearm owners as well.
While Thompson et al. (2013) surveyed only faculty members at university campuses,
Patten, Thomas and Wada (2013) examined not only faculty perceptions about concealed carry
on campus but also perceptions of students, faculty, staff, and administrators. Patten et al. (2013)
surveyed students, faculty, staff, and administrators at two state colleges, Chico State University
in California and Chadron State College in Nebraska, with a total number of responses from both
colleges being 1,484 and 580 responses respectively. The researchers found the respondents at
Chico State tended to be predominately white, female, politically middle of the road but tended
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to lean more liberal while at Chadron State, the respondents tended to be white, female,
politically middle of the road but tended to lean more conservative (Patten et al., 2013). Patten et
al. (2013) found that a “majority of faculty, students, and staff (73%) did not want qualified
individuals to be able to carry a gun on campus, 70% did not feel safer with more concealed guns
on campus, and 72% did not think armed faculty, students and staff would promote a greater
sense of campus safety” (p. 559-560). This would seem to indicate that many individuals
affiliated with an institution of higher education would not support concealed carry on campus.
Although Patten et al. (2013) did not address the issue of open carrying of weapons on campus in
their study, Bartula and Bowen (2015) did.
Bartula and Bowen (2015) were the first to conduct a study of Texas university police
officials and their perceptions regarding the possibility of open carrying of firearms being
allowed on college campuses. Just prior to the study, Texas passed legislation allowing for
concealed carry on Texas campuses. Bartula and Bowen (2015) sent surveys to 115 top police
officials of Texas universities to determine if those officials would be supportive of open carry
on campus and if those officials felt that open carry would make individuals on campus feel
safer. Bartula and Bowen (2015) chose top police officials “because they would be directly
responsible for enforcing the new Texas policies [Texas legislation allowing concealed carry on
campus] and responding to any potential incidents on campus” (p. 7). In their study, Bartula and
Bowen (2015) sent 115 electronic surveys and the researchers received 47 responses (41%). 43
of the 47 respondents (91.4%) were not in favor of the possibility of open carry being allowed on
their campuses (Bartula & Bowen, 2015). Additionally, those respondents indicated “they
believe that such a law would increase fear of crime and victimization among students, faculty
and staff.” (Bartula & Bowen, p. 12, 2015)
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While there is a growing body of research about weapons on campus, additional research
in this area should be conducted. Whether studying the opinions of students, faculty, staff,
administrators as well as university police officials, current research indicates that a majority of
constituents in higher education oppose the concept of additional weapons on their campuses
regardless of the reason those weapons are there.
Chapter Summary
The purpose of this study was to identify the deadliest community college campus
shooting in United States history. Presented in this chapter was a discussion of the prevalence of
mass murder in the United States from the 1900s to the present. This chapter addressed what
scholars considered the requirements for a mass murder incident to qualify as a mass shooting.
Additionally, this chapter reviewed what researchers said about mass shootings, including what
criteria were required for an incident to be a mass shooting, and explored the prevalence of mass
shootings on campuses of higher education. Along with the prevalence of mass shootings at
higher education institutions, this chapter discussed the evolution of firearms and the
development of a more zealous gun culture in the United States. Finally, this chapter discussed
the attitudes toward concealed weapons on campus by many of the constituents in higher
education.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY

As previously noted in the literature review, mass murders have occurred in the United
States for more than 200 years, and while mass shootings have been a part of the total number of
mass murders, not every mass murder is a mass shooting. Of all of the mass murders that did
qualify as mass shootings, an even fewer number of those mass shootings occurred on a campus
of higher education. Although not every mass shooting occurred on a college or university
campus, any shooting on a higher education campus is problematic, whether it qualifies as a
mass shooting or not. My study focused on a mass shooting at a campus of higher education. I
chose a qualitative, single-case study approach to answer three main research questions:
1. What was the law enforcement response to the deadliest community college campus
shooting in history?
2. Did previous mass shootings inform the law enforcement response to the deadliest
community college campus shooting?
3. What implications for practice can be derived by studying the deadliest community
college campus shooting?
According to Yin (2009), case study research requires one to “explain and show how you
are devoting yourself to following a rigorous methodological path” (p. 3). This chapter outlines
the method and rationale for selecting a qualitative, single-case study research design and
explains the specific procedure for collecting data. Additionally, this chapter addresses the type
of data collected, how this data was analyzed, and issues such as ensuring the integrity of the
data. The chapter also includes a discussion of the limitations of the design selected.
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Research Design
I chose a qualitative, single-case study approach to examine the deadliest campus
shooting at a community college, in part to determine if changes made as a result previous mass
shootings were helpful to that institution. Creswell (2008) asserted qualitative research:
is a type of educational research in which the researcher relies on the views of
participants; asks broad, general questions; collects data consisting largely of words (or
texts) from participants; describes and analyzes these words for themes; and conducts the
inquiry in a subjective, biased manner. (p. 46)
According to Creswell (2014), qualitative research differs from quantitative research in that
qualitative research methods “rely on text and image data, have unique steps in data analysis, and
draw on diverse designs” (p. 183). Additionally, Creswell (2008) described qualitative research
as research that “relies on the views of participants” and “collects data consisting largely of
words (or text) from participants” (p.46). In this study, I relied heavily on interviews with police
officers who responded to the shooting or who were involved directly with the response to the
shooting.
There are several important aspects of qualitative research that must be considered when
conducting a study. For example, methods for collecting qualitative data do not generally rely
upon instruments developed by the researcher to collect data; they more often examine
documents, observe behavior, and interview participants face-to-face (Creswell, 2014). In this
study, I chose not to design an instrument to collect data about the deadliest campus shootings
since the information from this case was readily available to be studied.
Qualitative research also uses multiple sources of data, such as interviews, documents,
observations, and audio-visual information as opposed to using a single source. The researcher
then organizes those multiple data sources to identify themes (Creswell, 2014). I used data from
multiple sources through the Internet, such as newspaper articles written about the incident,
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along with reports generated by police agencies involved with the shooting. In addition to
newspaper articles and reports, I conducted interviews with law enforcement officers who were
personally involved in the response to the shooting.
Finally, qualitative research planning can be difficult, as the initial plan for the phases of
the research may change as the researcher begins collecting the data and may even change the
initial research questions to some degree (Creswell, 2014). I did experience this during my study.
I had originally planned to interview individuals associated with the community college studied.
However, after reviewing my request for interviews, the administration at the college declined to
participate in the study. For all of the aforementioned considerations, I chose a qualitative
research method for this study.
Case Study Research
Since the purpose of this study was to examine the deadliest campus shooting at a
community college, it was not appropriate to use quantitative methods due to the small sample
size. Since the topic of higher education shootings in this study was so incredibly specific, that
is, not just a study of campus shootings but a study of the deadliest campus shooting at a
community college, I sought to find a method best situated for studying the event. Yin (2009)
asserted that “a case study is used in many situations, to contribute to our knowledge of
individual, organizational, social, political, and related phenomena” (p. 4). Creswell (2013) and
Merriam (2009) both noted the case study method of research is a valid form of qualitative
research, which is commonly used in the field of education. Merriam (2009) considered case
studies a type of qualitative research that differed from other types of research, such as surveys,
experiments, or statistical methods of research. Hancock and Algozzine (2003) asserted that
“although case study research sometimes focuses on an individual representative of a group (e.g.,
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a female principal), more often it addresses a phenomenon (e.g., a particular event, situation,
program or activity)” (p. 15). This study focused upon a particular event—a campus shooting—
and examined the deadliest campus shooting at a community college in an effort to identify
implications for law enforcement and higher education stakeholders.
The case study method in this study followed Hancock and Algozzine (2003), who
asserted that “doing case study research means identifying a topic that lends itself to in-depth
analysis in a natural context using multiple sources of information” (p. 16). Although I did not
physically travel to the location of the shooting, I was able to appreciate the natural context by
examining the perspectives and narratives of those individuals who were physically present for
the events. It is critical for educators and administrators to recognize the long history of campus
shootings and seek to identify ways to anticipate and mitigate the impact of campus shootings.
This study utilized multiple sources of information, from official police reports, archives
of publications, and statements from and interviews with those directly involved in the case.
“Case study research is generally more exploratory than confirmatory; that is the case study
researcher normally seeks to identify themes or categories of behavior and events rather than
prove relationships or test hypothesis” (Hancock & Algozzine, 2003, p. 16). Case study research
was the most appropriate method for this particular study in that I sought to examine the
deadliest community college campus shooting as a way to identify themes across higher
education and identify what implications those themes had on higher education constituents.
Similarly, Creswell (1998) noted that qualitative case studies are an “exploration of a
‘bounded system’ or a case (or multiple cases) over time through a detailed, in-depth data
collection involving multiple sources of information rich in context” (p. 61). The bounded
system means the case is bound by time and place (e.g., the United States and institutions of
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higher education since 1900). Multiple sources of information can include interviews,
documents, audio-visual material, as well as reports and observations; and context of the case is
focused on the physical, social, or historical setting (in this case the deadliest community college
campus shooting). I followed Creswell (1998), as well as Hancock and Algozzine (2003), and
utilized different types of information that included interviews, documents, reports and
observations (by others), archives, and databases.
I chose a single-case study design that followed Hancock and Algozzine’s (2003)
assertion that “case study research produces more than a chronological listing of events; it results
in a researchers descriptive interpretation of factors that both cause and result from events” (p.
31). In this study, I chose to examine the topic of the deadliest campus shooting at a community
college, and a single-case study design was the most appropriate.
Case Study Designs
Hancock and Algozinne (2003) asserted, “Doing case study research means selecting a
design that matches the disciplinary perspective of the investigation” (p. 33). Further, the
researchers argued case studies could be broken down into three groups—exploratory,
explanatory, and descriptive—and argued that exploratory designs “seek to define research
questions of a subsequent study;” explanatory designs “seek to establish cause-and-effect
relationships;” and descriptive designs “attempt to present a complete description of a
phenomenon within its context” (p. 33).
Additionally, Hancock and Algozinne (2003) argued that case studies were also classified
as intrinsic, instrumental, or collective. Intrinsic case studies primarily used to “study a particular
individual;” instrumental case studies used to develop “enhanced understanding of the particular
issue being examined;” and collective case studies “attempt to address an issue in question while
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adding to the literature base that helps up better conceptualize a theory” (p. 33). This study could
be considered an instrumental case study in that I attempted to create a better understanding of
the phenomenon of campus shootings by examining the deadliest campus shooting that occurred
on a community college campus.
After deciding upon a single-case study design, I relied upon the literature to provide a
framework for identifying the deadliest campus shootings. I utilized the following criteria for a
case to be considered. First, the incident had to have occurred on the campus of an institution of
higher education. Second, the incident had to have involved the use of at least one firearm. Third,
the incident had to have involved four or more victims killed, not including the shooter.
Mass Murder Criteria
When I examined the prevalence of mass murder, it became apparent that two schools of
thought existed when defining a mass murder. The disagreement primarily revolved around the
exact number of victims necessary in order to be considered mass murder. For example, in one
study, Dietz (1986) used three victims as the minimum number of victims killed for inclusion
into classification of mass murder in his research. Dietz (1986) cited the rationale of a threevictim threshold in order to “maximize the number of cases defined as mass murder (so that there
will be enough to study) while minimizing the odds that the cases so defined will be murders
occurring as a byproduct of other crimes” (p. 480). In other words, using three victims as
opposed to four, five, or even more, increased the sample size of the cases studied. I attempted to
identify the deadliest community college campus shooting, therefore, I chose not to follow
Dietz’s (1986) three-victim criteria to increase that sample size, but to follow Duwe’s (2004)
four-victim criteria.
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Duwe (2004) used four victims killed as the criteria to be included into the category of
mass murder. Duwe’s (2004) rational as to choosing the threshold of four victims killed as
opposed to three, appears to be two-fold. First, Duwe (2004) studied the period from 1900 to
1976 and primarily used newspaper coverage in The New York Times as the source of data for
the period. Additionally, Duwe (2004) relied upon the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Report,
which did not become a valid source of data until around 1976, for his study of the period of
1976-1999. Another scholar agreed with Duwe’s (2004) use of the four-victim criteria for
studying mass murder. Auxemery (2015) noted the “FBI distinguishes single, double, and triple
homicides from mass murders, which are four or more simultaneous homicides” (p. 150).
While one could argue that the number of victims necessary for a murder to be
considered a mass murder could either be three or four victims, I chose to use a four-victim
criteria as the minimum number of victims for a case to qualify as one of the deadliest campus
shootings for two main reasons. First, the FBI compiles reports of all major crimes committed in
the United States each year, which include major crimes such as shootings. The FBI makes a
distinction between normal murders and mass murders in that it does not classify an incident a
mass murder until four or more murders are committed in the same incident (Auxemery, 2015).
It made sense to use the same number used by the entity that kept track of the numbers of crimes
committed in the United States, as campus shootings would certainly be included in those
numbers. Second, when researching campus shootings, I first set out to identify the worst
shootings on higher education campuses. I considered choosing from cases that met the threevictim criteria suggested by Dietz (1986), however, many more campus shootings met the fourvictim criteria than the three-victim criteria and a higher number of victims killed seemed more
appropriate to classify as the worst of the shootings than a fewer number of victims. I am not
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suggesting that a shooting involving three victims or less was not worth studying, only that the
specific focus of this study was the worst campus shootings and using a four-victim criteria
maintained that specificity.
Mass Shooting Criteria
Next, I examined the literature to determine which shooting incidents were considered
mass shootings. Similar to the disagreement about the exact definition of mass murders that
existed in the literature, scholars also disagreed to some extent on what exactly constituted a
mass shooting. Blair and Schweit (2014) noted that the FBI categorized mass shootings as an
incident that involved an active shooter where one or more individuals killed at least four people.
The Department of Education and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security defined an active
shooter as “an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined
and populated area.” They further noted, “implicit in this definition is that the subject’s criminal
actions involve the use of firearms” (Blair & Schweit, 2014, p. 5). Bjelopera et al. (2013)
defined public mass shootings as “incidents occurring in relatively public places, involving four
or more deaths—not including the shooter(s)—and gunmen who select victims somewhat
indiscriminately” (p. 4). Schildkraut and Elsass (2016) identified a mass shooting as:
[A]n incident of targeted violence carried out by one or more shooters at one or more
public or populated locations. Multiple victims (both injuries and fatalities) are associated
with the attack, and both the victims and location(s) are chosen either at random or for
their symbolic value. The event occurs within a single 24-hour period, though most
attacks typically last only a few minutes. The motivation of the shooting must not
correlate with gang violence or targeted militant or terroristic activity. (p. 32)
I used the aforementioned criteria when I selected which cases to consider. Those cases not
meeting these criteria were excluded as potential cases to be studied.
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Sampling
According to Creswell (2008), the purpose of qualitative research is not to make general
statements about any particular population but to explore a central phenomenon, in this case the
deadliest campus shooting on a community college campus. Creswell (2008) claimed that “to
best understand this phenomenon, the qualitative researcher purposefully or intentionally selects
individuals and sites” (p. 212). In this study, I employed purposeful sampling where I chose a
specific case to study, the deadliest community college campus shooting, and I intentionally
chose the individuals to be interviewed about their experience with that shooting.
First, in order to determine which campus shootings were the deadliest, I developed a
table of the deadliest campus shootings by utilizing the previously mentioned criteria of:
1. The incident had to have occurred on the campus of an institution of higher
education.
2. The incident had to have involved the use of at least one firearm.
3. The incident had to have involved four or more victims killed, not including the
shooter.
This table included which type of institution the shooting took place at, the shooter’s affiliation
with the institution, as well as the number of people killed that were not the shooter.
Table 1
Campus Shooter Characteristics
Year
Location
Type of Institution
Number Killed
Class Status
______________________________________________________________________________
1961
University Of Texas
Public
13
Undergraduate
1976

California State University

Public

7

Custodian

1991

University of Iowa

Public

5

Graduate
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Table 1 (Cont.)
Campus Shooter Characteristics
Year
Location
Type of Institution
Number Killed
Class Status
______________________________________________________________________________
1991
University of Iowa
Public
5
Graduate
2007

Virginia Polytechnic Institute

Public

32

Undergraduate

2008

Northern Illinois University

Public

5

Graduate

2010

Oikos University

Private

7

Undergraduate

2015

Umpqua Community College

Public

9

Undergraduate

After examining the table, I was able to identify the deadliest campus shooting that had occurred
on a community college campus, the Umpqua Community College shooting in 2015.
Second, once I was able to identify the deadliest campus shooting on a community
college, I set out to identify which individuals I wanted to interview for the study. I originally
wanted to speak to individuals who were affiliated with the community college, such as faculty
and members of the institution, as well as law enforcement officers who responded to the
shooting or were very closely involved in the incident. I contacted representatives of the college
and presented my case study protocol along with a request for permission to contact faculty
members, administrators, or other institutional representatives who may be familiar with the
case. After deliberation at the institutional administrative level, Umpqua Community College
declined to participate in the study.
I then moved on to the second group of individuals I wanted to interview, those law
enforcement officers who responded to the shooting or who were closely involved with the
investigation of the incident. I employed what Creswell (2008) described as snowball sampling,
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where “snowball sampling is a form of purposeful sampling that typically proceeds after a study
begins and occurs when the researcher asks participants to recommend other individuals to
study” (p. 217). In this case, the participants I was looking for were those individuals who were
most closely involved with the incident, but not the entire sample of law enforcement officers
who responded that day. In particular, I wanted to identify the very first officers who engaged the
shooter in gunfire, those officers who arrived during that exchange of gunfire, those officers who
arrived very shortly after the shooting stopped, and the officers who were in charge of the
investigation in the aftermath of the shooting.
I started this process by contacting the public information officer of the municipality
where the shooting took place. This officer was the first person I interviewed and he was
instrumental in identifying the two officers on scene who engaged the shooter in a gun battle.
After interviewing those officers, they were able to identify some of the officers who arrived
during the shooting as well as those who arrived immediately after the shooting stopped. Finally,
I contacted the public information officer of the Sheriff’s Office who handled the investigation
and he was able to identify the detective who ran the investigation in the aftermath of the
shooting.
In all, seven participants took part in the current study, which included five officers from
the municipality where the shooting occurred, one officer from a municipality close by, and the
detective from the Sheriff’s Office who conducted the investigation in the aftermath of the
shooting. Since this shooting was so specific, that is, the deadliest campus shooting at a
community college, it was unlikely I would have been able to keep the participants’ identities
confidential since many of the participants were written about in newspaper articles and
television stories that were widely publicized in the days and weeks following the shooting.
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Data Collection
This study utilized multiple sources of information, from official police reports, archives
of publications, and statements from those directly involved in those cases. “Case study research
is generally more exploratory than confirmatory; that is the case study researcher normally seeks
to identify themes or categories of behavior and events rather than prove relationships or test
hypothesis” (Hancock & Algozzine, 2003, p. 16). Case study research was the most appropriate
method for this particular study in that I sought to examine the deadliest community college
campus shooting as a way to identify themes across higher education and identify what
implications those themes had on higher education constituents.
Hancock and Algozzine (2003) suggested case studies should utilize the study of “four
categories of documents: the Internet, private and public records, physical evidence, and
instruments created by the researcher” (p. 52). Given the scope of the study, I utilized three of
these categories, private and public records and the Internet. I was unable to collect any actual
physical evidence. However, I discussed what physical evidence was noted in those documents,
such as what type of weapon the shooter utilized. It did not seem appropriate to attempt to create
any type of instrument to administer, as the shooter in the case examined was deceased. Much of
the information surrounding the shooting, including witness statements, were available using the
aforementioned categories. In much the same manner as Hancock and Algozzine (2003), Baxter
and Jack (2008) asserted that a qualitative case study:
is an approach to research that facilitates exploration of a phenomenon within its context
using a variety of data sources. This ensures that the issue is not explored through one
lens, but rather a variety of lenses which allows for multiple facets of the phenomenon to
be revealed and understood. (p. 544)
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In other words, the phenomenon of mass shootings in higher education could be more richly
explored by looking at the cases from different viewpoints, such as from the perspective of
students, faculty, staff, and administrators.
In much the same manner as Hancock and Algozzine (2003), Creswell (2014) discussed
the four basic types of qualitative data collection procedures as being: observation, interviews,
documents and audio and visual materials. Given the fact that this study examined the deadliest
campus shooting to have occurred on the campus of a community college, I was not able to
utilize all four of the data collection procedures as suggested by Creswell (2014). Creswell
(2014) explained qualitative observation involved the researcher taking field notes of activities at
the research site where the researcher would typically ask participants questions and record their
views. Qualitative observation was not appropriate in this particular study as the incident had
already happened.
Second, Creswell (2014) asserted that qualitative interviews involved a face-to-face
meeting with the participants, telephone interviews, or a focus group of participants. In the
current study, I was able to conduct telephone interviews with seven law enforcement officers
who were directly involved in the incident. As previously mentioned, I attempted to gain
permission from the administration of Umpqua Community College to speak to representatives
of the college who were present at the time of the shooting, but the administration denied my
request.
Third, Creswell (2014) noted another valid data collection procedure included the
examination of qualitative documents, whether they were publicly available or private
documents available to the researcher. This study utilized different sources of public documents,
such as publications publically accessible from governmental agencies, newspapers, institutions,
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and scholars in the field. Additionally, I collected official police reports from agencies who
responded to the incident, along with lab reports, audio recordings of victim and witness
interviews, and surveillance video from the college and the pawnshop where the shooter
purchased weapons used in the incident. I was careful when I collected these documents since
many of the sources were free and available. Yin (2009) warned that a researcher utilizing these
types of sources should be cautious and verify the accuracy, scope, purpose and context before
utilizing them in the study. Creswell (2014) also cautioned that documents may be produced by
individuals who may differ in their level of articulation or perception of an event and the
documents may not be accurate or even authentic.
Finally, Creswell (2014) noted the last category of qualitative data included qualitative
audio and visual materials, such as photographs, e-mails, videotapes, and social media text and
digital archives. I was able to collect over 600 photographs taken by law enforcement at the
scene of the shooting. In addition, I collected several audio interviews of victims who were
present in the classroom at the time of the shooting along with surveillance video from both the
college and the pawnshop where the shooter purchased at least one of the weapons used in the
incident. Lastly, I was able to access many photographs and articles in both newspapers and
magazines available publically from reputable sources such as national magazines and
government entities.
One weakness I identified in these categories of data collection was that it did not require
me to travel to the particular institution in person; therefore, I could have missed some of the
context and unique atmosphere of the individual campus. Although I could have missed some of
that context and atmosphere, since much time had elapsed since the incident actually occurred, I
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felt it was unlikely I would have been able to get a better sense of the community of the campus
than I could derive from the materials I accessed remotely.
Participant Interviews
Creswell (2008) suggested that when conducting interviews for qualitative research, the
researcher could use one-on-one interviews with participants as part of the data collection
process. Yin (2009) agreed and considered interview data collection to be one of the most
important types of data collection for case studies because it allows the researcher the
opportunity to gather information they might otherwise not be able to collect from other types of
data collection. Creswell (2008) indicated that the researcher should take care to ask the right
kinds of questions while attempting to allow the participants to freely share their experiences.
Patton (2002) noted the need for the researcher to use a semi-structured approach in an effort to
balance the need to follow approved research protocol with the need to ensure questions are
open-ended that allows the participant to feel free to provide their own perspective.
Utilizing the IRB-approved case study protocol and interview questions found in
Appendix A, the current study used 14 semi-structured questions about the participants’ law
enforcement background, previous training in the area of active shooters, and level of
participation in response to the Umpqua Community College campus shooting on October 1,
2015. The types of questions centered on the participant’s memory of their involvement in the
incident. I began with the least intrusive questions, such as their background in law enforcement
and transitioned to questions more specifically regarding the event. As recommended by Patton
(2002), I concluded with an open-ended question intended to capture any particular memories or
comments not yet covered during the interview.
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Although I followed the approved case study protocol and asked all of the interview
questions, I allowed for some deviation to the order of the questions asked, based upon the
participant’s answers to other questions. I found that some of the participants began speaking
about questions I had planned to ask later in the interview, and I would ask those questions when
the interviewee brought the issue up.
Participant interviews all took place over the phone and began with confirmation the
participant had read the approved case study protocol that outlined their participation in the study
and had been provided the proposed interview questions. (Appendix B). In addition, I ensured
each participant had properly filled out the informed consent form and that I had a copy of it
available in hard copy prior to commencing the interview. Following Yin (2009), this informed
consent form outlined the protection afforded to the participant, including a statement advising
they could refuse to participate or withdraw their participation at any time. The form also
explained that the participant’s identity would not be keep confidential, but the use of the
information gathered during the interview would be subject to applicable law and University of
Arkansas policy. (Appendix C)
I recorded each interview digitally in addition taking comprehensive notes during the
interview. The interviews were immediately transcribed and the audio recordings of the
interviews were downloaded and stored on a password-protected laptop of which I had the only
access to the information.
Document Analysis
In the current study, I followed Yin’s (2009) suggestion of collecting and analyzing
documents in addition to other data collections procedures such as the aforementioned
participant interviews. Creswell (2008) suggested qualitative researchers collect documents such
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as newspapers, written reports of events, mass media products, and official publications. In the
current study, document analysis was an ongoing procedure that occurred over the course of
approximately 8 months. Document analysis began with collecting publicly available stories
from local and national news sources, such as the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times, as
well as major television news media outlets, such as Fox News, NBC News and Oregon Public
Broadcasting. Additionally, I was able to collect official police reports from agencies who
responded to the incident, along with lab reports, audio recordings of victim and witness
interviews, and surveillance video from the college and the pawnshop where the shooter
purchased weapons used in the incident. Table 2 specifies the documents analyzed and notes the
sources of those documents.
Table 2
Public Documents Analyzed, Listed by Agency/Author
Type of Document
Agency/Author of Document
______________________________________________________________________________
Newspaper Articles

Los Angeles Times
New York Times

Table 2, cont.
New York Daily News
The News-Review

Internet Articles

Oregon Public Broadcasting
Newsweek
Reuters
Fox News
NBC News
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Table 2 (Cont.)
Public Documents Analyzed, Listed by Agency/Author
Type of Document
Agency/Author of Document
______________________________________________________________________________
Law Enforcement Reports

Oregon State Police
Douglas County Sheriff
Roseburg Police Department
Douglas County D. A.

Other
Surveillance Video

Umpqua Community College
Associated Buyer Pawn Shop

Audio Recordings

Roseburg Police Department
Oregon State Police
Douglas County Sheriff

Manifesto of shooter

Perpetrator

In all, I collected approximately 265 pages of incident reports from the Oregon State
Police, and approximately 1,377 pages of incident reports from the Douglas County Sheriff’s
Office. In addition to the Douglas County Sheriff’s Office incident reports, I also collected more
than 600 crime scene and incident photographs and more than five hours of audio recordings of
interviews with victims and witnesses. I also obtained nearly two hours of surveillance footage
from both the College and the pawnshop where the shooter purchased at least one of the weapons
used in the incident. Finally, I obtained a copy of the contents of the manifesto written by the
shooter and given to the police by one survivor. These documents included a six-page manifesto,
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articles about previous mass shooting events, as well as articles about police response to active
shooter incidents.
Role of Researcher
Qualitative research requires the author to recognize how their own experiences,
background, and culture can shape their interpretation of the data being collected and can have
an impact on the direction the study takes (Creswell, 2014). I was careful to take into
consideration my personal background and experiences when examining this incident. I made
sure those individuals I interviewed were aware of the scope of my experience and background
in an effort to be completely transparent about the potential bias I might have based on my
background. The benefit of my particular background and experience was it assisted me in the
path the study took, specifically in regards to the access provided to potential participants based
on my law enforcement status as a currently commissioned police officer.
I have been involved in law enforcement for almost 20 years, and the knowledge I
possess in the area of law enforcement response to shooting incidents allowed me to examine the
response to the case studied and compare the response to what I have experienced. That
particular aspect of the study assisted me in identifying themes and implications for practitioners
in higher education that I noted in the conclusion. The drawback to my particular area of
expertise and experience was a potential bias toward those ideas that tended to support firearm
ownership, increased access to firearms, as well as any positive suggestions related to the
handling of the incidents by the police. Additionally, I was cognizant of the fact that since the
interviewees were all police officers with similar amounts of training and experience, there was
the potential that the information participants shared with me was information another researcher
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without that experience may not have collected. I was aware of my potential bias in those areas
when I discussed implications and recommendations for higher education constituents.
Profile of Case Institution
Umpqua Community College (UCC) is a public community college located in southwest
Oregon and was originally founded in 1964. The Northwest Commission on Colleges and
Universities (NWCCU) first accredited Umpqua Community College in 1970. The institution has
a seven-member Board of Trustees who are elected based upon their service districts for fouryear terms. Umpqua Community College offers Career and Technical Education, Community
and Adult Basic Education, and Workforce Development, in addition to offering transfer
programs and serving as a cultural center for the Douglas County area (Nolte & Kelly, 2016).
The college is located six miles north of Roseburg, Oregon, resides on 100 acres of land
overlooking the North Umpqua River, and is composed of 17 buildings on campus, with satellite
locations in Roseburg, Mrytle Creek, and Winston, Oregon. The campus is located in Douglas
County, Oregon, a more than 5,000-square-mile jurisdiction with just over 100,000 residents.
According to the Medicare/Medicaid rules for categorization of counties, Douglas County is
considered “super rural, isolated, and economically distressed” (Nolte & Kelly, 2016, p. 3).
The mission statement of UCC reads, “Umpqua Community College provides accessible
and affordable quality college education, lifelong learning opportunities, workforce training, and
cultural programs for its communities” (Nolte & Kelly, 2016, p. 17). UCC offers nine Associate
of Science (AS) direct transfer degrees, 49 Associate of Arts Oregon Transfer (AAOT) degrees,
and 26 Associate of Applied Science (AAS) degrees. Additionally, UCC offers 56 one-year or
less certificates and an Associate of General Science (AGS) degree. Subjects and majors for
those degrees include nursing, dental assisting, emergency medical service, fire science, and
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automotive. UCC also offers both cultural and recreational activities at its facilities, including the
Swanson Amphitheatre, Whipple Fine Arts Center, and the UCC gymnasium and pool.
At the time of the shooting in 2015, the UCC campus employed security officers who
were not law enforcement officers. Former UCC president, Joel Olson, told the New York Times
that in the months before the shooting occurred, the campus had engaged in discussions about
having armed security officers on campus, but according to Olson, ““The campus was split 5050. We thought we were a very safe campus, and having armed security officers on campus
might change the culture” (Vanderhart, D., Johnson, K., & Turkewitz, J., 2015, p.3). In
November of 2015, UCC contracted with the Douglas County Sheriff’s Office to have a fulltime, commissioned deputy on campus five days a week (Oregon Public Broadcasting, 2015).
According to their website, UCC now employs three full-time and two part-time security officers
certified by the Oregon Department of Public Safety Standards and Training.
Profile of Participants
I initially planned to interview both law enforcement officers as well as individuals from
the institution who were present when the incident occurred, however, the UCC administration
declined to allow their employees to participate in the study. For the current study, I interviewed
seven law enforcement officers from three different agencies that responded to the shooting at
Umpqua Community College. Those participants included the two officers who were the first on
scene and engaged the shooter, three officers who arrived as shots were being fired, a Public
Information Officer (PIO), and the detective who ran the entire investigation. The participants
included:
•

Sgt. Dennis Chrisenbery-Roseburg Police Department. Sgt. Chrisenbery is a
patrol supervisor who joined the United States Navy just after high school. Sgt.
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Chrisenbery attended the Reserve Police Academy at Umpqua Community
College and was hired by the Roseburg Police Department in 2001.
•

Sgt. Jeff Eichenbusch-Public Information Officer for the Roseburg Police
Department. Sgt. Eichenbusch has worked in law enforcement for over 20 years
and has worked as a patrol officer, field-training officer, hostage negotiator,
SWAT team member, and school resource officer.

•

Detective Sergeant Joe Kaney-Roseburg Police Department. Detective Sergeant
Kaney commands the investigation division and was hired by the Roseburg Police
Department in 1992 after he served in the United States Marine Corps. Sgt. Kaney
has served as a patrol officer, member of the SWAT team, and a detective.

•

Lt. Chris Merrifield-Douglas County Sheriff’s Office. Lt. Merrifield holds a
Bachelor’s degree in Criminology and has been in law enforcement for 24 years.
He has served as a patrol officer, field-training officer, SWAT team member,
Street Crimes unit member, Narcotics Team member and investigator. He is
currently the supervisor for the Douglas County Sheriff’s Office investigations
division.

•

Master Officer Tony Powers-Roseburg Police Department. Master Officer
Powers retired from the United States Air Force where he worked criminal
investigations, worked on a tactical team that protected nuclear weapons, and
worked as an Air Force recruiter prior to being hired by the Roseburg Police
Department.

•

Master Officer Vaughn Rains-Sutherlin Police Department. Master Officer
Rains served in the United States Air Force in a law enforcement specialist role
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and has been in law enforcement for 20 years. Master Officer Rains has worked
for the Sutherlin Police Department since 2004 and is an active shooter response
instructor.
•

Detective Todd Spingath-Roseburg Police Department. Detective Spingath has
been employed by the Roseburg Police Department for 18 years. He served in the
United States Air Force security police force and has been a patrol officer, a
SWAT sniper team leader, and a detective.
Data Analysis and Interpretation

According to Creswell (2008), data analysis and interpretation can be problematic as
there is no one agreed upon method for data analysis in qualitative research. Yin (2009) agreed
and argued that data analysis in qualitative research relies upon the individual researcher to
utilize his or her own style and method of thinking. Additionally, Creswell (2014) asserted that
“because text and image data are so dense and rich, not all of the information can be used in a
qualitative study. Thus, in the analysis of the data, researchers need to ‘winnow’ the data” (p.
195). That is to say, unlike quantitative research where the researcher ensures all of the data is
accounted for, qualitative researchers should “aggregate data into a small number of themes”
(Creswell, 2014, p. 195). I was able to aggregate the data into several themes, which were
discussed in the final chapter of the study.
Although no specific method for qualitative data analysis exists, several researchers have
written about methods for organizing the data collected and made suggestions of ways to analyze
the data. I chose to follow both Yin (2009) and Creswell (2008) who suggested the researcher
begin with a large amount of information and work that information down to several specific
themes. I began this task by transcribing the participant interviews and spending a great deal of
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time reading and re-reading these transcripts to become intimately familiar with the content of
the interviews. In addition to reading the transcripts, I also listened to the audio recordings of the
interviews prior to actually beginning the coding process. As suggested by Creswell (2008), I
kept copies of original recordings and transcripts, as well as all other data collected. I kept
duplicate copies of the information on a password-protected computer in a locked office.
Next, I began the data coding process by working with the electronic versions of
transcripts from the participant interviews. Merriam (2009) recommended that “assigning some
sort of shorthand” to the various pieces of data would make it easier to retrieve the data (p. 164).
According to Merriam (2009), the researcher should assign codes based upon both the
participants’ and the researchers’ own input but should closely follow the intended purpose of
the study. I utilized the paper copies of the transcripts and as Creswell (2008) suggested, I placed
the particular codes I assigned to the pieces of data in the left margin of the document and left
the right margin for later theme development. Once I completed the coding process in the left
margin of all the participant interviews, I began to cluster the codes that showed up most often
together into groups of codes (Creswell, 2008). I utilized those groups of codes for the
development of the major themes that emerged in the data analysis and interpretation process.
While coding the participant interviews, I was able to identify themes about their law
enforcement experience, prior training in active shooter response, participation in the active
shooter incident, as well as lessons learned and suggestions for the application of these lessons to
both law enforcement and higher education. This similarity informed some of the implications
discussed in the final chapter of the study.
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Research Trustworthiness
In an effort to ensure I conducted the current study in an ethical manner with the proper
emphasis placed on the trustworthiness of the study’s results, I followed several suggestions by
Patton (2002), Creswell (2008), and Yin (2009). Those suggestions included topics such as the
confirmability of the findings, the validity and reliability of the data, and the credibility of the
findings. It was this attention to detail which I hoped would indicate to other scholars that I was
diligent and meticulous during this process.
Confirmability
Creswell (2008) suggested researchers need reflexivity while conducting their research
projects, stating that “reflexivity means that the researchers reflect their own biases, values, and
assumptions and actively write them into their research.”(p. 58). I have extensive background in
law enforcement, and throughout the process of interviewing law enforcement officers who
responded to this shooting, I was able to follow Creswell’s (2008) suggestion that reflexive
research may “involve discussing personal experiences and identifying how you collaborated
with participants during phases of the project” (p.58). For many of the interviews I conducted, I
found a common theme or experience the participant had mentioned and related how my
experience was similar to theirs.
Validity and Reliability
In order to ensure validity and reliability of the data collected during this study, I
followed Creswell (2014), who noted “qualitative validity means the researcher checks for the
accuracy of the findings by employing certain procedures” and “qualitative reliability indicates
the researcher’s approach is consistent across different researchers” (p. 201). Creswell (2014)
suggested eight primary strategies for ensuring validity and reliability in qualitative research:
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•

Triangulate

•

Use member checking

•

Use rich, thick description

•

Clarify bias brought to the study

•

Present negative or discrepant information

•

Spend prolonged time in the field

•

Use peer debriefing to enhance accuracy

•

Use an external auditor to review the entire project (p. 201-202)

In this study, I followed several of these suggestions to include triangulation, rich and
thick description, clarifying bias I brought to the study, and peer debriefing. For the process of
triangulation, I examined data from multiple sources, both public and private, both from the
living survivors and the deceased individuals, as well as information from those who were near
the incidents when they occurred. For rich and thick description, I examined many sources of
information such as photographs, newspaper articles, interviews with witnesses and those
involved in the actual incident, stories told by individuals who were familiar with the shooters
prior to the incident, as well as governmental and institutional reports generated in the aftermath
of the shootings. I also identified the bias I brought to the study based upon my extensive law
enforcement experience and utilized peer debriefing by meeting with a colleague who is a
qualitative researcher to ensure my study would be beneficial to others in the field.
Credibility
In the current study, the credibility test followed Creswell’s (2008) suggestion that
“validating findings means that the researcher determines the accuracy or credibility of the
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findings through strategies such as member checking or triangulation” (p. 265). I employed both
member checking and triangulation in the current study.
Member Checking. The first aspect of the credibility test included was member
checking. According to Creswell (2008), member checking “is a process in which the researcher
asks one or more participants in the study to check the accuracy of the account” (p. 267). I was
able to ensure accurate interpretation of the data collected during the interviews by transcribing
each interview and sending a copy of the competed interview transcript to each participant.
Participants were asked to verify the transcription as accurate before the coding process began. I
requested participants to review the transcript and provide feedback within 14 days and advised
them that if they did not provide feedback within that timeframe, I would consider the transcript
to be a final version for data analysis. Additionally, once I selected the quotes from participants I
wanted to incorporate in the study, I provided participants a copy of the quotes and an
opportunity to verify the accuracy of the quotes I planned to use before I included them in the
final product.
Triangulation. A second aspect to the credibility test for the current study involved the
concept of triangulation, which Creswell (2008) defined as, “the process of corroborating
evidence from different individuals, types of data, or methods of data collection in descriptions
and themes in qualitative research” (p. 266). In this study, I was able to corroborate evidence that
I learned from document analysis, such as newspaper articles written in the aftermath of the
incident, with statements made by the participants during their interviews. In addition, I was able
to verify information from different participants accounts of their experiences that in many
instances validated the information located in the document analysis.
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External Audit. Finally, I was able to utilize the method of external audit in which I
utilized a colleague with a Ph.D. in Criminal Justice and Criminology to review the project.
(Creswell 2008). I asked my colleague to review my project several times throughout the process
and requested he provide me with both the strengths of the study, along with the weaknesses of
the study.
Chapter Summary
In this study, I chose to examine the shooting at the Umpqua Community College for two
main reasons. The first reason was due to the fact this campus shooting was the deadliest campus
shooting to occur on the campus of a community college ever. Secondly, this campus shooting
was the deadliest shooting to occur on a campus of higher education post the Virginia Tech
shooting.
After I decided which institution to study, I followed Creswell’s (2014) suggestion for the
process of data collection that included the examination of qualitative documents, whether they
were publicly available or private documents I had access to. I utilized different sources of public
documents, such as publications publically accessible from sources such as newspapers and the
Internet as well as investigative reports and documents proved by governmental agencies
involved in the incident. Additionally, I followed Creswell’s (2014) suggestion for ensuring
validity and reliability, which included triangulation, rich and thick description, clarifying bias I
brought to the study, as well as peer debriefing.

84

CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS
The purpose of this study was to examine the law enforcement response to the
deadliest mass shooting at a community college. In an effort to accomplish this purpose, I chose
a qualitative, single-case study approach to answer three main research questions:
1. What was the law enforcement response to the deadliest community college campus
shooting in history?
2. Did previous mass shootings inform the law enforcement response to the deadliest
community college campus shooting?
3. What implications for practice can be derived by studying the deadliest community
college campus shooting?
Summary of Study
This study used multiple sources of information, from official police reports, archives of
publications, and interviews of law enforcement officers who responded to the incident. “Case
study research is generally more exploratory than confirmatory; that is the case study researcher
normally seeks to identify themes or categories of behavior and events rather than prove
relationships or test hypothesis” (Hancock & Algozzine, 2003, p. 16). Case study research was
the most appropriate method for this particular study in that I sought to study the deadliest
community college campus shooting as a way to identify themes emerging from the event and
identify what implications those themes had on higher education constituents.
I interviewed seven police officers who responded to or were very closely involved with
the incident at varying levels, including the investigator in charge of the entire investigation and
the two officers who actually engaged the shooter. I had originally intended to include interviews
from Umpqua Community College, but when presented with my research protocol and request to
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interview individuals from the institution who were present when the incident occurred, the
administration declined to allow their employees to participate.
For each of the participants interviewed, I asked each 14 open-ended, IRB-approved
interview questions (Appendix B). I also followed up some of the responses with additional
probative questions in an effort to ensure I understood the responses correctly. I recorded these
interviews digitally, and once I had the interviews transcribed, I sent an electronic copy of the
transcript to the participant to ensure the accuracy of the transcription. I requested each
participant to review the document and respond with any corrections or clarifications and one
participant responded back within the requested period of two weeks. One of the participants
made minor corrections to phrases in the transcript, but none of the other participants made any
changes.
As previously mentioned, in addition to collecting participant interviews, I also collected
numerous documents. I began by collecting publicly available stories from local and national
news sources such as the New York Times, the L.A. Times, as well as major television news
media outlets such as Fox News, NBC News and Oregon Public Broadcasting. In addition, I
collected official police reports from agencies who responded to the incident, lab reports, more
than five hours of audio recordings of victim and witness interviews, and nearly two hours of
surveillance video from the college and the pawnshop where the shooter purchased weapons
used in the incident. I collected more than 1,600 pages of incident reports from both the Oregon
State Police and the Douglas County Sheriff’s Office. I also collected more than 600 crime scene
and incident photographs. Lastly, I obtained a copy of the contents of the manifesto written by
the shooter and given to the police by a survivor. The computer thumb drive included a six-page
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manifesto, articles about previous mass shooting events, as well as articles about police response
to active shooter incidents.
Overview of Incident
Initial Call
On October 1, 2015, a 27-year-old male student who attended Umpqua Community
College near Roseburg, Oregon, entered a classroom and opened fire on a classroom full of
students. At 10:37 a.m., numerous 911 calls started coming in to emergency dispatching centers
in Douglas County, Oregon. Callers advised that a gunman had entered a classroom in Snyder
Hall on the campus of Umpqua Community College near Roseburg, Oregon and had opened fire.
Caller 1: “There’s an active shooter at UCC right now!”
911 Dispatch: “Ok, UCC. Where at? UCC, what building, do you know?”
Caller 1: “He’s in the science building!”
911 Dispatcher: “1174, Medical Aid, this is for an active shooter at UCC. 1174, Medical
Aid, we have a report of one person shot. UCC, 1140 Umpqua College Road, an active
shooter.” (Douglas County 911 dispatch audio)
Over the course of the next approximately nine minutes, the shooter killed nine people in the
classroom, including the professor, before law enforcement arrived and engaged the shooter in a
gun battle. According to surviving students in the classroom, the shooter ultimately turned his
weapon on himself and committed suicide in what became the deadliest community college
campus shooting in United States history.
Response
Multiple police officers received the dispatch of the active shooter on the campus of UCC
and began responding to the area. Two Roseburg Police Department detectives, Detective Sgt.
Joe Kaney and Detective Todd Spingath, had just left the Roseburg Police Station and were
headed to get a cup of coffee when the call came out. The detectives immediately headed toward
the campus of UCC. Sgt. Dennis Chrisenbery and Master Officer Tony Powers of the Roseburg
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Police Department were also on duty when the call came in and responded to the scene. About
eight miles north of Roseburg in the town of Sutherlin, Oregon, Master Officer Vaughn Rains of
the Sutherlin Police Department and a police trainee had just finished a traffic stop and
immediately responded as well. Douglas County Sheriff’s Office Lt. Chris Merrifield heard the
dispatch over the radio, observed other deputies running out of the Sheriff’s Office, and also
responded to the scene. By 11:00 a.m., law enforcement officers from 13 different agencies
heard the call and responded to the campus, along with several fire and EMS agencies.
Arrival
Detective Sergeant Kaney and Detective Spingath were the first officers to arrive at the
campus of UCC and parked near Snyder Hall. Kaney and Spingath were about to get out of their
vehicle when they heard shots being fired at them. The detectives quickly exited their vehicle
and took a position of cover behind other vehicles in the parking lot near the classroom. The
shooter continued to fire at them but the detectives initially had difficulty locating the shooter’s
position because of the design of the building. Meanwhile, other officers arrived at the scene and
made their way toward Snyder Hall. Some of the responding officers were unfamiliar with the
location of Synder Hall, which delayed their arrival to the classroom where the shooter was
located. As the shooter continued to fire at the officers, Detective Sergeant Kaney and Detective
Spingath were able visually locate the suspect and returned fire, striking the suspect one time.
For the next few moments, no further shots came from the classroom and several students
began to exit the building and run toward Kaney and Spingath. One of the students told officers
that the shooter had taken his own life and was lying on the ground near the front of the
classroom. The detectives rushed into the classroom, secured the shooter in handcuffs, and called
for EMS to be sent to their location. By that time, many other officers had arrived on scene,
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including Master Officer Powers, Master Officer Rains, and Sgt. Chrisenbery. Powers and Rains
entered the classroom just after Kaney and Spingath and began triaging the wounded.
Several of the participants interviewed described the scene inside the classroom. Many of
those details were very specific and quite disturbing. Most of the participants described seeing a
mass casualty event, with several deceased individuals, several wounded individuals, and some
individuals who did not appear to be injured. Officers triaged the wounded as they awaited the
arrival of emergency medical personnel. Out of respect for the victims and their families, I chose
not to include those quotes from participants describing the scene details in this case.
In all, nine individuals, including the professor, were shot and killed, eight individuals
were shot but survived, and four individuals present in the classroom were uninjured. According
to participants, the shooter died of a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head. Response to the
incident included 13 law enforcement agencies, as well as numerous fire departments and
emergency medical service units.
Aftermath
In the hours and days that followed the shooting, law enforcement officers from those 13
agencies continued to investigate this incident. One of the tasks given to officers with the Oregon
State Police was to interview individuals who were present in the classroom during the incident.
OSP officers audio recorded the interviews of three of the students who were in the classroom
but were not injured during the incident. The details these students described helped inform the
present study as I developed implications for practitioners in higher education. Out of respect for
these students, at least one of which has never spoken publically about the case, I chose to refer
to them simply as a student and not by their real names.
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The officers began the interviews by asking the students if they were aware their
interviews were being recorded and each student acknowledge the understood. A student
remembered sitting in class listening to the professor going over the assignment for the day when
they noticed a subject wearing a backpack rush in the classroom. The individual yelled, “I want
everybody on the ground” and fired two shots into the ceiling. The individual told everyone to
get to the center of the room. He pulled off his backpack and said, “It will be a miracle if any of
you survive today.” That same student remembered hearing two gunshots but was not sure if the
shooter was inside or outside the classroom when the shots were fired and also remembered the
shooter telling everyone to get to the center of the room. That student told police:
He then stopped and said, “Hey, you in the back”, and pointed at one of the students, and
said, “You are going to be the survivor today, so come on up here. All of my stuff is in
here [in an envelope] there is a flash drive with all of my stuff. Show this to the police
after I am done.”
Another student told police the shooter looked at him and told him he [shooter] was not going to
kill him [student]:
He said he was not going to kill me if I kept the envelope and gave it to the police after
and then he told me to sit in the back of the class. Right after that, he shot a couple of
students that were on the ground.
Another student remembered being in the front row of the classroom when the shooter entered
the room. That student remembered kneeling down on the ground behind his table near the
professor who was also kneeling. The student told police that the shooter shot the professor in
the head and then shot the student who was directly beside him as well.
The students interviewed by the police that day also talked about how the shooter told
one individual to stand up and he [shooter] asked the individual if they were religious. When the
individual told the shooter they were Christian, the shooter just said, “Ok,” and shot them. The
shooter asked another individual to stand up and asked them if they were religious. The
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individual told the shooter they were Catholic, to which the shooter replied, “Thank you for
standing up for your beliefs” also shot them. Another student told police, “After that, he
[shooter] just started indiscriminately shooting at people.”
Shortly after that, a male subject, later identified as Chris Mintz, arrived outside of the
classroom (I chose to provide his full name here because I felt his heroic attempt to stop the
shooter should be recognized). A student told police:
I heard someone come up to the door, that was Chris Mintz and he [the shooter] was still
in the classroom. I heard him say, “Dude stop!” Then I heard a gunshot and then he
[Mintz] said, ‘Please stop, it’s my kids birthday!’ and then I heard another one [gunshot]
and I heard someone fall.
A different student also remembered Chris Mintz coming to the door of the classroom:
Then the man outside [Chris Mintz] was talking to people, he thought that he might be
telling people to go away The shooter peeked out the door and said he thought he heard
him say something about calling the cops The guy said, ’it’s my son’s birthday, please
don’t shoot me’. I don’t know how many shots he fired; I think it might have been just
one.
Another student told police they remembered thinking that something needed to be done
but the student expressed concern about their safety if they attempted it. That student heard
another student say, “We need to do something or we are all going to die” and the student
recalled,
I remember thinking a couple of different times; we are if we don’t do something. But
there was no way to—If I got up I would have had to go over a body, I would have had to
go through two tables to a guy with a gun. I knew I was going to die if I do that cause no
one else was trying to.”
Shortly after shooting Chris Mintz several times while standing outside the classroom,
the shooter apparently heard law enforcement officers responding to the scene. At that point, he
began shooting outside the classroom at responding officers. During the exchange of gunfire, a
round from one of the police officers hit the subject. A student said:

91

Then the cops showed up and he [shooter] heard them and he peeked out the door and
shot at them, and he did that a couple of times. I think he got hit and then he laid on the
ground for a second and shot himself.
One student who had been lying on the ground looked up and saw the shooter in the front of the
classroom with an apparent gunshot wound to his head. Shortly after the shooter committed
suicide, law enforcement officers entered the room. Another student remembered seeing
Detective Spingath enter the room and told officers that when they saw Detective Spingath, they
knew they were safe.
Background of the Shooter
Once the officers on scene located the deceased shooter, the next step in the investigation
was to learn as much about the shooter as was possible in an effort to ensure there were no other
subjects involved and no further potential victims. Normally the identity of the individual
responsible for a shooting of this magnitude would be important, however, many individuals
who were closely involved with this incident referred to the perpetrator only as the shooter. One
such individual was the Sheriff of Douglas County, John Hanlin. Around 7:15 pm on the day of
the shooting, Sheriff Hanlin addressed the media and made this statement:
We have information that leads us to believe we know who the shooter is. The official ID
will come from the medical examiner’s office. Let me be very clear: I will not name the
shooter. I will not give him credit for this horrific act of cowardice. Media will get the
name confirmed in time… but you will never hear us use it. We would encourage media
and the community to avoid using it, repeating it, or engaging in any glorification and
sensationalization of him. He in no way deserves it. Focus your attention on the victims
and their families and helping them to recover. (Hanlin press conference, 2017)
Additionally, during the interview portion of the study, it became very clear that no
matter which officer I spoke to, no one would mention the shooter by name. Given the obvious
fact that none of the interview participants referred to the perpetrator by name, and out of respect
for the victims and their families, I felt it was most appropriate to refer to him as the shooter for
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the remainder of this study. The name of the shooter in this incident is readily accessible by a
quick Internet search if one is so inclined to learn it.
Investigators learned the shooter was a 27-year-old white male born to Laurel Harper and
Ian Mercer who lived in the Torrance, California area before divorcing when the shooter was
around two years old. Two officers from the Oregon State Police located the shooters’ mother
and interviewed her to learn about the shooter. The shooter’s mother, Laurel Harper, told police
that the shooter never really bonded with his father, and Mercer [the shooter’s father] never
really tried to be a part of the shooter’s life. Harper told the officers that from time to time,
Mercer would call the shooter, but never really kept in touch after she moved to the area of
Roseburg several years earlier. Harper told detectives the shooter “doesn’t like him, never liked
him … he was never a good father.”
Harper remembered the shooter’s early years when he would have such bad tantrums that
she would physically restrain him until he ran out of energy. One time when the shooter was
about five years old, he attempted to jump out of her vehicle as it was traveling down the
freeway.
Harper went on to describe the shooter’s teenage years:
When he was … in his teens, like I said, he had anger issues. He would just, you know,
he would get all kind of, you know, kind of up in my face type thing, and try, and be very
intimidating, and it’s like there’s just like out of control. There was this one time when,
when he pointed a shotgun at me. This was, I don’t know, like five, no, no, six, six years
ago, maybe six, seven years ago. (Harper interview, 2017)
Harper continued to describe the shooter: “I just think he was angry at the world, angry, because
he couldn’t, he couldn’t fit in.” Harper went on to say, “He was not a spontaneous person.
Change was hard for him. Um, but I know that he, he had to have been lonely. He was alone and
he was a loner, and he took, it was difficult for him to commit to people.” When detectives asked
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if she had reported the shotgun incident, Harper said, “No. I was trying to give him every chance
in the book without having a record around his neck. He had enough, you know, obstacles. He
didn’t need that one.”
Harper described another incident when the shooter became very angry with her in the
waiting room of a medical facility and was verbally abusive to her. Because of that incident, the
shooter was placed in a group home, or halfway house, for a period of time. When he was
released, he traveled back to her home and broke into her house through a window. Harper told
the shooter if he was going to expect to stay with her, he would need to show he was going to
turn his life around. Harper told detectives, “I know you hear this all the time, no, he wasn’t bad.
Most people, they’re not really bad. He was very, he was, he was very troubled.”
Finally, Harper described the shooter as someone who did not approve of technology and
new things. “He hated all the, new technology, and he didn’t approve of people who would go
out and buy, you know, buy new things all the time.” Harper went on to say, “He hated
smartphones. Basically, he hated people who used them. He was kind of disappointed in me
because I, you know, I have one.”
In addition to interviewing the shooter’s mother, police interviewed an acquaintance of
the shooter and asked the subject to describe the shooter to them. Cecil Ritchey told police that
he had met the shooter on campus in line at the financial aid office in May 2017. Ritchey told the
police that he and the shooter had spent time together on approximately 10 occasions and were
friends on social media.
Additionally, Ritchey told investigators that the shooter was interested in his [Ritchie’s]
religion, Luciferianism, and was particularly interested in the part of the religion dealing with
sacrifices and black magic. The shooter told Ritchey he had been molested by a preacher at
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church when he was young and he [shooter] believed that Christians should have been Hitler’s
target and preachers deserved to be beheaded. Ritchey advised that the shooter had sent him
some videos on social media depicting Christians being beheaded, which included one video of
two 12-year old girls beheaded.
Finally, around the middle of August 2017, the shooter showed him a gun, which he
described as a rifle with a brown bottom with the rest of the gun being black, and told Ritchey it
was his [shooter’s] insurance when the nation became divided. Ritchey told the police the
shooter believed Christianity should be illegal and thought someone should stop it.
The two previously identified individuals, Harper and Ritchey, were the only two
individuals contacted by law enforcement who knew the shooter in any significant way. The only
other person who was interviewed who knew the shooter was his father, Ian Mercer who,
according to Newsweek, told CNN “The only thing I would like to say, the only question I
would like to ask, is how on earth could he compile 13 guns?” (Ziv, 2015, p. 2). The shooter’s
father, Ian Mercer, also said:
We talk about gun laws. We talk about gun control. Every time something like this
happens, they talk about it and nothing gets done. I’m not trying to say that that’s to
blame for what happened, but if [the shooter] had not been able to get hold [sic] of 13
guns, this wouldn’t have happened. (Newsweek, 10/5/15, p.3)
When asked about his relationship with the shooter, Mercer stated, “He’s my son. He was my
son, you know? There isn’t any kind of disharmony or bitterness or anything like that between
him and I” but Mercer went on to say it had been about two years since he had seen his son last
when they had dinner together.
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Preparation for Shooting
Prepared Manifesto
Shortly after police secured the scene on the day of the shooting, law enforcement
became aware of the existence of a computer thumb drive the shooter had given to one of the
surviving students in the classroom. The shooter told the student he would be spared if he
provided an envelope that contained the thumb drive to the police. When the student left the
classroom after the shooting stopped, he actually just threw the envelope down on the grass
outside the classroom and did not give it directly to the police.
Police began searching for the envelope the student threw down as they exited the
classroom. During the investigation, officers learned that a male subject was seen picking up the
envelope, opening the envelope, putting something in his pocket, and throwing the envelope
away. I obtained an audio recording of an interview with the individual who found the envelope
that contained the thumb drive in the grass, a student named James Perry. In the audio interview,
Mr. Perry told law enforcement officers that he observed an envelope lying on the grass and he
picked it up to see what was inside the envelope. He found a computer thumb drive inside the
envelope and he put the thumb drive in his pocket and threw the envelope away. He told police
he did not know it was involved in the incident but said that, “I thought it was just somebody’s
flash drive that some student dropped cause [sic] they were in a panic” (Perry audio recording,
2017). Police seized the thumb drive as evidence and I was able to obtain a copy of the contents
of the thumb drive.
Once the police had seized the thumb drive, one officer was assigned to examine the
contents of the thumb drive. One of the items on the thumb drive was the shooter’s six-page
manifesto in which he revealed some of his motivation for committing the shooting. In the
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manifesto, the shooter detailed his belief that everyone hated him and he felt he was the most
hated person in the world. He wrote about how he was a very lonely person and felt that he
would return from the dead as a demon to kill again. The shooter called previous mass shooters
“the elite, people who stand with the gods” (Shooter Manifesto, p. 1, 2015). The shooter wrote
about how he believed society would wonder what they could have done to prevent this incident,
but indicated there was nothing anyone could do. He felt that society would never have been able
to give him what he wanted and the only place left for him was in hell (Shooter Manifesto,
2015). The shooter also wrote about the mistakes he felt that previous mass shooters had made:
I have been interested in mass shooters for years. I noticed where they always go wrong
is they don’t work fast enough and their death toll is not anywhere near where it should
be. They shoot wildly instead of targeted blasts. They also don’t take on the cops. Why
kill other people but you won’t take out the cops. (Shooter manifesto, 2015)
He finished the manifesto by listing his favorite music artists, favorite movies, favorite colors
and explained that he did not feel he was mentally ill by saying, “Just because I’m in communion
with the Dark Forces doesn’t mean I’m crazy” (Shooter Manifesto, p. 6, 2015).
Researched Other Active Shooter Incidents
In addition to the shooter’s manifesto, investigating officers located several other files on
the thumb drive. Those files were links to websites about other mass shooters such as the
perpetrators of the Sandy Hook shooting, Colorado movie theatre shooting, and the Virginia
Tech shooting.
According to the investigator’s reports, the shooter had included links to several articles
about the perpetrator and the aftermath of the Sandy Hook shooting. One link was to an article
about morbid items found in the perpetrator’s room, such as photos of dead bodies, videos
depicting suicide, as well as information that advocated for the rights of pedophiles (Shooter
Manifesto, 2015). The thumb drive contained another link to an article written by the New York
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Times that outlined other items found in the Sandy Hook perpetrator’s apartment, including
multiple firearms, ammunition, knives, and a newspaper clipping about the shooting at Northern
Illinois University (Shooter Manifesto, 2015). It also contained a link to the final report of the
Sandy Hook shooting written by the Office of the State’s Attorney Judicial District of Danbury.
In addition to articles about the Sandy Hook shooter, the thumb drive contained several
links to articles about the Virginia Tech shooting, including a link to the final report of the
Virginia Tech Review Panel from 2007. This report was one of the two reports found on the
thumb drive that I had already cited in the current study’s literature review. The thumb drive also
contained a link to an article about the Colorado movie theatre shooter describing how he was in
solitary confinement after his conviction for the murder of 12 people in 2012 (Shooter manifesto,
2015).
Researched Police Response
In addition to research about previous mass shooters, the investigators found the thumb
drive contained links to two articles about police response to active shooters. The first article, “A
Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States Between 2000 and 2013,” (Blair &
Schweit, 2014) was the second article on the thumb drive that was cited in the current study’s
literature review. Additionally, the thumb drive contained a link to an article from the Police
Executive Research Forum, an independent research organization that focuses on critical issues
in policing titled, “The Police Response to Active Shooter Incidents” (2014). Those two articles
were very detailed about specific tactics used by both shooters and law enforcement, which may
have influenced the shooter’s plan of action.
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Firearms Purchase
During the initial response to the shooting, officers on scene located several firearms in
the classroom as well as a duffel bag which was left it the men’s restroom directly across the hall
from the classroom. The duffel bag contained a rifle, additional magazines of ammunition, as
well as a ballistic vest. After searching the crime scene and serving a search warrant at the
shooter’s residence, police located six firearms in the campus crime scene and an additional three
firearms at the residence. Officers seized all of the weapons, both at the crime scene as well as at
the shooter’s residence, and began to research where the shooter had obtained the weapons.
According to police reports, officers located copies of the firearms transaction paperwork
from when the shooter purchased all of the weapons he carried to the campus. According to the
firearms transaction paperwork, the shooter purchased three firearms, a rifle and two handguns,
in 2012. The shooter purchased another handgun in 2013, and purchased the final two handguns
in 2015. One of the handguns that the shooter had purchased in 2015, a .380 caliber HiPoint
semi-automatic handgun, was purchased just two days before the shooting. I obtained
surveillance video from the pawnshop where the shooter purchased the firearm and the video
showed the shooter entered the pawnshop, handled the firearm, filled out the paperwork, and left
the store with the handgun.
Disposition
Law enforcement officers from 13 agencies responded to the deadliest community
college campus shooting in United States history, along with multiple fire agencies and EMS
workers. Law enforcement officers collected more than 300 pieces of evidence from the scene of
the shooting and from the shooter’s residence and interviewed over 150 individuals during the
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investigation. In addition, law enforcement officers followed up on more than 400 leads and
generated more than 100 police reports.
Nine students, including the professor in the classroom, died as a result of gunshot
wounds from a handgun. An additional eight students received at least one gunshot wound but
survived the incident and four students present in the classroom escaped without physical injury.
The shooter turned his handgun on himself and committed suicide just after engaging the first
responding officers in a gun battle. Toxicology reports indicated there were no illegal substances
or prescription medication in the shooter’s blood at the time of the shooting.
As a result of the investigation, law enforcement determined the shooter in this case acted
alone and had not made his intentions known to any family or friends, although the shooter did
leave behind a written manifesto in which he outlined some of his motivation for committing
mass murder.
Themes
Once I completed the data collection and analysis of the participant interviews, several
themes emerged with respect to the law enforcement response to the deadliest shooting on a
community college campus in United States history. Themes that emerged surrounded such
topics as training for active shooter incidents and the changes to that training over time. Other
themes centered on participants expressed disbelief and uncertainty about the actual nature of the
call, unfamiliarity with campus, challenges in locating the shooter, chaotic nature of the incident,
and the complexity of the investigation. The following section outlines those themes using the
data collected during participant interviews.
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Training for Active Shooters
One of the questions I asked the participants was about the type of training in active
shooter response they had been involved in during their career. Most of the participants
interviewed had 15-20 years’ experience in law enforcement and several participants indicated
they had participated in training on how to respond to an active shooter incident during their
career. Some of the participants had prior military experience and indicated their training on
active shooters came during that service.
Master Officer Rains mentioned he was an instructor in active shooter response and
spoke about the early active shooter training. Rains said, “Early attempts on the active shooter
response was you set up a perimeter. You try to assess the situation the best you can, and you
wait for special units to come in.” Sgt. Eichenbusch also remembered participating in active
shooter training through his agency on in his career. Eichenbusch said,
I’ve had some classroom training over the years, where they just talk about active shooter
situations and how to respond to them and different things of that nature. As far as, actual
hands on active shooter training, we’ve incorporated a lot of that into our combat
simulations that we do as an agency.
Eichenbusch went on to say that after the active shooter training scenario was over, the use of
force, defensive tactics, and firearms instructors would give positive feedback to the participants.
He remembered how his early training was basically just, “When you respond to a shooting type
of situation to contain, group up, and basically get that area secured off and then come up with
the plan and go in.”
Detective Sergeant Kaney also remembered the training he received early in his career in
active shooter response. Kaney described that training as, “Back in the [19]90s, it was all about
containment. It was about containing the situation, don’t let it grow…almost like an armed and
barricaded type scenario or a hostage standoff.” This type of philosophy was common for law
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enforcement in the late 1990s, and I have participated in that type of training in my career. It was
not until the Columbine High School shooting occurred in 1999 that law enforcement began to
shift the response to active shooter incidents.
Prior to the Columbine shooting, protocol for an active shooter situation required officers
who arrived at the scene to secure a perimeter and wait for additional backup officers to arrive.
Once enough officers arrived and had the necessary equipment to safely enter the building, teams
of officers would enter the building to locate and stop the shooter. One of the criticisms of the
police who responded to the Columbine shooting was that they waited for additional resources to
arrive and that delay of the entry into the building likely resulted in additional loss of life.
Over the next several years, law enforcement training evolved to a philosophy that
suggested when the first law enforcement officer arrives at the scene of an active shooter
incident, the officer or officers should not delay entry into the building but should go directly
toward the shooter. Participants in the current study indicated they had experienced that change
in philosophy when it came to training for active shooter response and also indicated that a
previous mass shooting at a high school in Colorado had precipitated that change in training
philosophy
Change in Training
Many of the participants talked about the change in law enforcement training that
happened in the aftermath of the Columbine High School shooting in 1999. After the Columbine
High School shooting, law enforcement agencies started to change their active shooter training
from a more static style of training, where you secure the scene and wait for special response
teams, to focus more on quick response and immediate engagement of the shooter. In addition,
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agencies began to incorporate more realistic scenario-based training using simulated weapons
and role players.
Detective Sergeant Kaney remembered a change in active shooter training that took place
at his agency. He noted that immediately after Columbine, his agency began scenario-based
training for responding officers, but it was more geared toward holding a perimeter until a
special response team could respond. Over time, the training changed when the agency came to
realize that the delay in waiting for the special response teams to arrive could cost lives. Kaney
said, “I don’t remember when it was, but there was a change in philosophy. We don’t have time
to wait for the tactical team, so the threat has to be ended well before the tactical team can get
there.”
Additionally, Detective Sergeant Kaney spoke about scenario training that happened
where officers were presented with situations with role players and simulated weapons. Kaney
mentioned that their agency had even used teachers from the schools as role players on teacher
in-service days so the faculty would be familiar with how law enforcement would respond to
such a situation.
Master Officer Rains, who was an active shooter instructor, talked about lessons learned
from the Columbine shooting and about how he modified his training tactics. Rains said,
“Columbine taught numerous lessons, you know, and victims bled out. They could have been
saved had they [law enforcement] had a different response tactic.” Master Officer Rains went on
to talk about the scenario-based training he offers at his agency. Rains said, “We are big in
scenario based training…the body’s not gonna go where the mind hasn’t been. I tell people in
training a lot, by making it [training] more realistic, those guys are ready to go in and face that.”
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When asked how training for active shooters had changed, Master Officer Powers said, “I
know way back, when they used to preach if you responded to an active shooter, you would
always standby for a second officer. Now they teach if you’re the first officer there, you go in
towards the gunfire.” Powers also talked about how his agency began to do scenario-based
training where they used simulated weapons and role players to see how officers responded when
someone was shooting at them.
In the aftermath of the Columbine High School shooting in Colorado, law enforcement
agencies began to rethink their response to active shooter incidents. Many agencies moved from
training their officers to respond to an active shooter incident, secure the scene, and wait for
additional officers and special response units, to training their officers that the first officer on
scene should immediately enter and engage the shooter.
Disbelief/Uncertainty
After completing the data analysis and coding of the participant interviews, several other
themes emerged with respect to the law enforcement response to the deadliest community
college campus shooting. Another theme expressed by participants when asked about what went
through their mind when the call came in was a certain level of disbelief or uncertainty of the
actual nature of the call. As 911 calls flooded into the dispatch center, Detective Sergeant Joe
Kaney of the Roseburg Police Department was already at work for the day. Detective Todd
Spingath had adjusted his shift to arrive at work just before 10:30 due to a scheduled training
class and met Detective Sergeant Kaney in the bottom portion of the building. On that particular
morning, the detectives decided to go for a cup of coffee. Detective Sergeant Kaney
remembered:
So, we were actually—the news, I know said we were out working an investigation or we
were out doing follow up. In reality, we were on our way to Starbucks when the call
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came out. I don’t know how, I think the news maybe jumped to conclusions but, yeah, so
we were on our way for our morning Starbucks run. (Kaney interview, 2017)
Detective Sergeant Kaney pointed out that it was important for law enforcement officers to
remember that no matter what activity they were involved in, even if they are doing something
such as going to get a cup of coffee that a major incident such as an active shooter could happen
at any time and on any day.
Normally, when police officers leave the office, they each take their own police vehicles,
but on that morning, the detectives left the police department in one vehicle. Detective Spingath
remembered how the detectives ended up riding together that morning:
My CID [Criminal Investigation Division] car, we have take-home cars, so I keep my
armory in my trunk. I’ve got my sniper system; I’ve got my AR back there. All my
SWAT gear is back there in the trunk. So we ended up taking Joe’s [Detective Sergeant
Kaney] rig and we are heading to our coffee place. (Spingath interview, 2017)
The initial dispatch notification about the active shooter came over the radio on the Douglas
County Sheriff’s Office frequency. Detective Sergeant Kaney explained, “We heard a County
unit [Douglas County Sheriff], and we are on a shared dispatch system. So we heard a County
unit get a call of an active shooter at Umpqua Community College.” (Kaney interview, 2017)
When asked what went through his mind when he heard the call, Detective Sergeant Kaney said,
I don’t know if Todd [Detective Spingath] and I verbalized it to each other, but at first, I
remember thinking, this is probably some guy that’s killing his girlfriend or significant
other. I thought, this is probably some kind of a domestic dispute or something that is
going on. That’s kinda what’s running through my head. That somebody is there shooting
somebody over some kind of dispute. (Kaney interview, 2017)
Detective Spingath remembered what was going on in his mind when the call came over the
radio:
We were running lights and sirens, but its [the vehicle] is unmarked, and I remember
thinking at this point, shit, man. I am not in my car. I’ve got all my stuff in my car and
now I am starting to do a round count in my head. Well, I have my pistol and I’ve got this
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single magazine and cuff pouch. I am doing a little ammo count in my head and I don’t
have a vest with me. (Spingath interview, 2017)
As the detectives got closer to the college, dispatch continued to provide information about the
shooting. Dispatch advised there were at least two victims down and continual shots were being
heard. Detective Sergeant Kaney remembered, “It slowly starts to sink in that, oh, this is actually
an active shooter. This is the real deal. This probably isn’t just one person there to kill another
person” (Kaney interview, 2017).
Other law enforcement officers interviewed also remembered what went through their
minds when the call of the active shooter came out. Sergeant Dennis Chrisenbery of the
Roseburg Police Department was the corporal in charge of the other Roseburg officers that day.
Sgt. Chrisenbery was in the parking lot of the police department:
I remember being at the parking lot and hearing the radio call come out and I kind of look
at another officer like, ‘If this is real. Why are they only dispatching one officer? Did we
miss something? Is there training going on this morning?’ Because if that was a real
dispatch, I would, with other major calls, we usually hear dispatch dispatch any and all
available officers or they’ll dispatch several different radio units. This one came out and
it sticks in my mind that they only dispatched one unit. So I just remember that being
something bizarre and unusual given the circumstances. (Chrisenbery interview, 2017)
Master Officer Vaughn Rains of the Sutherlin Police Department was field training a new
officer that day and had just finished with a traffic stop. When they got back in their vehicle, they
noticed the MDC, or mobile data computer, in the car was showing an alert of active shooter at
UCC. Master Officer Rains remembered:
We kinda looked at each other, there was nothing on the radio yet and it was –I can’t
remember if it was the first day of duck hunting season, and along the river was the
school [UCC] and it was not uncommon for duck hunters to be around there. So, I am
thinking maybe it’s a duck hunter. We always train for this, you know, and the mentality
is, around here, for a lot of people, ‘Oh, it will never happen here.’ And then, now that
it’s happened, ‘Oh, it won’t happen again.’ (Rains interview, 2017)
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Master Office Rains also remembered something specific about the dispatcher who was giving
out the call on the radio. Normally, this dispatcher would talk very rapidly:
I knew something was wrong because this particular dispatcher, I know her, and she talks
a hundred miles an hour. It’s like she drank twenty Red Bulls before work and she’s just
on fire all the time. But this time she was dead calm. Talked very softly and so in the
back of my mind I know something is up. (Rains interview, 2017)
Master Officer Powers of the Roseburg Police Department was on duty that day and
remembered what went through his mind when the call of the active shooter came over the radio:
I remember that we only had two officers and a watch commander, so it was only three of
us working for the whole city, which is typical. It was like 10:15 and I had walked into a
Little Caesar’s, because you know, you grab something when you can because it gets so
busy. I had ordered a couple of pizzas for myself and a couple of other guys I was
working with. And then, while in there, all I heard was, ‘Active shooter,’ and I thought it
was odd because the dispatch said active shooter and then there was—I mean a pause
seemed like it was forever. And I’m just like, I didn’t know if it was a training. I didn’t
know what it was. He just said, active shooter. So I stepped out of the Little Caesar’s and
that’s when they said there was an active shooter in a classroom at UCC. (Powers
interview, 2017)
Master Officer Powers also remembered thinking for a moment about whether or not he should
respond since it would leave the city unprotected if all of the officers left the city. UCC is located
about five miles outside of Roseburg, which meant the college was actually just outside of his
jurisdiction. That thought was fleeting, however, because shortly after he considered that, “I will
never forget. Deputy Zambrano, who was a forest timber deputy, was driving a truck and I
remember him passing me. He was just hauling so I just tucked in behind him in my patrol car
and we went.” (Powers interview, 2017)
Lieutenant Chris Merrifield of the Douglas County Sheriff’s Office was at work that
morning when he noticed a couple of officers running by his desk, which was not an uncommon
occurrence at the Sheriff’s Office. Many times when high priority calls come into a law
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enforcement agency, available officers move rapidly to their vehicles to respond to the call. In
this instance, Lieutenant Merrifield remembered not knowing exactly what was going on:
We don’t know necessarily what they’re responding to, but I do remember somebody yell
out something like there’s a shooting at UCC. We just—all detectives just started
responding and as we’re responding, we’re finding out that it’s a- that there’s an active
shooter. The first thought of this is this is going to be a one on one thing that happened at
the college. A lot of times it was a domestic type of thing that turns into a shooing.
Typically, that’s kind of our mindset of what it’s going to be. (Merrifield interview,
2017)
However, in this case, as Lt. Merrifield and other officers were responding to the scene, they
found out through dispatch that there actually was an active shooter, that they were shooting
victims, and ultimately dispatch informed them that the shooter was down [neutralized].
Sgt. Jeff Eichenbusch was the Public Information Officer for the Roseburg Police
Department on the day of the shooting, however, he was actually off-duty and at home when the
call came in. Sgt. Eichenbusch remembered a relative sent him a text message and asked him if
he had heard about the shooting at UCC. Sgt. Eichenbusch remembered thinking:
‘What? What are you talking about?’ I started making some phone calls and found out it
was legitimate. Then I was just kind of like, ‘Wow’, I mean this is, this is real. I thought
they had some bad information but then, when I get ahold of my contacts, they’re like,
‘No, it’s really happened.’ I called my captain and said, ‘Hey, I’m coming in’, even
though it was not in the city limits of Roseburg, it’s within a couple of miles and if you
knew our area, we work really closely with all of our outlying jurisdictions. I knew this
was going to be a group effort for all local law enforcement, plus I know federal agencies
and state agencies were on their way. (Eichenbusch interview, 2017)
Although law enforcement officers are trained to expect the unexpected, participants in
the current study indicated they experienced some level of disbelief or uncertainty whether there
was actually an active shooter at the UCC campus and not some other explanation for the call. It
is important for officers to expect the unexpected and not delay the response to a possible active
shooter incident as that delay in response could result in further loss of life.
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Unfamiliarity With Campus
Another theme expressed by the participants was an unfamiliarity with the campus and
uncertainty of exactly where to go on campus. Some of the participants did not actually know the
names of the buildings or the exact layout of the campus, which caused some participants a
degree of anxiety not knowing the quickest and safest way to respond to the active shooter
incident.
Given the fact that the Umpqua Community College campus is not located within any
local city’s boundaries, the Douglas County Sheriff’s Office had law enforcement jurisdiction
over the campus. Not surprisingly, several of the participants who responded to the college were
unfamiliar with the campus since it was located outside their area of responsibility. Law
enforcement officers tend to be familiar with those schools and other buildings within their city
limits but are seldom called to respond to locations outside their jurisdiction.
Sgt. Chrisenbery from the Roseburg Police Department followed several officers on the
way to the campus but was unsure exactly where the buildings on campus were:
I remember thinking, I really don’t know the names of those buildings up in the college,
and I didn’t like that situation because I really didn’t know what the best approach would
be in terms of getting there quickly and getting close but not getting too close so that we
could deploy properly and safely. Thankfully, Officer Dahl was asking the same
questions and he was more familiar with the campus than I was because I think he had
some family members that recently attended out there. (Chrisenbery interview, 2017)
Once on scene, Sgt. Chrisenbery and other officers moved toward Snyder Hall, but his lack of
knowledge of the layout of the campus that continued to concern him. Sgt. Chrisenbery said,
“Not knowing what building we were going to was unnerving because it really felt like it was a
disadvantage.”
Neither Master Officer Rains nor his police trainee were familiar with the layout of the
campus, even though Master Officer Rains had participated in training at the Reserve Police
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Academy on the campus. Master Officer Rains stated, “I taught active shooter at that college but
I’ve never ventured past their gym area…. I didn’t know the lay of the land. They kept saying
Snyder Hall and the science building, I had no idea.” Master Officer Rains knew his trainee grew
up in the Roseburg area, but when he asked the trainee where Snyder Hall or the science building
was, the trainee had no idea. Rains and the trainee exited their vehicle and could hear gunshots
but did not know where they were. Master Officer Rains said, “We jumped out and we’re all
kind of lost, and finally I see someone from Roseburg [Police Department] running towards a
corner, so we followed him.” Master Officer Tony Powers was also unfamiliar with the campus
even though he had been a student at one time:
I went to UCC myself. I got a scholarship at my senior high school and I went up to UCC
but I couldn’t tell you where Snyder Hall was. But we ended up parking a distance from
it. I grabbed my AR and me and Zebrano ran toward where people were pointing. I
remember getting to the classroom and the way the classroom is set up, there were like
three or four classrooms joined and then if you walk out the main doors, it was like a
breezeway that’s covered. (Powers interview, 2017)
As Detective Sergeant Kaney and Detective Spingath got closer to the campus of UCC,
the detectives concluded that they would be the first officers on the scene of this incident.
Detective Spingath talked about how even though he had taught part-time at the Reserve Officer
academy on campus, he also was unsure of the location of Snyder Hall, Detective Spingath
remembered:
We got a little bit more information that there was—they’d mentioned Snyder Hall
specifically, which I wasn’t really sure where it was at. I think Joe [Detective Sergeant
Kaney] had a fairly good knowledge of where it was. We both teach out there. (Spingath
interview, 2017)
In fact, only one of the participants in the current study mentioned they were familiar with the
location of the building where the shooter was reported to be. Detective Sergeant Kaney was an
adjunct instructor in the Criminal Justice program at the college
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I’ve been teaching there for about 10 years, and so, I remember being really worried
because this could be going on anywhere. And fortunately, as we start getting closer,
that’s when dispatch put out that it’s happening at Snyder Hall and I knew where that
was. (Kaney interview, 2017)
Given the fact that the campus of UCC was located outside the jurisdiction of many of the
officers who responded to the shooting, it was not surprising to learn that officers were
unfamiliar with the campus layout and the names of the individual buildings. Fortunately, one of
the first officers who arrived on scene was an adjunct faculty member who taught class on
campus and knew where to go.
Building Design
Another theme that emerged from participants was the difficulty in actually seeing the
shooter once they arrived on scene and began taking fire from the suspect. The main reason
participants had difficulty seeing the shooter was because of the layout of the building.
As other officers converged on the campus, Detective Sergeant Kaney and Detective Spingath
arrived near Snyder Hall and immediately began to take fire from the shooter, who was able to
take advantage of the layout of the building and the officers’ unfamiliarity with the building.
Detective Sergeant Kaney stated:
So I pull up and I put the car in park and right as I am putting the car in park, Detective
Spingath says, ‘Shit, gunshot!’ I heard something but I was too busy ratcheting the shift
lever into park and so—I guess we took a round or there was a gunshot at the moment we
pulled up. So he and I kind of rolled out of our car. So we didn’t take time to vest up. I
remember at that time, this is going to sound silly, but I threw my car keys—I think into
like a flowerbed adjacent to me. I had this strange weird thought in my mind that if I get
killed, I don’t want the guy to be able to get my car. (Kaney interview, 2017)
Detective Spingath also remembered arriving on scene to the sounds of gunfire: “So we pull into
the parking lot from the main road, and no sooner than the Explorer goes into park, through the
closed windows, I hear probably five gunshots.” The detectives then headed toward Snyder Hall
where they could see debris from the windows where the shooter was firing at them. Neither
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officer was able to see the shooter at that point. As the officers approached Snyder Hall,
Detective Spingath remembered taking cover behind a vehicle in the parking lot and Detective
Sergeant Kaney took a position to Detective Spingath’s left.
The main reason the officers had trouble seeing the shooter was because of the design of
the building where the shooter was located. Detective Sergeant Kaney described the building and
the doorway where the shooter was standing:
He was shooting from a doorway and adjacent to this doorway, there’s like a breezeway,
a covered breezeway. Then there’s the corner of another structure that is attached to the
that breezeway, which was actually the restrooms. And so, basically, what he was able to
do was pop out the door, look out into the parking lot, see us approach but he is almost—
the edge of the structure that is the restrooms is almost completely blocking our view of
him. (Kaney interview, 2017)
Detective Spingath also described the difficulty of locating the shooter because of the layout of
the building:
We probably got about halfway through the parking lot where he [shooter] was at the
front entrance of Snyder Hall. The shooting starts toward us. I hear at least two rounds
whiz past us and then there was debris which ended up being the blinds from inside the
classroom. So we split and Joe [Detective Sergeant Kaney] went to my left. The
architecture of the building—you know what a Pizza Hut looks like, kind of that 70’s
style architecture? So that’s basically what this building looks like, just on a larger scale.
(Spingath interview, 2017)
Detective Sergeant Kaney remembered how he finally saw the shooter the next time he [shooter]
fired a shot: “Then he shot and I saw a little bit of movement around where that smoke was…I’m
seeing that gun, I’m seeing a bit of his shoulder.” Kaney went on to say, “And it was at that point
where I was kind of like, ‘Ah, there you are.’ And so then I fired two shots, in pretty rapid
succession.” Detective Spingath also fired at the shooter but there was a bit of a delay because, “I
knew this guy could see me so I relocated to where this van was.” Spingath saw the shooter
through the partially open door and it appeared the shooter was firing at Detective Sergeant
Kaney. He [Spingath] heard two shots from his left, which he assumed, came from Kaney.
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Detective Spingath said, “I could hear debris hit the cars where I was again. So basically I
squeezed off one round while I was on the move” to get out of the way of the shooter.
Since the detectives had to split up in order to keep from being shot and to gain a better
view of the location of the shooter, Detective Spingath was not sure where Detective Sergeant
Kaney was or if he had been hit. Detective Spingath remembered holding his position and trying
to see if Detective Sergeant Kaney was okay. He yelled to Kaney but was not able to see or hear
him. While he was holding his position, Spingath remembered:
I remember a really small-statured Asian girl came out. She was holding the side of her
face, and I see blood on her face and on her hand, and she just came out in a daze. I called
her to me, told her to run, she ran over to where I was, and I couldn’t tell how bad her
injury was by just seeing the blood on it. I asked her where he [shooter] was and she said
she thinks he shot himself, and that he was at the front of the class. (Spingath interview,
2017)
Detective Sergeant Kaney also recalled seeing a female, with an apparent wound to her hand exit
the classroom along with another male subject. The male subject did have blood on him but
Kaney did not think he was injured. They [Kaney and Spingath] gave the subjects commands to
hold their hands where they could be seen, but they [students] ran toward Detective Spingath and
one of them yelled that the shooter was down.
The first responding officers who engaged the shooter indicated they had difficulty
locating the shooter when they arrived on scene because of the building the shooter was in.
Participants described the building as having a breezeway between classrooms that allowed the
shooter to easily lean out of the classroom to shoot at them, but made it difficult to see the
shooter when he did. It was only after seeing the smoke from the muzzle of the shooter’s firearm
that the detectives were able to locate the subject and return fire.
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Chaos on the Scene
Another theme expressed by participants was the chaotic nature of the scene when they
arrived. Officers converged on the scene, but as previously mentioned, some of the participants
were not familiar with the layout of the campus, providing a slight delay in the response to the
building where the shooter was located. Upon determining the location of the shooter and
making their way to the building, several participants remembered the chaotic nature of the
scene.
Sgt. Chrisenbery recalled, “Once we approached Snyder [Hall], we started seeing just
absolute chaos with students kind of all over the place.” At this point, Sgt. Chrisenbery and about
six to eight other officers were moving as a group toward the classroom. Since he was in the
second wave of responding officers, he could hear other law enforcement officers yelling and
someone yelled the shooter was down. Sgt. Chrisenbery recalled:
But really, there was so much chaos and students screaming and running all over the
place and people bleeding. So we were just kind of moving forward, trying to move
forward safely, as best as we could, but move quickly because we didn’t hear any
shooting. I remember because I’ve been to a scene before where the shooting was still
going on and I just remember I’m not hearing shooting so that was probably a little bit of
a good sign. (Chrisenbery interview, 2017)
Master Officer Powers also recalled the scene when he got close to Snyder Hall. As he
approached Snyder Hall, Powers could see there were already some other law enforcement
officers outside the classroom tending to victims in the breezeway. Master Officer Powers saw a
man lying on his side with his hands up and screaming for help. He could also see officers
administering CPR to an individual in the doorway of the classroom. Sgt. Chrisenbery also
recalled seeing the man lying in the breezeway outside the classroom. Chrisenbery said, “I
remember feeling bad because I had to just walk, I had to keep moving past him because it
[scene] wasn’t secure yet and I found out later that was Chris Mintz.” Sgt. Chrisenbery went on
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to say, “He was one of the students there that sort of distracted the shooter and took a whole
bunch of rounds [was shot several times] right there in between the classrooms.”
The initial chaos some participants described on the campus of UCC was not limited to
the campus itself. Sgt. Eichenbusch, the public information officer (PIO) for the Roseburg Police
Department, responded to the reunification center set up at the local fairgrounds, several miles
away from the campus. The reunification center was the location designated for relatives and
others to meet with law enforcement and receive information about their family members who
were on campus at the time of the shooting. The fairgrounds were also the location where
students from campus were transported once being released from the scene. Sgt. Eichenbusch
remembered how when he arrived on scene:
I hate to say this but initially it was chaotic, it was a mess. We, at the time I got there,
there were Douglas County Sheriff’s Office deputies, supervisors, people like that. There
were some people from other outlying, smaller agencies. There were federal investigators
that were showing up from the DEA and FBI, and I mean there were a lot of people there
initially. It was kind of chaotic and it wasn’t real clear on who was in charge and what we
were going to do next. (Eichenbusch interview, 2017)
When asked why he felt the scene at the reunification center was as chaotic as he described, Sgt.
Eichenbusch said:
It [the shooting] wasn’t expected. It [the shooting] was one of those things where
obviously we knew we weren’t immune to it and that it could happen. Of course, we do a
lot of training with active shooters and guys on the ground, but as far as the aftermath, the
stuff you do afterwards, it was all new territory. That was kind of learning on the fly.
(Eichenbusch interview 2017).
Since the campus of Umpqua Community College is located just outside of Roseburg, Oregon,
the Douglas County Sheriff’s Office had jurisdiction over the investigation. Lt. Merrifield of the
Douglas County Sheriff’s office described what he remembered about the scene when he arrived:
Probably within about a mile or so of getting to the campus, I heard on the radio that they
were Code 4 [secure], the suspect was down. I arrived and the chaos, there were already a
lot of people there. You got students moving around, we got a college campus, and it’s
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chaos. I think there were a lot of—my impression was, there were a lot of people in
shock, almost kinda just standing around, not even really sure of what to do or what
happened. (Merrifield interview, 2017)
Detective Sergeant Kaney approached Lt. Merrifield and told him he [Kaney] was sorry he was
not going to be able to help him in the investigation because he was one of the officers involved
in the shooting. Normally, Detective Sergeant Kaney would work closely with Lt. Merrifield on
major cases, but in this incident, since he was one of the officers who shot at the suspect, he was
not able to participate in the investigation.
Although law enforcement officers routinely respond to major incidents and are
accustomed to some degree of chaos at those events, participants in the current study expressed a
degree of surprise as to the amount of chaos they observed when they arrived on scene. Some
participants described seeing students running around, with some of them screaming and some of
them bleeding, as well as other students lying on the ground near the classroom. In addition to
chaos at the scene of the shooting, participants described the chaotic nature at the local
fairgrounds where numerous law enforcement agencies had gathered along with students and
family members of students.
Enormity of the Investigation
Once he arrived, Lt. Merrifield took control of the scene and began to organize the
medical response, began to secure the scene, and started to coordinate with tactical teams in
order to sweep the campus for additional suspects. Additionally, Lt. Merrifield organized the
evacuation of victims and witnesses, identified personnel to work the crime scene, and began
preparing for the next phase of the investigation, setting up an investigation command post. Lt.
Merrifield described the challenges with actually organizing an incident of that magnitude and in
addition knew “all of the people [media, family, other agencies] were going to start arriving; they
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are showing up to do their job or help you with yours.” Lt. Merrifield described how in his
previous experience with large-scale incidents, when those individuals started to show up “they
are doing their job, but doing their job requires them to interact with you, which pulls you away
from what you need to do, so they are an additional drain on your resources.”
Lt. Merrifield set up the investigative command post at the Oregon State Police Office
that was located about a mile away from campus. Lt. Merrifield remembered, “We were able to
set up a command post there, start our investigative command post, started to get people
organized, start working on assignments, and start working on identifying victims.” Merrifield
stated, “In retrospect, we could have made the process easier for ourselves if we had set up a
formal Emergency Operations Center (EOC) early on, but we ended up doing many of the EOC
duties within the Investigative Command Post.” According to Merrifield, other EOC duties were
informally handled at the Sheriff’s Office. He also said that because the Douglas County
Sheriff’s Office is a small agency with limited resources, they had to rely on local responders to
fulfill multiple roles. For example, a local officer who responded to the initial incident might
have later been assigned to handle other duties to assist in the investigation. Merrifield stated,
“Our local responders did an amazing job of fulfilling multiple roles, even in the face of
something so devastating.” Additionally, Lt. Merrifield remembered that even when additional
officers arrived to assist, many of the first responding officers who could have been relieved or
reassigned actually refused to be relieved and continued to work on other tasks that needed to be
accomplished.
Although Lt. Merrifield had experience with previous large-scale investigations and
knew what to expect, he realized the magnitude of this incident was beyond anything he had
experienced. Merrifield said he prepared himself to recognize the scope of what was to come,
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and realized it was going to be more then he could understand. This helped him work through
what was to follow. Merrifield said, “You just have a realization that this is going to be so much
bigger than what you can initially understand. This is going to grow…things are going to happen
that I don’t even know are going to happen.” Merrifield indicated that from an investigative
standpoint they were not trying to find a suspect, but because of the enormity of the event, and
the resulting necessary investigation, the aftermath was overwhelming. Lt. Merrifield went on
to say it helped knowing that other agencies and officers were there to offer assistance in the
investigation. He also said it helped knowing that other agencies and officers were there to offer
assistance in the investigation and noted that the outside agency response and resources they
brought to the investigation were beyond measure. Merrifield indicated that because of those
agencies, much of the work put into the investigation was completed in a matter of days, rather
than weeks. However, he cautioned that the primary agency responsible for the investigation
should realize that those outside agencies and resources will leave at some point and there will
still be a tremendous amount of work to do. Merrifield suggested the primary agency should
prioritize tasks and utilize those outside resources while they are available.
Lessons Learned
When asked about the biggest lessons learned from the response to the deadliest
community college campus shooting, three main themes emerged from the participant’s
responses. Those themes included: (a) the need for officers to continually train and be prepared
for an active shooter incident; (b) the need for communication between law enforcement
agencies; and (c) the need for law enforcement to collaborate with higher education.
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Preparation/Training
Many of the participants in the current study spoke about the need for law enforcement
officers to continually train and be prepared for an active shooter incident. Detective Sergeant
Kaney talked about preparation for an active shooter incident and the need to become familiar
with the institution where the incident may occur. He stated:
My department, we are only five miles down the highway from this campus but we have
never given our officers a walkthrough of the campus, or we’ve never trained them on
what the layout of the campus was, what buildings were where, and what the best route
would be. And in my case, I happened to know where that building [Snyder Hall] was,
but as we were engaging the shooter, there was another team of officers there, probably
10 officers arriving on scene and they were on another part of the campus because they
did not know where to go.
In other words, law enforcement agencies who have institutions of higher education in or near
their jurisdiction should take the time to become familiar with the overall layout of the campus
and the names of the buildings.
Detective Sergeant Kaney also recounted how his response to this incident was
influenced by some research he had previously done about active shooter response. Kaney
remembered reading an article in a police magazine about actives shooters, specifically campus
shooters, which spoke about how in previous mass shooting incidents, a high percentage of the
time when law enforcement engaged an active shooter, the shooter took their own life. Kaney
stated:
It [the article] talked about how in most situations when law enforcement arrives on scene
and engages the shooter, then there’s no more loss of innocent life. And I remember, that
greatly influenced my response to this. And I remember kind of thinking about that
article periodically after reading it. So, you go in there and you find the suspect, make
sure he knows law enforcement is on the scene, engage him as quickly as you can and
you’re gonna limit his movement and therefore limit his access to additional victims.
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Given the fact that Detective Sergeant Kaney knew the location of Snyder Hall and the fact that
he had previously researched law enforcement response to previous mass shootings, it is likely
he was able to save lives by being prepared for an active shooter situation.
Detective Spingath also spoke about the need to be prepared at all times because law
enforcement officers never know when they might be called to respond to an active shooter
incident, either while on duty or off. Spingath stated, “Be prepared with what you have, no
matter what, whether it’s something on duty or something off duty. Don’t take anything for
granted.” Detective Spingath also noted that even if officers routinely prepare themselves,
sometimes things do not go as planned. On the day of the shooting, Detective Spingath rode with
Detective Sergeant Kaney to get a cup of coffee and left his patrol vehicle at the police station.
Spingath said, “I didn’t have a vest, I didn’t have enough ammo and the only thing I could really
rely on was my past training and experience” since he found himself without the resources in his
own vehicle.
Detective Spingath also talked about preparation and how he changed his duty gear setup
after the incident. On the day of the incident, Detective Spingath was wearing normal dress
clothes, his sidearm, and a combination magazine and handcuff case, which limited the number
of rounds he was carrying. Detective Spingath said, “I can tell you, that handcuff magazine
pouch I had, that’s like in a closet floor somewhere. I will certainly never, never only carry one
magazine with me ever again!”
Sgt. Chrisenbery also talked about how in his own preparation for incidents such as an
active shooter, he had prepared a “Go Bag” which is basically a small bag with emergency
supplies such as extra ammunition, knee pads, food, water, and even a tourniquet. He prepared
this bag so he would have extra supplies in the event he was stuck at a major incident for an

120

extended time. Chrisenbery also spoke about the concept of mental preparation and its
importance for responding officers:
To me, the mental training, in some ways, is almost equally valuable as the actual
training itself because I am a firm believer that if you train in your mind that you’re going
to have to resolve and you’re going to have to take decisive action, I think it shortens
your actual hesitation or response time when you actually get there. I think it just better
prepares you to just go into training mode and not have to rely on all the crazy emotions
that may want to run around in your head.
Although Sgt. Chrisenbery had taken the time to prepare additional duty gear to be ready for the
response to an active shooter incident, when he arrived on scene he failed to grab the bag when
he left his patrol car, leaving those additional resources behind. Since he had just recently
prepared the items, it is likely he had not had enough time to train himself to remember to pick it
up when he arrived on scene.
Master Officer Rains said the biggest lesson he learned from his experience with his
response to the incident was the need for fire, EMS, and law enforcement to train together. He
spoke about how training with other public service agencies would be beneficial so that during a
critical incident they could “get these guys on that same sheet of music that when I go through
the door, I know what this guy’s gonna do.” In other words, if agencies train together, they
would already be familiar with each other and would understand what the other agencies would
likely do when they arrived on scene.
Sgt. Eichenbusch also spoke about the need for training, but from a different perspective
than some other participants. Sgt. Eichenbusch believed that law enforcement officers who
responded to this event to be well trained and prepared to end the threat, but had not trained or
prepared for what to do once the shooter had been stopped. Eichenbusch said:
I have no doubt that our guys are trained to respond to the threat and to deal with it. To
get the incident stopped, but it is from that point forward I think where we need most of
our training and communication, especially between different types of community
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shareholders. Like the college, for example. They didn’t think about what they’re going
to do after there’s a shooting on campus. They figured the police will come in and take
care of everything but it doesn’t quite work that way. It’s a lot better figuring that out
when you’re doing training then it is when the real incident is happening.
When asked how law enforcement and colleges could make that happen, Sgt. Eichenbusch said
he would try to bring in as large a group of shareholders as he could. He listed law enforcement,
fire, medical, local hospital, the VA hospital, and the college. Eichenbusch stated:
Get all those shareholders on board and then have those discussions and go through
exactly what would happen if X happened, then what are we going to do as a group and
what areas are we deficient in. Where do we need to make some changes or just be more
prepared for?
In other words, Eichenbusch suggested that the need to train for the response to an active shooter
incident was important; however, he felt that it was also important for agencies to train for the
things that will happen once the shooting stopped and the investigation begins.
Lt. Merrifield talked about how many agencies do not think that they will ever be
involved in such an incident and have not prepared to do so. Merrifield said, “It’s not a part of
daily life, and so, there’s just recognizing or having an awareness that it could happen to you
even when you don’t think it’s going to happen to you.” Additionally, Lt. Merrifield talked about
how higher education institutions should have an emergency plan in place and that he was not
sure that UCC had that plan in place. Merrifield said, “I would probably say from my experience,
what I saw institution-wise, I would say prepare yourself. Have an emergency operation plan that
somebody knows where it is at if you have to activate it.”
Participants in the current study indicated that both physical and mental training for
response to an active shooter helped them in their response to the shooting at UCC. For example,
one participant talked about preparing an emergency supply kit to take to the scene of an active
shooter in the event they were required to stay in one location for an extended period. Another
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participant indicated they had mentally prepared themselves for such an incident and that mental
training assisted them with the actual response to the shooting.
Communication
Another theme that developed when participants were asked about lessons learned in the
response to the deadliest community college campus shooting was the need for communication.
Master Officer Powers talked about communication as being the biggest lesson he learned in the
incident, and how agencies need to be able to talk to each other in order to be aware of what is
happening around them. When the call of the active shooter on campus came into dispatch,
multiple police agencies responded to the incident, but the closest agency to the campus, the
Oregon State Police, were initially unaware of the shooting because they operated on a different
radio frequency than other agencies. Master Officer Powers said,
Right down the street, right off the main road [to UCC], there is a new Oregon State
Police [building], one of their posts is there. I’ve heard rumors that somebody had to
drive by there and inform them because we are not on the same regular channel as their
department is, you know, they have their own dispatcher. And I think somebody had to
drive by and let them know there was a shooting going on at the UCC.
Had the Oregon State Police been dispatched on the same radio system as other law enforcement
agencies, it is possible the response time to the incident would have been reduced since the OSP
office is roughly one mile away from the UCC campus. Reduction in response time may save
lives since officers nearer the incident would get to the scene of the shooting faster and
potentially stop a shooter sooner.
Sgt. Eichenbusch suggested it was important for agencies who are likely to respond to an
active shooter incident to communicate with each other prior to such an event. Sgt. Eichenbusch
said, “I’d probably have to say it’s just to keep communicating and training. A lot of times when
we do EOC training in our region, whether it'd be for floods or natural disaster whatever, we
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need to have those talks and those conversations and get those questions be answered before
something happens.”
The theme of communication is important to not only law enforcement agencies who
respond to active shooter incidents, but to all public service agencies. After the September 11,
2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York City, law enforcement and other
public service agencies in the United States realized that the inability to communicate with the
other agencies who responded to that large-scale disaster created significant challenges in
disseminating information. Unfortunately, over 14 years later, participants in the current study
indicated a possible delay in response by at least one law enforcement agency because that
agency operated on a different dispatch frequency than the other agencies.
Collaboration
Another theme that developed when participants were asked about the biggest lessons
learned was the need for collaboration between all stakeholders, including law enforcement,
higher education representatives, and even the state and local legislators. Master Officer Rains
agreed and described a disconnect between law enforcement and higher education in Oregon.
Rains said,
One thing I have noticed in Oregon, you know, there is a separation between education
and law enforcement. For educators, security is not their priority. It’s not on their priority
list; it’s probably number 100 out of 100. But they need to take a look at that and say,
“Hey, maybe we need to be making an effort to understand and work with law
enforcement and train with them so that we know what to expect from them.”
In other words, if higher education institutions have not made security on their campus a top
priority, the institutions should reach out to the local law enforcement agencies who would
respond to an incident on campus and work together to prepare in the event it were to happen. By
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training and working together, the campus community would become familiar with what to
expect from law enforcement when they arrived on the scene of an active shooter incident.
Detective Spingath also spoke about the importance of training and of collaboration with
higher education institutions for that training. Spingath suggested higher education
administrators fail to recognize the potential for an active shooter incident on campus, therefore,
it is unlikely those administrators will take steps to prepare for such an incident:
The obstacles always fall in kind of the administrative loops where, whatever mindset
they’re in, they live in their little pink fluffy cloud of, “Well, nothing like that’s gonna
happen here.” So joint training [with educators] there has to have an educational training
aspect in this. You know, train, train with one another, be familiar with the campuses, be
familiar with the personnel there. I think police departments don’t have a problem
bringing people up to speed on security issues.
In other words, higher education administrators should seek to collaborate with law enforcement
to train for a potential active shooter situation on their campus, even though the event is unlikely
to occur.
Sgt. Chrisenbery also talked about the need for collaboration between law enforcement
agencies and with practitioners of higher education. Sgt. Chrisenbery noted:
So at the highest levels, we probably need to take a hard look at how we’re going about
keeping our folks safe. And it’s going to need to be collaborative with our legislators, our
politicians involved, and our school administrators. We need to continue to collaborate
across agencies and across borders to come up with the most viable ways to prevent these
things from happening. You can’t prevent everything, but at the same time, it just needs
to be a priority and not go to the wayside just because we have had a couple of good
years in our area.
Lt. Merrifield agreed with other participants who suggested law enforcement and
institutions of higher education should work together in training for the response to an incident
on campus. Lt. Merrifield stated colleges should find out:
How could we do that? How do you liaison with the [law enforcement] responders and
how do you communicate with the responders and share with them those kinds of things?
Who has access to having a master key that could get the cops in every single room to
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clear the campus. Do you have a way to do surveillance? Do you have electronic keys?
Do you have pass keys? Where are those located at? Those kind of little details.
Lt. Merrifield suggested the benefit of collaboration between law enforcement and higher
education would be the ability to quickly and safely evacuate individuals on campus. Merrifield
explained that when the tactical teams were trying to clear different buildings, some people
refused to open the door. He felt this was because the individuals were not aware that it was law
enforcement trying to rescue them since they had never been trained on what to expect from law
enforcement in the event such an incident occurred. Lt. Merrifield recommended that institutions
keep an updated emergency operations plan available, with several copies at different locations
on campus, so depending on what area is affected, there should be a copy available to find.
When asked about the biggest lessons learned from the response to the campus shooting
at UCC, participants shared several examples which centered on three themes. One theme was
the need for law enforcement to continually train and prepare for an active shooter incident, even
though it may never actually happen. Another theme was the need for law enforcement agencies
to be able to communicate with each other on the same radio system and for communication
between entities who are likely to respond to an active shooter incident. Additionally,
participants indicated the need for collaboration between law enforcement and institutions of
higher education so that each entity learns what to expect from each other in the event an active
shooter situation occurs.
Chapter Summary
The purpose of the present study was to examine the law enforcement response to the
deadliest community college campus shooting in history. I interviewed seven law enforcement
officers who responded to or were closely involved with the response to the incident. I also
examined more than 1,500 pages of incident reports from law enforcement agencies, more than
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600 crime scene photos, more than five hours of audio recordings as well as the documents left
by the shooter in his manifesto. Several themes emerged when examining that response including
the previous experience in active shooter training as well as changes that occurred in active
shooter training after the Columbine High School shooting. Additionally other themes emerged
such as law enforcement officer’s disbelief or uncertainty of the actual nature of the call, law
enforcement’s unfamiliarity with the layout of the campus when responding to the call, and the
significant amount of chaos that ensued when officers eventually arrived on scene.
Finally, when asked about the biggest lessons that they learned from their response to the
campus shooting at UCC, participants shared several examples that centered on three themes.
One theme was the need for law enforcement to continually train and prepare for an active
shooter incident, even though it may never actually happen. Another theme was the need for law
enforcement agencies to be able to communicate with each other on the same radio system and
for communication between entities who are likely to respond to an active shooter incident.
Additionally, participants indicated the need for collaboration between law enforcement and
institutes of higher education so that each entity learns what to expect from each other in the
event an active shooter situation occurs. It was those themes and lessons learned by the officers
that informed the present study’s conclusions and recommendations for law enforcement and
higher education discussed in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Overview of the Study
While relatively rare, mass shootings on campuses of higher education are concerning to
all constituents. When the news of another mass shooting at an institution of higher education
appears, Americans seem surprised it happened again. Although campus shootings are not a
recent phenomenon, as they have happened on college campuses as early as the 1960s, the
frequency of those shootings has increased. The purpose of this study was to examine the
deadliest community college campus shooting in United States history in an effort to develop
implications for practice for both law enforcement and higher education constituents.
To address that purpose, the current study focused on three specific research questions:
1. What was the law enforcement response to the deadliest community college campus
shooting in history?
2. Did previous mass shootings inform the law enforcement response to the deadliest
community college campus shooting?
3. What implications for practice can be derived by studying the deadliest community
college campus shooting?
Data Collection
I employed a qualitative, single-case study method to answer the research questions.
According to Creswell (2008), qualitative research “relies on the views of the participants;
…describes and analyzes these words for themes; and conducts the inquiry in a subjective,
biased manner” (p. 46). The current study examined a single case, the deadliest community
college campus shooting in history, and a single-case study design was the method best situated
for studying the event. To ensure I was able to examine the case as intimately as possible, I
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conducted interviews with seven law enforcement officers who responded to or were closely
involved with the response to the incident. I attempted to gain permission to interview
participants employed by the institution studied who were present on campus during the incident,
but the administration declined to allow their employees to participate.
In addition to collecting and analyzing the interviews of the participants, I collected and
analyzed publically available reports and newspaper articles available on the Internet over the
course of approximately eight months. Sources included the New York Times, Los Angeles
Times, Fox News NBC News and Oregon Public Broadcasting. Additionally, I collected official
police reports from agencies who responded to the incident. Those reports included law
enforcement interviews with victims and witnesses, lab reports, video surveillance, audio
recordings of interviews and police dispatch radio traffic.
Analysis of Themes
After completing the data analysis and coding of the participant interviews, several
themes emerged with respect to the law enforcement response to the deadliest community
college campus shooting. In addition, other themes developed that surrounded lessons learned
and had implications for both law enforcement and higher education. I developed Table 3 as a
summary of those themes and presented them within the context of the current study’s research
questions.
When asked about what participants remembered about their response to the shooting,
participants remembered: (a) uncertainty and disbelief, (b) unfamiliarity with the location of the
incident, and (c) the level of chaos present when they arrived on scene. When asked how
previous mass shootings influenced their response, the participants indicated: (a) training in
active shooter response changed over time and (b) the Columbine High School shooting in
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Colorado had a greater influence on their response than any other mass shooting. Finally, when
participants were asked what implications their experience could provide for law enforcement
and higher education, participants recommended: (a) training, (b) communication, and (c)
collaboration between law enforcement and higher education.
Table 3
Summary of Research Questions and Themes
Research Question One: What was the law enforcement response to the deadliest community
college campus shooting in history?
______________________________________________________________________________
Theme
Subtheme
Uncertainty and disbelief

Feeling unprepared

Unfamiliarity with location

Feeling at a disadvantage

Level of chaos at the scene

Varied with timing of response

Research Question Two: Did previous mass shootings inform the law enforcement response to
the deadliest community college campus shooting?
______________________________________________________________________________
Theme
Subtheme
Training for active shooters

Scenario-based training increased
Use of simulated weapons

Training changed after Columbine shooting

Officers trained not to wait

Deadliest campus shooting in history did not inform

Columbine shooting changed response

Research Question Three: What implications for practice can be derived from studying the
deadliest community college campus shooting?
______________________________________________________________________________
Theme
Subtheme
Training

Training for aftermath of shooting
Mental training
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Table 3 (Cont.)
Research Question Three: What implications for practice can be derived from studying the
deadliest community college campus shooting?
______________________________________________________________________________
Theme
Subtheme
Communication

Able to hear other agencies dispatch
Between all stakeholders

Collaboration between law enforcement and higher education
Research Question One: What was the law enforcement response to the deadliest
community college campus shooting in history?
When participants in the current study were asked what they remembered about their
response to the deadliest community college campus shooting in United States history, several
main themes emerged. First, the officers remembered experiencing disbelief and uncertainty as
to whether there was actually an active shooter at the campus. Second, participants expressed a
feeling of disadvantage for not being familiar with the UCC campus and the particular building
where the shooter was located. Last, participants remembered significant chaos at the scene upon
their arrival.
Uncertainty and disbelief. The first theme noted during data analysis and coding of
interviews revolved around the level of uncertainty and disbelief that an active shooter incident
was actually occurring at UCC. Six of seven participants in the current study expressed either
initial disbelief that an active shooter incident was happening or an uncertainty that the incident
was actually real and not a training exercise. For example, one participant received text messages
from family members alerting them to the event. The participant called their supervisor to see if
it was really happening. The participant said, “Then I was just kind of like, wow, I mean this is,
this is real. I thought they’ve [family members] had some bad information but then, when I get
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hold with my contacts, they're like, ‘No, it’s really happened.’” Another participant thought there
must have been a training exercise going on somewhere because:
If that was a real dispatch, I would—with other major calls, we usually hear a dispatch,
[they] dispatch any and all available officers or they'll dispatch several different radio
number units. This one came out and it sticks in my mind that they only dispatched one
unit.
Two of the seven participants thought it might not be an actual active shooter incident but
rather a domestic homicide situation where an estranged husband had shot his wife. One
participant said, “I remember thinking this is probably some guy that’s killing his girlfriend or
his significant other. I thought this is probably somebody there who’s [sic] some kind of a
domestic dispute or something is going on.” Another participant thought it could be duck hunters
shooting guns near campus since duck hunting season had just opened and the campus was
located next to the river where duck hunters liked to hunt. The participant went on to say, “we
always train for this, you know, and the mentality is—around here for a lot of people, ‘oh it will
never happen here.’”
Overall, a majority of the participants, even though they were law enforcement officers
who are trained to expect the unexpected, were surprised when they learned the incident was
actually an active shooter on the campus of UCC. This theme of uncertainty and disbelief as to
the actual nature of a call of an active shooter has implications for law enforcement officers in
other agencies. The potential for officers to react and question the true nature of a call, therefore
delaying the response to it, is a real concern to law enforcement officers. Any delay in response
to an incident could potentially result in the loss of life or an increase in the number of victims. It
is important for officers to react quickly when notified of an active shooter in an effort to
respond as quickly as possible.
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Unfamiliarity with location. The second theme that emerged with the participants was
the fact that a majority of the responding officers were unfamiliar with the layout of the campus.
During the current study’s incident, 911 calls were made from individuals on campus and
dispatchers learned that the shooter was located in a building called Snyder Hall. Dispatchers
notified responding officers the shooter was located in a classroom in Snyder Hall. Four of the
seven participants indicated they were unfamiliar with the campus layout or the names of any of
the buildings. One participant stated, “I remember thinking I really don’t know the names of
those buildings up in the college, and I didn’t like that situation because I really didn't know
what the best approach would be in terms of getting there quickly.” Another participant was a
former student of UCC and when asked about the reported location of the shooter, he stated, “I
wasn’t familiar, you know. I went to UCC myself. I got a scholarship at my senior high school, I
went up to UCC and I couldn’t tell you where Snyder Hall was.” Another participant had been
on campus before to teach an active shooter course to the police academy recruits but was also
unfamiliar with the layout of the campus or the names of the buildings. They stated, “I taught
active shooter at that college but I've never ventured past their gym area… I didn’t know the lay
of the land … they kept saying Snyder Hall, and the science building, I had no idea.”
Only two of the seven participants were actually familiar with the campus and the
buildings. Both of those participants indicated their familiarity with the campus was because they
had previously taught or currently taught at the college. One participant said, “I teach at the
Reserve Academy out there, but I was kind of familiar with that building [Snyder Hall].” The
other participant who was familiar with the campus said, “I teach part-time at that college in the
criminal justice program. So I’m somewhat familiar with the campus … and fortunately… when
dispatch put out that it’s happening at Snyder Hall and I knew where that was.” Fortunately,
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those two participants were the first officers on scene of the active shooter incident and engaged
the shooter prior to his suicide in the classroom.
Level of chaos. The third theme expressed by participants was that of the level of chaos
they remember upon arriving at the scene of the shooting. In the current study, six of the seven
participants talked about the chaos at the scene, whether on the campus or at the other locations
associated with the incident. One participant remembered: “I remember hearing people yelling
that the shooter was down. But really, there was so much chaos and students screaming and
running all over the place and people bleeding.” Another participant said, “I hate to say this but
initially it was chaotic, it was mess… It was kind of chaotic and it wasn’t real clear on who was
in charge and what we were going to do next.” Another participant noted, “I arrived and [it was]
chaotic, there is [sic] already a lot of people there. You got students moving around, we got a
college campus and it's chaos.”
Although a majority of the officers spoke about the level of chaos, it is important to note
that one of the seven participants talked about the scene and did not describe it as chaotic. The
participant noted, “I don't remember anybody screaming hysterically anywhere. It was just quiet.
Until people, first responders, everything and that’s when it started to get loud.” The participant
explained, “Before that, I just remember it being quiet and that really struck me as odd and you
know looking back on it, people were actually in shock.”
There are two possible explanations for the participant’s experience. First, given the fact
that the participant was there as the shooting was still going on, it is possible that not very many
people had recognized or understood exactly what was happening , therefore, they may have still
been calm. A second explanation is the possibility the participant experienced some auditory
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exclusion while responding to the scene. According to Honig and Lewinski (2008), auditory
exclusion occurs in stressful situations such responding to an active shooter:
Auditory exclusion or selective attention in the auditory sense also begins to occur with
an increase in stress as attention is then focused on the perceived threat. Under these
circumstances, information deemed not relevant to the primary task at hand is simply
filtered out (p. 134).
In either instance, it is significant to note that out of the seven participants, only one participant
indicated a marked lack of chaos as was described by all other participants. Further research into
auditory exclusion and the degree of chaos experienced at active shooter incidents should be
considered in the future.
Research Question Two: Did previous mass shootings inform the law enforcement response
to the deadliest community college campus shooting?
The purpose of Research Question Two was to explore whether previous mass shootings
informed the law enforcement response to the deadliest community college campus shooting.
Participants described their training for active shooters and indicated that a change in training
occurred after a previous mass shooting that took place at a high school in Colorado.
Interestingly, none of the participants indicated that the mass shooting at Virginia Tech informed
their response to the UCC shooting.
Training for active shooters. I asked participants to describe their previous training in
response to active shooter incidents and several participants indicated that there had been a
change in that training over time. Many of the participants had been employed in law
enforcement for 15-20 years and several of the participants spoke about their initial training for
active shooters. The participants indicated the change was from a mostly static style of
containment of the scene and waiting for special response teams to arrive to a more scenariobased training that placed officers in mock situations to teach them how to respond in a more
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proactive way. Those scenario-based training exercises included the use of role players, which
was more realistic since the officers had to interact with real individuals. Also, since the training
evolved to use role players, several participants indicated that their agency began to incorporate
simulated weapons into the scenarios. Simulated weapons are functioning weapons that are
modified to hold either blank cartridges that make sound or projectiles made of a paint marking
substance. When asked why they believed their agencies made the change to that type of
training, participants indicated they believed it was in response to lessons learned in the
aftermath of the Columbine High School shooting.
Training changed after Columbine shooting. When asked how active shooter training
had changed over time, several of the participants mentioned the Columbine High School
shooting as the incident that changed law enforcement response to active shooter incidents. In
1999, two students entered the Columbine High School armed with firearms and improvised
explosive devices. The students spent the next 45 minutes moving throughout the school and
killing or injuring students and teachers. The shooters detonated several pipe bombs and a
propane bomb. In all, 12 students and a teacher were killed and numerous others were injured.
Police responded to the scene and stayed outside the school while waiting for tactical teams to
arrive and assemble. Meanwhile, the shooters continued to shoot students and ultimately
committed suicide while police waited to gather the necessary resources to enter the building.
One law enforcement officer who responded to the UCC shooting said, “Back in the 90s,
it was all about containment. It was all about containing the situation and don’t let it grow.” The
participant went on to say, “Then slowly over time…there was a change of philosophy, and that
was, ‘We don’t have time to wait for the tactical team, the threat had to be ended well before the
tactical team can get there.’” Another participant said: “its [active shooter training] much more
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developed now, I think. Prior to the Columbine shooting, there was this theory about how you
gather up three or four guys together. Don’t go in there by yourself.” That philosophy changed as
a result of the lessons learned from the law enforcement response to the Columbine shooting.
When I began my career in law enforcement in the late 1990s, I was trained that when
responding to an incident such as a shooting, officers should wait until they had an adequate
number of other officers and appropriate weapons available prior to entering the scene. Just a
few short years after, the training changed and now the standard law enforcement active shooter
training teaches the officers that when an event happens, the first law enforcement officer or
officers who arrive on scene should move directly to the sound of the shooting in an effort to
engage the shooter and end the threat. There is an inherent danger with this type of response;
however, the need to end an active shooter incident as quickly as possible outweighs the amount
of risk placed on law enforcement officers when responding to such an event.
Virginia Tech did not inform response. Surprisingly, none of the participants indicated
that Virginia Tech had any influence on their response. One participant indicated they were
aware of the Virginia Tech shooting and had read an article about police response to active
shooters but the article was not specific to Virginia Tech. Nearly all of the participants
mentioned the change in training in response to active shooters that occurred as a result of the
Columbine High School shooting. One possible explanation as to why participants did not
mention the lessons learned from Virginia Tech could have been the geographic location of this
incident. The UCC shooting happened on the West Coast, and the Virginia Tech shooting
happened on the East Coast. It is possible there was less exposure to the Virginia Tech shooting
in Oregon than in other parts of the country. Another potential geographic explanation could also
include the fact that the Columbine shooting was closer to UCC, therefore, it might have had a
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greater impact on law enforcement officers in Oregon, than it did on officers closer to Virginia
Tech. A third possible explanation was the amount of time that had elapsed between the
Columbine shootings and the Virginia Tech shooting. Law enforcement may have had time to
learn lessons from Columbine, and implement those changes; therefore, law enforcement officers
were not as impacted by the Virginia Tech recommendations. Finally, with a perceived
disconnect between law enforcement and higher education that at least one participant indicated
existed, law enforcement in that area may not have even been aware of the recommendations
from Virginia Tech. It is possible that law enforcement officers directly affiliated with an
institution of higher education were more influenced by the recommendations from the Virginia
Tech shooting than law enforcement officers who had no higher education affiliation other than
having a college campus inside or close to their jurisdiction. Since UCC was a small community
college that did not employ law enforcement officers on campus prior to the shooting and not a
major research institution with a dedicated law enforcement presence, it is possible that
participants in the current study were not particularly influenced by the recommendations from
Virginia Tech.
Research Question Three: What implications for practice can be derived by studying the
deadliest community college campus shooting?
Finally, participants were asked about lessons learned from their response to the scene of
an active shooter. Three additional themes emerged during data analysis and coding of
participants’ response to Research Question Three. The purpose of this question was to identify
what implications for both law enforcement and higher education that could be derived from
studying the deadliest community college campus shooting. Those themes developed included:
(a) both mental and physical training, (b) communication, and (c) collaboration between higher
education and law enforcement.
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Training. When asked about the biggest lessons learned from their response to the
deadliest community college campus shooting, five of seven participants indicated that law
enforcement should continue to train as they currently do but should consider training with other
law enforcement agencies as well as fire and EMS agencies. One participant stated, “You know
that in our county it is uncommon for us (multiple police, fire, and EMS to intermingle [for
training] in incidents like this.” Another participant indicated that continuous training, both
mental and physical, is very important for law enforcement officers in order to keep them from
becoming complacent. The participant stated, “those of us who have been on the job for a while,
it becomes easier to become lax and let those things slide as we get more comfortable on the
job.” When asked what they recommended to keep officers from becoming complacent, the
participant said, “Just try to change things up and throw out curve balls just to change it up so it
doesn’t get comfortable.”
When asked about the biggest lesson learned from the incident, another participant noted
“You know, train, train with one another, be familiar with the campuses, be familiar with the
personnel there.” Another participant said, “The more you can be prepared for it then obviously,
you know, that you train and train and train and train and then after a while it just becomes
habit.” The participant went on to say, “If you do that from the very beginning to the very end,
it’s a lot more useful. It’s a lot better figuring that out when you’re doing training than it is when
the real incident is happening.”
In addition to training prior to the incident actually taking place, one participant indicated
law enforcement should train for the aftermath of the incident, not just the response to the
shooting itself. The participant noted:
I have no doubt that our guys are trained to respond to the threat to deal with it and to get
to the incident stopped. But it’s from that point forward I think where we need most of
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our, most of our training and communication especially between different types of
community shareholders. Like the college, for example, I mean college… they didn’t
think about what they’re going to do after there’s a shooting on campus. They figured the
police will come in and take care of everything but it doesn't quite work that way. I think
that's where training really needs to focus is all the way through to the end.
Another participant mentioned training when they offered advice to law enforcement officers
responding to an active shooter incident. The participant said, “I know it sounds a bit cliché but
it’s kind of simple, it comes down to doing what you’re trained to do and using your head, and
not let the situation overwhelm you despite the gravity of it.”
Finally, one participant spoke about the need to mentally train and prepare for response to
an active shooter incident and indicated they felt mental preparation for the incident is just as
important, if not more important, than the actual physical training. The participant said,
To me, the mental training in some ways is almost equally is valuable as the actual
training itself because I’m a firm believer that if you train in your mind that you’re going
to have resolve, you're going to take decisive action in those kinds of things. I think it
shortens your actual hesitation or response time when you actually get there. I think it just
better prepares you to just go into training mode and not have to rely on all the crazy
emotions that may want to run around in your head. So, I think it just helps to create a
resolve overall in terms of a mindset when you train, when you think on those things and
mentally prepare for them.
Officers in the current study spoke about the need to continue training as being one of the biggest
lessons they learned in their response to the deadliest community college campus shooting.
Participants indicated that it is not only important to train with each other in the same agency, but
that training should also include other law enforcement agencies as well as other emergency
service workers.
Communication. A second theme that emerged from the participants when asked about
lessons learned from their response to the incident, two of the seven participants indicated the
need for communication. While both participants mentioned communication, each had a
different reason for their recommendation.
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The first participant spoke of the need to be able to communicate between agencies while
responding to an active shooter incident. In the current study, multiple agencies responded to the
incident, but they were not all on the same radio frequency. The Oregon State Police operated on
a separate frequency than other agencies in the Douglas County area. The OSP had an office just
a mile down the road from the campus but did not hear the initial dispatch. One participant said:
“They [OSP] are not on our dispatch system so they got the call really late, and so, as we went by
them with lights and sirens, there was a trooper just starting to pull out of their station.”
Although the first law enforcement officers arrived on scene less than five minutes after the first
911 call, it is possible that if the State Police and local agencies would have heard the call on the
same frequency, response time could have been reduced.
The second participant who mentioned communication spoke of the need for law
enforcement to communicate not only within their own agencies, but across other agencies as
well when designing and participating in training for major events. The participant noted:
We need to have those talks and those conversations and get those questions answered
before something happens…have those discussions and go through what would happen if
X happens. Then, what are we going to do as a group…where do we need to make some
changes or just be more prepared.
Officers in the current study also talked about the need for law enforcement agencies to be able
to communicate when the call of an active shooter incident comes in. Additionally, participants
spoke about the need to communicate between law enforcement agencies when developing
training for response to active shooters.
Collaboration between law enforcement and higher education. Finally, when
participants were asked about lessons learned in their response to the incident, four of the seven
participants mentioned the need for collaboration between law enforcement and higher
education. Additionally, three of the seven participants indicated the burden of initiating that
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collaboration fell on the shoulders of both law enforcement and higher education. For example,
one participant stated, “First and foremost, I mean the responsibility of the security on the
campus lies with the campus, lies with the school. But, law enforcement agencies that service
campuses also need to be proactive about it.” The participant also stated,
I know my agency does that so we have officers in the high schools and whenever there
is a large gathering or festival or something along those lines, where we know people
who are going to congregate, we as an agency reach out to the people organizing that and
we come up with the plan. So we take it upon ourselves. So, I think they need to be a
little bit of both, I think both sides need to take responsibility for it.
In other words, law enforcement often prepares for large-scale events they know are going to be
held in their jurisdiction by reaching out to those venues and the organizers of the event before
the event in an effort to prepare for such a large gathering. Law enforcement should take the
same approach to the potential of an active shooter incident on a college campus and reach out to
the campus beforehand to make preparations.
Another participant agreed that law enforcement and higher education should work closer
together but felt there was a degree of disconnect between the two groups. The participant noted,
“One thing I have noticed in Oregon, you know, there is a separation between education and law
enforcement. For educators, you know, that security isn't their, their responsibility. It’s not on
their priority list.” He went on to suggest that higher education make an effort to collaborate with
law enforcement because “they need to take a look at that and say, ‘Hey, maybe we need to make
an effort to understand and work with law enforcement and train with them so we know what to
expect from them.”
When asked about their experience in responding to the deadliest community college
shooting in history, several themes emerged in their answers. Participants in the current study
expressed a level of uncertainty and disbelief that the incident was an actual active shooter event.
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Most participants were unfamiliar with the location of the active shooter event, which created
some degree of discomfort when they arrived on scene. Additionally, participants spoke of the
level of chaos that existed when they made it to the campus. Participants in the current study
indicated the recommendations that came after the Virginia Tech shooting did not influence their
response; however, they noted a change in active shooter response and training did occur after
the Columbine High School shooting. In addition, participants in the study recommended law
enforcement officers continue to train for active shooter incidents and that higher education and
law enforcement should work together collaboratively in preparation for such an event.
Limitations
As discussed in Chapter III, I chose a qualitative, single-case study design to examine the
deadliest campus shooting at a community college. The intent of the current study was to
examine that one specific shooting, so the case study design itself limited the current study.
While Yin (2009) recommended the necessary steps to conduct case studies, the details of how to
accomplish those tasks were largely left up to the individual researcher. The choice to study this
single case came with several other limitations due to the limited scope of the study.
The current study included interviews of seven police officers directly involved in the
response to the incident. Those officers interviewed were purposefully selected through snowball
sampling. I did not interview every officer who responded to the incident, as once I had
completed those seven interviews, I felt I had reached the point of saturation with the officers
who agreed to participate. I felt it was unlikely I would gain more insights into the response, as
the officers I spoke to were the first of the officers on scene, two of which actually engaged the
shooter. Since the incident ended quickly, officers who responded after the participants
interviewed would not likely have had additional information not gleaned from the participant
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interviews. While it was most appropriate to select the participants in this manner, this limited
sample size prevented me from broadly applying the results of the study to other incidents. The
findings in this study were intended to inform law enforcement and higher education about
themes identified by the responding officers, however, they may not be the same themes
identified by other officers responding to other campus shootings.
Additionally, there were other limitations to the current study such as the length of the
participant interviews, inability to interview college representatives, and the fact that the
participants were identified by name in the study. Each participant phone interview lasted an
average of one hour, which limited the amount of data collected and limited the time for
additional follow-up questions. In addition, I originally planned to interview participants from
the institution studied to gain their perspective into the law enforcement response to the shooting.
I contacted the institution and presented them with my research protocol and a request to
interview several members of the institution, such as faculty or administrators who were present
for the incident. The institution administration denied my request for their participation citing the
fact that there were pending lawsuits surrounding the shooting, the fact that the official police
report had not been released, and indicated their institution had not officially debriefed following
the incident.
Yet another limitation to the current study was the fact that I identified the officers who
participated in interviews. Since local and national media outlets had already identified those
officers as having participated in the police response, I felt it was unlikely I could keep their
identities confidential. Given the fact that the officers were identified by name in the study, it is
possible that some of their responses were different than they would have been had their
identities been kept confidential. Finally, given the fact that I conducted the interviews by phone
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and I did not actually travel to the scene, it is possible that I missed some of the context and
unique atmosphere of the incident. However, since so much time had elapsed since the incident,
it would be unlikely I would learn much about the atmosphere of the scene.
Implications for Future Research
Research into school shootings across all educational institutions should be conducted in
the future in an effort to discern if the findings in this study hold true for other institutions of
higher education as well as primary and secondary schools. Since the specific purpose of this
study was to examine the deadliest community college campus shooting, it is not likely the
findings in this study will transfer to every institution of higher education or to all primary and
secondary schools. Additional research about the law enforcement response to shootings at other
institutions as well as response to shootings on the grounds of primary and secondary schools
could reveal additional findings valuable to all constituents. Some suggestions for specific areas
of further research could include: (a) examining police response to other active shooter incidents
on campuses of higher education, (b) expanding the study to include not only higher education
but primary and secondary schools, (c) interviewing individuals affiliated with higher education
and primary and secondary schools, (d) interviewing law enforcement officers anonymously, and
(e) conducting a follow up study with the members of the UCC faculty and administration once
the institution settles the lawsuits and has an opportunity to officially debrief the incident.
There are three of the above-mentioned suggestions I feel would be the most valuable as
a way to expand the current study’s findings. First, I originally planned to include participants
from the institution studied, but, as previously mentioned, the institution declined to participate
in the study. The lack of participation from the institution was one of the limitations noted in the
current study. In its refusal to participate, the UCC administration cited the fact that there were
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lawsuits pending against the institution and the college had not yet officially debriefed the
incident with its members. As a recommendation for future research, once the lawsuits are settled
and the campus has the opportunity to debrief the incident, it would be beneficial to contact the
institution and request permission to interview some of the faculty, staff, and administration and
gather their perspective of the incident. The lack of perspective from the institution that
experienced the deadliest community college campus shooting leaves a gap in the current
research into shootings on higher education campuses.
Additionally, a limitation of the current study was the fact that the participants were not
anonymous. Given the fact that participants were aware their responses were not confidential,
and had the potential to be read by their peers and even supervisors, it is possible the participants
did not fully divulge their thoughts and feelings about their response. Another recommendation
for further research would be to interview officers who have responded to other campus shooting
incidents and present them with the same interview questions as were presented to participants in
this study. This additional research would help determine, what, if any similarities exist in law
enforcement officers’ response to campus shootings when the participants know their identities
are confidential.
Finally, it would be beneficial to interview police officers who have responded to other
campus shootings geographically situated closer to Virginia Tech. As previously noted,
participants in the current study did not seem influenced by the Virginia Tech Review Panel’s
findings. As a recommendation for further research, it would be valuable to determine whether
the recommendations that came from the Virginia Tech Review Panel had a greater influence on
the response to officers geographically closer to Virginia Tech and those who work for four-year
institutions (rather than local governments) than the officers who responded to the UCC
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shooting. Information from the current study has added to the current knowledge and additional
suggested areas of research would contribute significantly to the study of higher education
campus shootings.
Implications for Practice and Policy
After studying the deadliest campus shooting to occur on the campus of a community
college, several implications for both law enforcement and higher education practice were
apparent. Given the fact that higher education and law enforcement form a synergistic bond in
the aftermath of a campus shooting, some of the implications for practice apply to both law
enforcement and higher education fields. Conversely, some of the implications for practice and
policy must be addressed by each field independently. The following section examines the
implications for law enforcement specifically, higher education specifically, and also discusses
implications that impact both law enforcement and higher education collectively.
Law Enforcement
Although police officers are aware that an active shooter incident can happen at any time,
even trained law enforcement officers are surprised when a campus shooting occurs. In the
current study, several participants indicated a degree of disbelief that the incident was actually an
active shooter. Some of the participants remembered thinking that there was some other
explanation for the call, such as a training exercise they were not informed about. One of the
participants even stopped to think about whether they should actually respond to the incident at
all.
Given the fact that some participants had difficulty believing there was really an active
shooter at UCC, there may have been a slight delay in their response. One implication for
practice and policy for law enforcement would be the need for law enforcement officers to
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immediately respond to the call of an active shooter when dispatched, even if there could be a
different explanation for the actual nature of the call. By limiting the delay in the response time,
it is possible that additional victims would be saved due to a more rapid law enforcement arrival
on the scene.
In addition, law enforcement officers in the current study expressed concern about their
unfamiliarity with the campus, specifically the building where the active shooter was located.
When the call about an active shooter on the campus of UCC came in, participants indicated that
they were familiar with the location of the campus; however, they were unfamiliar with the
layout of the campus or the names of any of the buildings. The UCC campus is not located
within the city limits of any of the responding officers’ jurisdiction and those officers may have
never even actually been to the campus. While it was not surprising that responding officers did
not know the layout of the campus, their unfamiliarity with the campus caused some of them to
respond to a different part of the campus, which delayed their response to the actual classroom.
Again, any delay in locating and stopping an active shooter could result in further loss of life.
Given the fact that many of the law enforcement officers who responded to the campus
were unfamiliar with it, another implication for law enforcement practice and policy is the need
for agencies to become familiar with any institution of higher education within a reasonable
response distance from their jurisdiction. Officers routinely train and learn the layout of
businesses and schools within their jurisdiction but may not be familiar with those higher
education institutions outside their jurisdiction. Law enforcement should reach out to those
institutions to gather maps of the campus, names of the buildings, layout of the buildings, and
locations of entrance and exit from the campus. Law enforcement should include that
information in field training of new officers as well as for current officers in an effort be more
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informed about the layout of the campus in the event of an active shooter. The more familiar
with the campus the officers are, the less likely there will be a delay in the response to the
campus in the event of an active shooter, which could potentially save lives.
Finally, participants in the current study talked about their previous active shooter
training and indicated that the training never prepared them for the aftermath of the shooting.
The participants indicated that the training generally prepared them for response to the scene,
how to deal with the immediate threat, but never included what the officers should expect once
the shooter had been stopped. According to the participants, law enforcement active shooter
training evolved over time from a philosophy of responding to the scene, containing the
situation, and waiting for special response teams to a philosophy of responding to the incident
and immediately locating and engaging the subject. Participants also spoke about the change to
scenario-based training exercises that included the use of role players and simulated weapons.
Given the fact that officers only routinely train for the response to an active shooter
incident, another implication for law enforcement practice and policy would be the need to
design training scenarios that begin with the aftermath of an active shooter incident where the
shooter was neutralized. The scenario could work forward from there to train them on what to
expect in the aftermath of the shooting. Many of the participants spoke about the chaos that they
experienced once the shooter had been located and was deceased. In the aftermath of the
shooting, multiple law enforcement, fire, and EMS agencies responded along with the news
media, family members of students on campus, and various other interested parties. Law
enforcement training for the aftermath of the shooting could include training on how to triage
wounded persons, how to communicate between all responding agencies, and how to deal with
the news media and bystanders. Additionally, that training could include not only immediate
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responders such as fire and EMS workers, but also hospitals, medical examiners, and even
temporary morgue workers if necessary. The scenarios could be tabletop exercises where
representatives of all interested parties gather in a large conference center and discuss what their
response and responsibilities include. Emergency management officials often conduct such
exercises to prepare for large-scale events such as natural disasters. However, law enforcement
training could be adapted to cover the response to an active shooter incident since many of the
same agencies are involved.
Higher Education
While the focus of the current study was to examine the law enforcement response to the
deadliest community college campus shooting, implications for higher education practice and
policy developed after interviewing officers who responded to the incident. It is important to
note that while the current study was limited to law enforcement officers’ perceptions, some of
the recommendations made by the participants apply to institutions of higher education.
First, participants indicated that institutions of higher education should have a plan in
place to address what will happen before and after an active shooter incident on their campus. In
other words, administrators of higher education should realize that there is a chance their campus
could be affected by an active shooter and have a plan in place to deal with it in the event it
actually occurred. Although shootings on the campus of a higher education are a relatively rare
occurrence, the possibility still exists. An implication for higher education practice and policy
would be to develop a strategic response to the potential threat of an active shooter and have a
plan in place to address it if it happens. Administrators should not only develop a plan, but it is
incumbent upon them to communicate that plan to the students, faculty, and staff at their
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institution. It is not enough to simply design a plan; the institution must take the additional step
of training members of the campus about the plan.
Along with the implication of the need for higher education to develop a plan for an
active shooter, participants in the current study suggested that higher education also work with
local law enforcement agencies prior to an active shooter event in an effort to learn what the law
enforcement response will be. A participant in the current study indicated that while clearing the
buildings on campus after the shooter was deceased, they had trouble in removing some
individuals from their classrooms because those individuals did not believe it was actually the
police. Therefore, an additional implication for higher education practice and policy is the need
to become familiar with what the law enforcement response to their campus would entail, from
how law enforcement will deal with the shooter, triage wounded students and staff, and what the
officers would do after the shooter is stopped. Many students, faculty, and staff may be unaware
that the police will search all of the buildings on the campus after the shooter is located to ensure
there are no additional suspects. If students, faculty, and staff are trained for what to expect from
the law enforcement response, they may be able to further assist the law enforcement efforts to
conclude the incident and eliminate the uncertainty the campus may experience if they are not
aware of what to expect.
Law Enforcement and Higher Education
Some of the implications derived from the current study tend to affect law enforcement
practice and policy separately from higher education. Those implications such as the need to
respond as quickly as possible, the need to be familiar with the campus, and the need to train for
the aftermath of an active shooter are specific to law enforcement. Likewise, implications for
higher education policy and practice tend to affect only higher education. Those implications
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such as the need to develop a plan to prepare for an active shooter, and the need to learn what to
expect from the law enforcement response and communicate that to their constituents are
specific to higher education. Although those implications are specific to each group, there are
implications for practice and policy that affect law enforcement and higher education
collectively.
For example, most participants in the study indicated a high degree of chaos at both the
shooting scene as well as at the location of the reunification center at the fairgrounds.
Participants spoke about seeing students near the classroom where the shooter was located
running around and screaming, with some of them bleeding. Additionally, one participant talked
about how chaotic the scene at the fairgrounds was which was supposed to be the location where
family and friends would be reunited with students. In reality, because of the numerous law
enforcement representatives that gathered at the fairgrounds, there was confusion about who was
in charge and what information should be given. An implication for both law enforcement and
higher education practice and policy is the need for both groups to realize that there is likely to
be a high degree of chaos at the scene of an active shooter and steps should be implemented to
ensure the timely release of information. If both groups understand and plan for there to be chaos
at the incident, appropriate direction can be given to employees on both sides who have the
responsibility to organize the scene and the subsequent release of information.
A second implication for both law enforcement and higher education centered on the
need for law enforcement and higher education to collaborate when training for and developing a
response to an active shooter on a college campus. Several participants spoke about how they
believed there was a disconnect between the two groups and recommended that both work
together in developing training and implementing training for their representatives. For example,
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one participant believed that UCC did not have a plan in place to respond to an active shooter
and therefore the campus was unprepared. Another participant felt that, in general, higher
education administrators do not give much thought to the possibility of an active shooter event at
their campus. Additionally, some participants indicated they believed that the campus
community was not aware of how the police would respond to such an event, and because of that
lack of knowledge, it made it difficult for law enforcement to complete their responsibilities.
An implication for both law enforcement and higher education practice and policy, is the
need for both entities to reach out to each other and develop a response plan that includes both
sides interests. Such a response plan should include training together, not only for the response to
the incident, but also for the aftermath of the shooting. This collaboration between law
enforcement and higher education should have the single focus of mitigating the loss of life in
the event a subject enters the campus and starts harming individuals present. For law
enforcement, it should include knowledge of the campus, the names of the buildings, and access
to the campus. For higher education, it should include knowledge of what law enforcement will
do when they arrive on the scene of an active shooter. If both entities are familiar with each
others response, it will likely reduce the response time to resolve an incident and thus has the
potential to save lives.
Chapter Summary
This chapter discussed the findings and drew implications for practice and research from
a qualitative, single-case study of the Umpqua Community College campus shooting on October
1, 2015 in Roseburg, Oregon. The UCC campus shooting was the deadliest community college
campus shooting in United States history and was the deadliest campus shooting to happen on
any campus of higher education since the Virginia Tech shooting in 2007. The purpose of the
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study was to examine the law enforcement response to the deadliest community college campus
shooting in an effort to identify themes and implications for both law enforcement and higher
education constituents. Additionally, the current study sought to examine law enforcement active
shooter training to see if previous mass shootings informed the law enforcement response to the
deadliest community college campus shooting. Finally, the current study examined lessons
learned by the law enforcement officers who responded to the incident in an effort to identify
implications for both law enforcement agencies and higher education administration, faculty,
staff, and students.
This chapter identified areas of future research into higher education shootings.
Suggested areas of further study include examining other shootings that happened on higher
education campuses, interviewing individuals from other institutions who experienced campus
shootings, and expanding the study to include primary and secondary school shootings to
determine if findings in the current study could be more broadly applied to other incidents. These
recommendations will help address the current gap in the research concerning shootings at
educational institutions.
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Appendix B
Interview Questions

A Case Study of the Umpqua Community College Campus Shooting

Proposed interview questions

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

What is your current title?
How long have you been in your current position?
Can you tell me how you came to have a career in law enforcement?
How did you come to work for LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY?
Can you describe any training regarding active shooters?
Did any of this training change over time?
Can you describe what you remember about the mass shooting that occurred at Umpqua
Community College in October 2015?
8. Was this your first experience with an active shooter situation?
9. If not, how did your first experience with an active shooter situation guide your response
to this active shooter incident?
10. What recommendations would you have for police departments and community colleges
given your experiences on that day?
11. In what way did your previous training regarding active shooters guide your response to
this mass shooting?
12. What is the biggest lesson you took away from your experience with this campus
shooting?
13. In what ways has your experience with this active shooter incident changed your planned
response to another active shooter situation?
14. What sort of obstacles did you encounter when you responded to the call of an active
shooter?
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Appendix C
Informed Consent

Title: A Case Study of the Umpqua Community College Shooting

Investigator(s): Tim Wilson, Doctoral Candidate
University of Arkansas
College of Education and Health Professions
Higher Education Program
324 Graduate Education Building
Fayetteville, Arkansas 72701
479-575-3208

University of Arkansas
Office of Research Compliance
109 MLKG
1424 W. Martin Luther King, Jr.
Fayetteville, AR 72701
Office: 479-575-4572

Faculty Advisor: Dr. Michael S. Hevel
Assistant Professor of Higher Education
College of Education and Health Professions
(RHRC)-Rehabilitation, Human Resources,
And Communication Disorders
324 Graduate Education Building
Fayetteville, Arkansas, 72701
479-575-4924
Description: The present study will offer a case study of the mass shooting at Umpqua Community
College in October 2015. The purpose of these interviews is to examine the response to the
shooting at Umpqua Community College from the perspective of individuals who were involved in
the response or present when the incident occurred. Each interview is expected to take 45-60
minutes. Each interview will be audio recorded for the purposes of transcription and the original
recording will be destroyed after transcription. The interviewee will be identified by name in the
transcript and subsequent use of any quotes in the study.
Risks and Benefits: The benefits include contributing to the knowledge base of the effects of mass
shootings on campuses of higher education. There are no anticipated risks to participating in the
study.
Voluntary Participation: Your participation in the research is completely voluntary. You may choose
at any time to discontinue the interview. You will have the opportunity to preview the questions to be
asked as well as being able to examine the proposed use of any quotes documented in the interview
before they are published in the study.
Confidentiality: Your identity will be safeguarded by the researcher and all information obtained by
the researcher will be held on a secure laptop and hard drive which the researcher will have the
exclusive access to. All information collected will be kept confidential to the extent allowed by law
and University policy. Right to Withdraw: You are free to refuse to participate in the research and to
withdraw from this study at any time. Your decision to withdraw will bring no negative consequences
— no penalty to you.
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Informed Consent: I, _____________________________________, have read the description,
(please print)
including the purpose of the study, the procedures to be used, the potential risks, the confidentiality,
as well as the option to withdraw from the study at any time. Each of these items has been explained
to me by the investigator. The investigator has answered all of my questions regarding the study,
and I believe I understand what is involved. My signature below indicates that I freely agree to
participate in this study and that I have received a copy of this agreement from the investigator.
________________________________________________ _________________________
Signature
Date
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Appendix D
Member Checking Email
A Case Study of the Umpqua Community College Shooting
Principal Researcher: Tim Wilson
Faculty Advisor: Dr. Michael S. Hevel

From: Wilson, Timothy
Sent: [DAY, MONTH XX, 2017]
To: [PARTICIPANT]
Subject: Interview transcript
[PARTICIPANT],
On [DATE], you participated in an interview as part of a research study I conducted regarding
the shooting at the Umpqua Community College.
First, thank you for your participation. As anticipated, your participation yielded valuable
information that will help inform my research findings and contribute to the larger body of
research on campus shootings.
Second, I’ve attached a record of your interview. To ensure that research findings are as
accurate
as possible, I request that you review the record and provide me with your feedback. Please mark
your comments on the document itself or attach a document with your comments.
Please note that your feedback is requested by [DATE], after which date I will assume you
approve the record as it is in its current form. I will provide a follow up email when I select
which actual quotes I will be utilizing, if you wish.
I hope you’ll give the document your careful attention. Feel free to contact me as you review
the
record if you have questions, comments, or concerns.

Tim Wilson
Assistant Professor
Criminal Justice Administration
Missouri Southern State University
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Appendix E
Institutional Review Board Documentation
A Case Study of the Umpqua Community College Shooting
Principal Researcher: Tim Wilson
Faculty Advisor: Dr. Michael S. Hevel
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